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INTRODUCTION 
Only twice in the last century, in 1919 with the Treaty of Versailles, 
and two years ago with the comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty,1 
has the Senate rejected a significant treaty sought by the President. In 
both cases, the international agreement received support from a ma­
jority of the Senators, but failed to reach the two-thirds supermajority 
required by Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution.2 The failure of 
the Versailles Treaty resulted in a shattering defeat for President 
Wilson's vision of a new world order, based on collective security and 
led by the United States. Rejection of the Test-Ban Treaty amounted 
to a major setback for the Clinton administration's arms control poli­
cies and its efforts to promote American participation in international 
efforts at regulatory cooperation. In both cases, presidents raised the 
concern that a minority of the Senate could frustrate an international­
ist American foreign policy and thereby turn the nation toward isola­
tionism. 
According to most international law scholars and authorities, how­
ever, both presidents easily could have evaded the Treaty Clause by 
submitting their international agreements as statutes. Instead of navi­
gating Article H's advice-and-consent process, presidents have sent 
many international agreements to both houses of Congress for simple 
majority approval. Known as congressional-executive agreements, 
these instruments are indistinguishable under international law from 
treaties in their ability to bind the United States to international obli­
gations. Several recent agreements of significance, such as the North 
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")3 and the World Trade 
1. See Sen. Jon Kyl, Maintaining "Peace Through Strength": A Rejection of the Compre­
hensive Test Ban Treaty, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 325 (2000). 
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the Ad­
vice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators pres­
ent concur."). 
3. See North American Free Trade Agreement, done Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 
I.L.M. 289. 
February 2001] Laws as Treaties? 759 
Organization ("WTO") agreement,4 have undergone this statutory 
process. Not surprisingly, presidents have favored this easier route to 
making international agreements. While in the first fifty years of 
American history, the nation concluded twice as many treaties as non­
treaty agreements, since World War II the nation has concluded more 
than ninety percent of its international agreements through a non­
treaty mechanism.5 
Despite the fact that the constitutional text includes a specific 
Treaty Clause but no other means to enter into international agree­
ments, a broad intellectual consensus exists that congressional­
executive agreements may serve as full substitutes for treaties. As Pro­
fessor Louis Henkin, the dean of American foreign relations law 
scholars, writes, "it is now widely accepted that the Congressional­
Executive agreement is available for wide use, even general use, and is 
a complete alternative to a treaty."6 Declares the Restatement (Third) 
of United States Foreign Relations Law: "The prevailing view is that 
the Congressional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative 
to the treaty method in every instance."7 Under this theory of "inter­
changeability," congressional-executive agreements and treaties are 
indistinguishable from one another, with the result that the former 
may enjoy all of the benefits that accrue to the latter, despite the eas­
ier method for enacting statutes. Rather than a supermajoritarian bar­
rier to international agreement-making, the Treaty Clause becomes 
merely an alternative method for making contracts with other nations. 
According to this logic, President Bush could now resubmit the Test­
Ban Treaty to Congress for approval by majority vote, and President 
Wilson could have brought the United States into the League of Na­
tions through a statute, even after the defeat of both agreements in the 
Senate. Few constitutional provisions seem so easily evaded. 
4. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat. 4809, 33 1.L.M. 1 125. 
5. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 15 (Comm. Print 1993) [herein­
after SENATE 1993 REPORT]. While these nontreaty numbers include both congressional­
executive agreements and sole executive agreements, most of these agreements appear to 
have undergone approval by both houses of Congress. See id. at 16. 
6. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 217 
(2d ed. 1996) [hereinafter HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS]; see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY (1990); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990); Philip R. 
Trimble & Jack S. Weiss, The Role of the President, the Senate and Congress with Respect to 
Arms Control Treaties Concluded by the United States, 67 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 645 (1991). 
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STA TES 
§ 303 cmt. e (1987). 
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This striking divergence between the constitutional text and prac­
tice is not just a matter of intellectual curiosity. International agree­
ments today are assuming center stage in efforts to regulate areas such 
as national security, the environment, trade and finance, and human 
rights.8 In order to establish effective global solutions, treaties have 
come to resemble domestic legislation in directly mandating norms of 
public and private conduct.9 As international agreements increasingly 
assume the function of statutes, the treaty power - an executive 
power that excludes the House of Representatives - threatens to 
supplant the domestic lawmaking process, even in areas within Con­
gress's Article I, Section 8 competencies.10 At the same time, inter­
changeability raises the prospect that statutes could fully replace trea­
ties, which raises the mirror-image problem that Congress could come 
to exercise executive powers in areas where treaties have force beyond 
domestic statutes. While this may not have presented much of a prac­
tical problem in an era when the Commerce Clause's reach was 
thought to be virtually limitless, the Supreme Court's recent federal­
ism decisions - which, for example, have limited Congress's authority 
to expand civil rights protections11 - make clear that significant areas 
still exist where treaties provide the sole constitutional source for na­
tional regulatory power. Interchangeability would permit statutes to 
evade the restrictions on Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, just as 
globalization threatens to allow the executive treaty power to invade 
the domestic lawmaking process. 
Explaining the constitutionality of the congressional-executive 
agreement is a matter not just of intellectual coherence, but of practi­
cal economic and political importance. Today, about one-quarter of 
the gross national product arises from international trade, whose rules 
are set by the NAFf A and WTO agreements.12 If all international 
agreements must undergo the supermajority treaty process, it is likely 
8. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and 
the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956-57 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, 
Globalism]. 
9. See id. at 1967-69. 
10. In other work, I have argued that, for textual and structural reasons, treaties which 
seek to regulate areas within Article I, Section 8 subject matters should be deemed non-self­
executing, so as to preserve Congress's monopoly over domestic legislation. See generally 
John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of Non-Self­
Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2233-57 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Non-Self-Execution]. 
11. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); College Sav. Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). For criticism of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in­
validating civil rights statutes as beyond congressional power, see, e.g., Robert C. Post & 
Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After 
Morrison and Kimel, 1 10 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). 
12. See ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. No. 105-176, at 216 (2d 
Sess. 1998). 
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that America's ability to participate in a new world of international 
cooperation will be hampered. On the other hand, use of a constitu­
tionally illegitimate method would throw America's participation in 
the world trading system into doubt. Not only would constitutional 
questions undermine the validity of current congressional-executive 
agreements, they also would raise problems for America's ability to 
engage in ever more intensive efforts at international cooperation. 
Uncertainty about the constitutionality of the congressional-executive 
agreement may inhibit the ability of the public lawmaking system to 
embrace novel efforts to craft international solutions in response to 
the effects of globalization on areas such as international finance and 
economics, security, the environment, and human rights. 
Resolving the looming conflict between globalization and the 
American public lawmaking process requires us to consider carefully 
the scope of treaties, the reach of statutes, and how to reconcile the 
two. Within the context of the debate over the constitutionality of the 
congressional-executive agreement, this Article will develop a theory 
that allows us to understand the difference between treaties and stat­
utes and the subject matter appropriate for each - a difference that 
permits us to maintain important distinctions between international 
lawmaking and domestic lawmaking in an age of rapid globalization. 
This distinction provides the foundation for determining when con­
gressional-executive agreements are a constitutional mode of interna­
tional agreement. Unfortunately, our leading constitutional scholars 
have failed to understand that the debate over the congressional­
executive agreement actually embodies deeper structural questions 
concerning the proper relationship between the treatymaking and the 
domestic lawmaking processes. 
Instead of seeking to harmonize the respective scopes of treaties 
and statutes, many in the academy have embraced extreme positions 
that eviscerate either the treaty or the congressional-executive agree­
ment. Traditional international law scholars, for example, too willingly 
embrace complete interchangeability while brushing aside severe tex­
tual and structural problems with eliding statutes and treaties. Profes­
sors Bruce Ackerman and David Golove also defend full interchange­
ability, but only on the basis of their provocative and idiosyncratic 
theory of unwritten constitutional amendments.13 Professor Laurence 
Tribe, on the other hand, argues that congressional-executive agree-
13. See Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional, 108 HARV. L. 
REv. 799 (1995). For more complete articulations of the "constitutional moments" theory, 
see 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANS­
FORMATIONS). 
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ments like NAFT A and the WTO violate the Constitution.14 Because 
the Constitution only addresses international agreements in the Treaty 
Clause, Tribe concludes that all significant international agreements 
must undergo a supermajority vote in the Senate - a theory of treaty 
exclusivity. Ackerman, Golove, and Tribe fail to see that the question 
of the congressional-executive agreement actually turns on the proper 
line between the executive treaty power and Congress's legislative 
power, and on the changes globalization has wrought upon the domes­
tic lawmaking process.15 Because of this, they fail to see that adopting 
either interchangeability or treaty exclusivity would lead to unaccept­
able distortions of the constitutional structure and would require the 
rejection of more than a half century of practice by the political 
branches. 
This Article will provide a constitutional justification for the con­
gressional-executive agreement, one consistent with the text, struc­
ture, and history of the Constitution. It will provide a clear dividing 
line that demarcates the situations in which treaties must be the sole 
instrument of national policy, and those that can be dealt with by the 
congressional-executive agreement. This Article is the first to base its 
theory of treaties upon the record of practice by the political branches, 
rather than making normative claims derived simply from different 
14. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free­
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995). 
15. Recently, two articles have addressed the debate over interchangeability with dif­
fering results. Compare Peter J. Spiro, Constitutional Method and the Great Treaty Debate, 
79 TEXAS L. REV. (forthcoming 2001), with Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Ex­
ecutive Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1998). Although Pro­
fessor Spiro's article shares several of this Article's methodological doubts about both the 
Ackerman/Golove and Tribe approaches, he does not attempt to develop a theory about the 
differences between treaties and congressional-executive agreements or about the constitu­
tional principles that should govern international agreements. Rather, Professor Spiro seeks 
to use the issue as the springboard for a general theory of constitutional change. Professor 
Paul claims in part that that congressional-executive agreements resulted from the expansion 
in executive power due to the increased geopolitical demands on the Constitution after 
World War II. He argues that now that these problems have receded with the end of the 
Cold War (itself a debatable proposition), we should return to constitutional practices that 
comport more closely to the original Constitution. Paul's conclusions are quite similar to 
those of Professors Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Jules Lobel, who have argued that the Cold 
War period led to an emergency powers model of the Constitution that improperly ex­
panded the presidential authority in foreign affairs. See generally ARTHUR M. 
SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and 
the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989). Paul would conclude, as would 
Schlesinger and Lobel, that treaties should be the only method for making international 
agreements. I find Professor Paul's analysis lacking, however, in its failure to examine the 
relationship between treaties and statutes in light of the distribution of authority between 
the legislative and executive branches in Articles I and II, and in its haste to discard the sig­
nificant practice of international agreement-making by the political branches. See infra text 
accompanying notes 142-311. 
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theories of constitutional interpretation.16 Practice suggests that com­
plete interchangeability ought to be rejected because it creates severe 
distortions in the American public lawmaking system. Allowing stat­
utes completely to replace treaties eliminates the restrictions upon 
Congress's enumerated powers and undermines the separation of 
powers in foreign affairs. Nor is treaty exclusivity an acceptable alter­
native. Congressional-executive agreements still have a legitimate 
place in the constitutional conduct of foreign policy, because their use 
preserves Congress's constitutional powers over matters such as inter­
national commerce.17 
This Article will also demonstrate that a proper place still exists for 
the operation of treaties, even in a world of expanded congressional 
powers, and it will seek to define that place. Treaties, for example, still 
remain an indispensable instrument for regulating subjects that rest 
outside of Congress's Article I powers. Recent federalism decisions by 
the Supreme Court make clear that several areas rest outside of Con­
gress's enumerated authority: areas beyond the reach of the Com­
merce Clause,18 the commandeering of the executive or legislative 
branches of the state govemments,19 overriding state sovereign immu­
nity in either federal or state court (when the Reconstruction 
Amendments are not involved),20 and expanding the constitutional 
definition of civil rights that may apply against the states.21 While the 
lawmakers run into their constitutional boundaries in these areas, the 
treatymakers may still use their powers to reach beyond the limits of 
the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment. Treaties also are 
required for the national government to act in areas that are the sub­
ject of the concurrent powers of the executive and legislative branches. 
16. As far as I can tell, no legal scholar has attempted to conduct an empirical survey of 
the use of treaties versus congressional-executive agreements to regulate different subjects. 
17. Thus, treaties cannot be self-executing in such areas, because to allow the treaty­
makers to regulate such matters would infringe the Constitution's vesting of the federal leg­
islative power in Congress alone. I have provided a fuller account of the doctrine of non­
self-executing treaties elsewhere. See generally Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8 (arguing that 
original understanding supports doctrine of non-self-executing treaties); Yoo, Non­
Self-Execution, supra note 10 (arguing that text and structure justify non-self-execution). 
18. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (striking down federal civil 
cause of action for gender-motivated violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) 
(invalidating federal law banning handgun possession in school zones). 
19. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
20. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44 (1996). 
21. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); College Sav. Bank v. Flor­
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997). 
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Congressional-executive agreements present a way for the political 
branches to maintain the distinction between treatymaking and law­
making. This Article argues that the normal statutory mode must be 
used to approve international agreements that regulate matters within 
Congress's Article I powers. The device of the congressional-executive 
agreement ensures that the same public lawmaking process will apply 
to the same subjects, regardless of whether an international agreement 
is involved or not. This approach leaves ample room for treaties, 
which still must be used if the nation seeks to make agreements out­
side of Congress's competence or bind itself in areas where both 
President and Congress exercise competing, overlapping powers. 
Maintaining this line - which, unlike the Ackerman-Golove, Tribe, or 
traditional international law approaches, comports with the practice of 
the political branches - ensures that the spheres of the executive for­
eign affairs power and of domestic public lawmaking do not intrude 
into one another. 
The Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will describe the im­
portance of congressional-executive agreements, their lack of support 
in the constitutional text, and scholarly efforts to justify their use. It 
also will discuss and critique the recent, contending academic theories 
concerning the interchangeability of treaties and statutes. Part II will 
argue against complete interchangeability by identifying its severe tex­
tual and structural problems. Part III proposes a new approach to the 
congressional-executive agreement and explains its superiority to the 
theory that treaties must be used to make all international agreements. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND THE 
INTERNATIONALIST VISION 
This Part will provide the necessary context for a discussion of 
congressional-executive agreements. Section A describes the status of 
congressional-executive agreements today and reviews the doctrine of 
interchangeability. Section B discusses and critiques the different con­
stitutional theories that have arisen to justify the use of statutes to 
make international agreements. It finds that even as congressional­
executive agreements have assumed a significant role in American 
foreign policy, academic theories defending this instrument have been 
lacking. If these scholars are right, significant elements of America's 
participation in the postwar world order apparently rest on founda­
tions of dubious constitutionality. 
A. The Current Importance of Congressional-Executive Agreements 
During the postwar period, the political branches have come to 
rely upon congressional-executive agreements as one of the primary 
instruments of American foreign policy. Several of the nation's most 
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important international obligations, such as the international financial 
order established by the Bretton Woods agreement, the world trading 
system created by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
("GA TT") and WTO, and our regional trading regime established by 
NAFf A, have been enacted by a simple majority vote in both houses 
of Congress. This Section will first describe the increasing use of con­
gressional-executive agreements to make international agreements. It 
will then discuss the lack of support in the constitutional text for the 
use of such instruments. It will conclude by reviewing the doctrine of 
interchangeability, by which international law authorities argue that 
congressional-executive agreements may serve as a perfect substitute 
for treaties. 
1. The Explosion of Congressional-Executive Agreements 
Before examining the constitutionality of congressional-executive 
agreements, some definitions are in order. When using the phrase 
"congressional-executive agreement," some do not distinguish be­
tween two analytically distinct methods of agreement - congres­
sional-executive agreements, which require participation by both 
houses of Congress, and sole executive agreements, in which the 
President unilaterally reaches an agreement with another nation in ar­
eas of his plenary executive authority.22 This Article will address only 
the former; the latter do not raise the same constitutional problems, as 
they are not considered to be interchangeable with treaties. Within the 
category of congressional-executive agreements, there are three types. 
First, Congress may provide ex ante authorization to the President to 
reach agreements with other nations on certain discrete subjects. In 
1792, for example, Congress authorized the Postmaster General to 
reach arrangements for the exchange of mail.23 Second, Congress may 
legislate on a foreign relations matter, in which the President must de­
termine the existence of certain facts before a statute can take effect. 
In the area of reciprocal trade agreements, for example, Congress will 
mandate the reduction of tariffs on a country's goods, but only when 
the President reports that the other country will drop its tariffs on 
22. President Franklin Roosevelt's negotiation of the Litvinov assignment, which was 
part of the recognition of the Soviet Union, is an example of a sole executive agreement. 
Since the agreement involved the President's powers over recognition and his power to set­
tle claims, it could preempt inconsistent state law. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 
(1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). If the President had sought to reach 
agreements outside of his plenary constitutional powers, the agreement could not have exer­
cised such domestic legal effects. See Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the 
(Non) Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REV. 133 (1998). 
23. See Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239. 
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American products. While facially domestic in nature, this arrange­
ment produces international agreements because Presidents may ne­
gotiate with other nations to ensure reciprocal tariff reductions.24 This 
Article will focus only on a third type. This arises when the President 
has negotiated an international agreement and seeks ex post approval 
from Congress, which is usually bundled with provisions implementing 
the agreement in domestic law. Unlike the first two types of agree­
ments, this third type does not involve the delegation of authority 
from Congress to the President, but instead seeks to replace the treaty 
process with a statutory one. 
Congressional-executive agreements of the third type have become 
one of the central tools in the exercise of American foreign policy. In 
the early period of the nation's history, the treaty process held a vir­
tual monopoly on the making of agreements.25 During the 1789-1839 
period, the nation entered into sixty treaties and only twenty-seven 
nontreaty international agreements.26 Many of the early nation's most 
significant international commitments, such as the Jay and Pinckney 
Treaties and the Louisiana Purchase, were concluded as treaties. As 
the nation entered World War II, however, statutory devices or even 
unilateral executive action came to overwhelm the treaty process as 
the preferred method for making international agreements. From 
1939-1989, for example, the nation entered into 11 ,698 nontreaty 
agreements but only 702 treaties.27 A congressional study has found 
that between 1946 and 1972, 88.3 percent of all international agree­
ments made by the United States took a statutory form, only 6.2 per­
cent were treaties, and the remaining 5.5 percent were sole executive 
agreements.28 The following charts illustrate the heavy use of the 
congressional-executive agreement as an alternative to the treaty pro­
cess since 1939. 
24. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 682-92 (1892). 
25. See G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign 
Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. 1, 9-21 (1999) (explaining the historical development of treaty 
power jurisprudence). 
26. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 14 tbl. 2. 
27. See id. 
28. See id. at 16. 
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EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS AND TREATIES CONCLUDED BY THE 
UNITED STATES, 1930-1992 
Source: CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE (Comm. Print 1993). 
TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED BY THE 
UNITED ST ATES, 1789-1989 
Source: CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 103D CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 
SENATE (Comm. Print 1993) 
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These numbers cannot be explained merely by the use of the con­
gressional-executive agreement to engage in large numbers of minor 
international agreements. Rather, the political branches have resorted 
to the statutory process to make some of the nation's most important 
international commitments. In 1945, Congress approved by statute the 
Bretton Woods Agreement, which established two pillars of the post­
war international economic system, the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank.29 Congress also approved by statute negotiating 
rounds of the GAIT and the United States-Canadian Free Trade 
Agreement.30 Under the Clinton administration, approval of both 
NAFTA and the Uruguay Round that established the World Trade 
Organization took the same form.31 These agreements control matters 
that have effects on the United States as direct and as important as 
any treaty: they regulate the prices of goods, the operations of mar­
kets, and the conduct of governments and businesses. GAIT and 
NAFT A do not just commit the United States to certain political or 
military courses of action; they primarily regulate economic activity of 
great importance to many private citizens. Expanding free trade has 
been one of the central themes of postwar American foreign policy, 
and the congressional-executive agreement has been its servant.32 
2. The Lack of Textual Support 
Given the important role played by the congressional-executive 
agreement, its lack of convincing textual or structural support ought to 
be a matter of great concern. The Constitution explicitly grants the 
federal government the power to make international agreements only 
in Article II, Section 2's Treaty Clause, and it refers to treaties only 
three other times.33 International legal scholars such as Professor 
Myres McDougal read an implicit authorization for nontreaty, interna­
tional agreements in Article I, Section lO's prohibition upon states 
from entering into any "agreement or compact" with a foreign power. 
From this, they suggest that the Constitution recognizes a broader 
29. Bretton Woods Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 79-171, 59 Stat. 512 (1945). 
30. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-449, 102 Stat. 1851 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2112 (1994)). 
31. North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 103-182, 
107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3301 et seq. (1994)); Uruguay Round Agree­
ments Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501 et seq. 
(1994)). 
32. For a recent discussion of the benefits of the expansion of free trade, see John 0. 
McGinnis & Mark C. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 1 14 HARV. L. REV. 511 
(2000). 
33. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (giving treaties supremacy over inconsistent state 
law); id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that jurisdiction of federal courts may include treaties); 
id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from entering into treaties). 
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class of international agreements than just "treaties." Why would the 
Framers preclude the states from exercising the power to make an 
"agreement or compact," but then not give it to the federal govern­
ment?34 
Constitutional silence, however, can cut both ways. The canon of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius, by which the presence of one term 
implies the exclusion of others, suggests that the Framers understood 
all of the federal government's power to make international agree­
ments to rest in the Treaty Clause. If the presence of the words 
"agreement or compact" in the text demonstrates that the Framers 
understood international agreements to take forms other than the 
treaty, then we can expect them to have used those words in Article II 
if they meant to grant a broader power to the national government. 
An examination of the original understanding shows no support for 
the idea that the Framers believed that the federal government pos­
sessed some free-floating, non-textual power to make international 
agreements. Rather, the attentions of both Federalists and Anti­
Federalists during the ratification debates focused exclusively on the 
Treaty Clause.35 Instead of worrying about whether statutes could do 
the job of treaties, the Framers argued over whether treaties might in­
vade the province of statutes.36 
Further, reading prohibitions on the states as empowering the fed­
eral government to do the opposite is an unpersuasive and ultimately 
dangerous interpretive technique. Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, for example, prohibits states from denying citizens the 
equal protection of the laws. Adopting a McDougal-like approach 
would require us to infer the lack of a similar prohibition on the fed­
eral government as an implicit constitutional authorization to do oth­
erwise. A similar interpretive approach would read the Fifteenth 
Amendment's prohibition on state efforts to block access to the ballot 
based on race as confirming the federal government's power to so dis­
criminate. It does not appear that the Court would agree with these 
propositions,37 nor would most constitutional theorists today. 
One might suggest, as Professors Ackerman and Golove have, that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with the authority 
to make international agreements in aid of its other powers.38 In one of 
34. See Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive or 
Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE L.J. 181, 
203-06 (1945). 
35. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2021-69. 
36. See id. 
37. See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
38. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 811 .  Professor Golove provides a more 
complete exegesis of this idea in his individual response to Professor Tribe. See David M. 
Golove, Against Free-Form Formalism, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1791 (1998). 
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their rhetorical moments, they characterize this as a "Marshallian" 
reading of the Constitution because it builds upon the approach of 
Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland.39 As all law students 
learn, McCulloch upheld the constitutionality of a national bank, even 
though it was nowhere mentioned in the constitutional text, because it 
was an appropriate means to achieve Congress's powers to regulate 
commerce, establish the treasury and currency, and fund government 
operations. Claiming to follow the same logic, defenders of the con­
gressional-executive agreement claim that so long as Congress has de­
cided that a congressional-executive agreement is "appropriate" to 
achieve the full use of a constitutional power, and so long as the "end 
[is) legitimate,"40 then the congressional-executive agreement is consti­
tutional. While this argument better engages the textual problem, it 
suffers from several flaws. It incorrectly identifies constitutional 
meaning with Supreme Court decisions that limit the Court's own dis­
cretion in reviewing the constitutionality of legislation. McCulloch's 
language about the link between ends and means serves the purpose 
of removing the Court from the job of reviewing legislative judg­
ments.41 It does not relieve the President or Congress from determin­
ing whether certain means actually are constitutional, and it was on 
precisely this ground that President Jackson vetoed the bill chartering 
the Second Bank of the United States.42 
A greater problem for this approach is that it misreads the feder­
alism implications of McCulloch as authorization to alter the separa­
tion of powers. McCulloch's reading of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause only countenances expansions in federal powers, vis-a-vis the 
states, when necessary to achieve some legitimate federal aim. Recent 
cases, such as United States v. Printz, even indicate that state sover­
eignty may impose some limit upon the reach of the Clause.43 What is 
important to recognize, however, is that McCulloch does not allow 
Congress to deploy the Necessary and Proper Clause so as to rear­
range the separation of powers. Reading the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to justify congressional-executive agreements causes separa-
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
40. Id. at 421. 
41. Indeed, in McCulloch, the Court never really explains the fit between the national 
bank and the great constitutional ends it cites early in the opinion. See John Yoo, McCulloch 
v. Maryland, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 241, 244 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998). For a narrow reading of the 
Clause, see Gary Lawson & Patricia 8. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Federal Power: A 
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). 
42. See Andrew Jackson, Veto Message, July 10, 1832, in 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENT 1139, 1145 (James D. Richardson ed., Bureau of Nat'l Literature 1917) 
(1897). 
43. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (invalidating federal law that comman­
deered state executives to carry out federal regulatory scheme). 
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tion of powers problems because it transfers the power to make inter­
national agreements from the executive branch (made up of President 
and Senate) to the legislature. If this reading were correct, a variety of 
other congressional efforts to restructure government should have 
been equally constitutional. Congress, for example, could have used 
the Necessary and Proper Clause not just to condition the removal of 
an independent counsel so as to protect against interference in the in­
vestigation of high executive officials, but to shield completely the of­
fice from presidential control altogether. Congress could have relied 
upon the Clause to justify the creation of the legislative veto, or the 
vesting of budget reduction authority in the Comptroller General. Just 
as the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot infringe on the sovereignty 
of the states, so too it cannot be read to interfere with the core powers 
of the three branches.44 While it may be very well to read the Clause as 
allowing a power to establish a national bank where none had been 
granted to the federal government, it is quite a different matter to read 
the Clause as allowing Congress to seize from the President and Sen­
ate the power to make international agreements. 
3. Interchangeability with Treaties 
Despite the paucity of textual support, the congressional-executive 
agreement has come to provide for many a complete alternative to the 
treaty. According to the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States, "[t]he prevailing view is that the Congres­
sional-Executive agreement can be used as an alternative to the treaty 
method in every instance."45 As the Restatement explains, the govern­
ment has resorted to the statutory method to make agreements on a 
wide variety of subjects. None has ever been successfully challenged in 
court on constitutional grounds. Since there is no line between the two 
instruments, " [w]hich procedure should be used is a political judg­
ment, made in the first instance by the President."46 Although he rec­
ognizes the difficult constitutional issues surrounding interchangeabil­
ity, Professor Henkin accepts that the· congressional-executive 
agreement may serve as a complete substitute for a treaty. He even 
encourages their expanded use should the Senate oppose internation­
alism: such agreements, he advises, "remain[] available to Presidents 
for wide, even general use should the treaty process again provide dif­
ficult. "47 In other words, any matter upon which the President and 
Senate can make a treaty is fair game for a congressional-executive 
44. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to 
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 590-92, 622-26 (1994). 
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303 cmt. e. 
46. Id. 
47. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 218. 
772 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 99:757 
agreement.48 Most scholars in foreign relations law to write on the 
subject,49 as well as members of the executive branch,50 and even ad­
visers to Congress,51 seem to agree with this conclusion. 
Under this doctrine of interchangeability, congressional-executive 
agreements apparently receive all of the benefits that accrue to trea­
ties. Congressional-executive agreements, for example, are not re­
stricted by any subject matter limitations. According to standard in­
ternationalist thought, the President and Senate may resort to the 
treaty process to address any matter, so long as it is "an agreement be­
tween two or more states or international organizations that is in­
tended to be legally binding and is governed by international law."52 If 
treaties enjoy this broad scope, then, so too, must congressional­
executive agreements. Similar logic suggests that congressional­
executive agreements will not encounter the same separation of pow­
ers and federalism restrictions that apply to statutes, because treaties 
are exempt from many of these limitations. Both treaties and congres­
sional-executive agreements bind the United States in the same way 
and with the same permanence under international law. President 
Truman summarized the consensus view in discussing whether to use a 
treaty or a statute for the agreement for the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands. "I am satisfied that either method is constitutionally 
permissible and that the agreement resulting will be of the same effect 
internationally and under the supremacy clause of the Constitution 
48. While the Restatement (Third) appears to limit congressional-executive agreements 
to "any matter that falls within the powers of Congress and of the President under the Con­
stitution," RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303(2), it is unclear how far this re­
straint goes, given that foreign relations scholars believe that the federal foreign affairs 
power includes the power to legislate on any subject that could arise between the United 
States and a foreign nation. See Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The 
Law of the Land and Foreign Relations, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 903, 905 (1959). 
49. See, e.g., Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Executive Agreements, 14 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 434 (1975); Philip R. Trimble & Alexander W. Koff, All Fall Down: The 
Treaty Power in the Clinton Administration, 16 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 55 (1998); Trimble & 
Weiss, supra note 6, at 650-53; Armen R. Vartian, Approval of SALT Agreements by Joint 
Resolution of Congress, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 421 (1980). 
50. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, Department of State Legal Adviser's Reply to Senate Of­
fice of Legislative Counsel Memorandum on Certain Middle East Agreements, 121 CONG. 
REC. 36,718 (1975). 
51. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra 5, at 58-59. 
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(a); see also Lori F. Damrosch, The 
Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" 
Treaties, 67 CHJ.-KENT L. REV. 515, 530 (1991); see also HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra 
note 6, at 197; Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimensions of RFRA, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 
33, 34, 46-47 (1997). According to Henkin, "[i]f there are reasons in foreign policy why the 
United States seeks an agreement with a foreign country, it does not matter that the subject 
is otherwise 'internal', that the treaty 'makes laws for the people of the United States in their 
internal concerns', or that - apart from treaty - the matter is 'normally and appropri­
ately . . .  within the local jurisdictions of the States." HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 
6, at 197. 
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whether advised and consented to by the Senate or whether approval 
is authorized by a joint resolution."53 
B.  The Defects of Interchangeability 
The increasing use of the congressional-executive agreement is 
ironic. Just as it has assumed a central role in the conduct of American 
foreign policy, the justification for its constitutionality appears to rest 
on increasingly shaky foundations. Prominent constitutional scholars 
recently have attacked this alternative method for making interna­
tional agreements. Indeed, the leading defense of the constitutionality 
of the NAFf A and WTO agreements expressly relies upon a theory of 
non-textual constitutional amendments. This Part will begin by dis­
cussing and evaluating the internationalist defense of the statutory 
procedure, and then detailing recent scholarly controversy over its 
constitutionality as a substitute for the treaty. It will describe the new 
defense of congressional-executive agreements offered by Professors 
Ackerman and Golove, and Professor Tribe's response to their views. 
It will explain why neither approach proves satisfactory and why each 
is subject to crippling doubts. 
1 .  The Internationalist View and Its Defects 
As Professors Ackerman and Golove document in their detailed 
history of the intellectual origins of the congressional-executive 
agreement, the idea of using ex post congressional approval of presi­
dentially negotiated international agreements did not take firm root 
until the World War II period. At that time, several prominent schol­
ars, among them Edwin Corwin,54 Quincy Wright,55 and Myres 
McDougal and Asher Lans,56 argued that such a procedure might sub­
stitute for the treaty process. Without adopting the notion that these 
legal intellectuals helped spark a constitutional moment, much in the 
same way that one always needs the intelligentsia to help along the 
Russian Revolution, it is worth examining their arguments because 
they still have currency today. Their views are also worth further con­
sideration because they continue to form the basis for the acceptance 
of congressional-executive agreements by leading authorities such as 
Professor Henkin and the Restatement. 
53. Message of the President of the United States to Congress, H.R. Doc. No. 80-378, at 2 
(1947). 
54. EDWIN S. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WORLD ORGANIZATION (1944). 
55. Quincy Wright, The United States and International Agreements, 38 AM. J .  INT'L L. 
341 (1944). 
56. McDougal & Lans, supra note 34. 
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Initially, internationalist scholars built their case on precedent. 
They pointed to a long line of examples, beginning with the first con­
gressional authorization of international postal agreements, continuing 
through the annexations of Hawaii and Texas, and including various 
reciprocal trade laws, that allegedly demonstrated almost 200 years of 
interchangeability. Part II will examine the practice of the political 
branches, but suffice it to say at this point that none of these prece­
dents evidenced a decision to replace the treaty with a statutory proc­
ess in which Congress gives its ex post consent to a presidentially ne­
gotiated agreement. Rather, many of these examples fall within the 
other types of interbranch cooperation - sometimes erroneously con­
flated with the distinct type of congressional-executive agreement ad­
dressed here - in which Congress essentially delegates factfinding or 
rulemaking authority to the President.57 
Defenders of the constitutionality of congressional-executive 
agreements have claimed that two Supreme Court cases, Field v. 
Clark58 and B. Altman & Co. v. United States,59 provide legitimacy for 
the practice of interchangeability. Closer examination of these cases, 
however, demonstrates that they lend little support for the idea that 
statutes could substitute for treaties.60 In Field v. Clark, the plaintiff 
argued that Congress could not delegate to the President factfinding 
authority for a reciprocal tariff law. As mentioned earlier, however, 
this type of arrangement is a very different creature from the ex post 
congressional-executive agreement of today, and, in fact, it does not 
even require an agreement with another nation.61 Field v. Clark only 
rejected the claim that the reciprocal tariff statute violated the non­
delegation doctrine, and nothing more. It could not find that the ex 
post congressional-executive agreement was constitutional because 
there was no such congressional-executive agreement involved.62 
B. Altman similarly did not call upon the Court to review the con­
stitutionality of a statutory method for making international agree­
ments. The case involved a different kind of mechanism, in which 
Congress provided the President with ex ante authorization to reach 
trade agreements, within specified criteria, with different nations. Fur­
ther, B. Altman did not raise the question of the constitutionality of 
the use of this procedure in place of the treaty. Instead, it asked only 
57. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
58. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
59. 224 U.S. 583 (1912). 
60. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 830-32. 
61. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
62. The Court also rejected, in one sentence, the argument that the tariff statute had 
unconstitutionally vested the President alone with the treaty power. See Field, 143 U.S. at 
694. 
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whether a statute that provided the Court with appellate review over 
claims based upon "treaties," could be read to include this novel form 
of executive and legislative cooperation. The Court read the statute 
broadly to include not just a "treaty possessing the dignity of one re­
quiring ratification by the Senate of the United States,"63 but also a 
congressionally authorized executive agreement that rose to the level 
of an "international compact."64 As others have recognized, B. Altman 
did not come close to passing on the question of the interchangeability 
of congressional-executive agreements and treaties for constitutional 
purposes.65 
Once we dispel the notion that the congressional-executive agree­
ment has received the approval of historical practice or judicial deci­
sion, the genuine reason for its modern use comes into focus. Congres­
sional-executive agreements represented an effort to replace what was 
seen as an outmoded method for dealing with international affairs, 
one established in a world of sailing ships, horse-borne couriers, and 
muskets, with a more efficient, democratic process. New Deal legal 
scholars and their progeny believed that providing the Senate with a 
checking role in making international agreements had been a dismal 
failure. Functionally, the Senate had never assumed the co-equal role 
in international negotiations that the Framers had hoped for.66 The 
Senate's formal role in treatymaking had become one of after-the-fact 
consent, while the President assumed primary responsibility for setting 
foreign policy and conducting diplomatic negotiations. Vesting the 
treaty power partially in the Senate to achieve secrecy and speed no 
longer seemed compelling, due to the large size of the Senate, the role 
of the House in foreign affairs, and the nature of modern treaties, 
which no longer demanded such secrecy. 
Defects in the Senate's role did not rest just in process. Giving the 
states a checking role in foreign affairs had led to results that harmed 
the national interest. With only a small minority needed to block an 
international agreement, the treaty process allowed isolationism to 
reign over American foreign policy.67 Some even suspected that states 
63. B. Altman, 224 U.S. at 601. 
64. Id. 
65. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 831. 
66. See STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 55-58 (1993) 
(describing President Washington's failed attempt to consult with the first Senate on trea­
ties). Apparently, when President Washington appeared in the Senate, the noise and confu­
sion led to the treaty matter being deferred to another day. President Washington left in a 
huff and, according to one story, declared that "he would be damned if he ever went there 
again." Id. at 55. 
67. As Professor Henkin has written, "By permitting approval of an agreement by sim­
ple majority of both houses, it eliminates the 'veto' by one-third-plus-one of the Senators 
present which in past had effectively buried important treaties." HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 217. 
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would use their voice in the treaty process to win regional or sectional 
advantages. Sectional controversy, they asserted, originally had forced 
the Framers to create the two-thirds requirement for senatorial ap­
proval in the first place.68 While some might argue that the constitu­
tional difficulty in making treaties expressed the Framers' bias against 
international entanglements, the New Deal authors believed that iso­
lationism was simply a disease that threatened to cripple America in a 
new, interdependent world. Isolationist Senators, after all, had 
blocked American participation in the League of Nations, to which 
they attributed the failure of the peace, the rise of Hitler, and the re­
turn of world war. New Deal scholars believed that a small minority of 
Senators should not be able to use the Constitution to foist their isola­
tionist preferences upon the majority's desire for more engagement in 
the world. Adopting a congressional procedure, without a superma­
jority, would rid isolationism of its chokehold over American foreign 
policy. 
Building on this previous point, internationalist scholars believed 
that the congressional-executive agreement substituted a more demo­
cratic mechanism for a state-dominated process. As Professor Henkin 
has suggested, " [o]ne way of rendering treaty making more demo­
cratic without constitutional amendment might be to have agreements 
made by the President if authorized or approved by both houses of 
Congress," which would serve "the cause of greater democracy."69 
International agreements reached through a statutory process reflect 
the will of the majoritarian President and of both houses of Congress. 
Internationalist scholars believe approval by the most democratic 
branches to be particularly important for new types of international 
agreements. These agreements were just as significant to the nation's 
welfare as any domestic legislation, and with national economies and 
societies becoming more interdependent, they would have a direct im­
pact on the everyday domestic lives of Americans.70 The congres­
sional-executive agreement better promotes democratic government 
by requiring the consent of the most democratic part of the govern­
ment, the House of Representatives, before the nation undertakes in­
ternational obligations that so directly affect the people. 
68. For a discussion of the historical roots of this argument, see Yoo, Globalism, supra 
note 8, at 2061-64. See also FORREST MCDONALD, WE THE PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC 
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION 259, 268, 366-67 (1958); Charles Warren, The Mississippi 
River and the Treaty Clause of the Constitution, 2 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 271, 282-85, 296-97 
(1934). 
69. LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 60 
(1990) [hereinafter HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM]. 
70. Congressional-executive agreements also simplified the process of making interna­
tional agreements by combining the international agreement with the implementing legisla­
tion that usually is required to bring it into effect in domestic law. 
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These criticisms of the treaty process no doubt have substantial 
truth to them. It is clear from the historical evidence that the Framers 
understood that the treaty process would be anti-democratic.71 A de­
sire for greater democracy, however, standing alone does not provide 
sufficient reason for reading a clear textual provision out of the Con­
stitution. The same arguments that internationalist scholars levied 
against the Senate's role in treatymaking easily could be repeated 
against many other features of the Constitution. Take the Senate's in­
stitutional role generally. States representing a minority of the popula­
tion can block treaties; states representing a minority of the popula­
tion can block normal legislation as well.72 Senators representing a 
minority of the population can block the appointment of cabinet offi­
cers and federal judges. Senators representing a minority of the states 
can block constitutional amendments, as can an even smaller minority 
of state legislatures. Or take the Supreme Court's power of judicial re­
view, which is not even explicitly granted in the Constitution. Every 
time the Court invalidates a federal law, a small number of unelected 
officials have prevented the majority from acting. Do these anti­
democratic features demand that the political branches devise non­
text-based methods for their evasion?73 
Indeed, the weakness of the internationalist defense of congres­
sional-executive agreements is further revealed by an unwillingness to 
take the pro-majoritarian case to its logical conclusion. If the objective 
is to increase the democratic nature of making international agree­
ments, internationalists provide no reason to stop with a statutory pro­
cess. Even the constitutionally prescribed method for making laws suf­
fers from antimajoritarian features.74 Senators from the least populous 
states can block a statute supported by the majority; an even smaller 
number can use the filibuster to prevent even a majority of Senators 
from voting; committee chairs and majority leaders can impose their 
wishes at variance with that of the majority; interest groups may suc­
ceed in manipulating the legislative process to engage in rent-seeking. 
If internationalist scholars pursued their quest for democracy full 
bore, they ought to seek to centralize all international agreement 
making in the President alone, who (along with the Vice-President) is 
71. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2024-74. 
72. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10, at 2240 n.79 ("According to 1998 
population estimates, two-thirds of the Senate can represent as little as 32 percent of the 
population."). 
73. Cf Henry P. Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and Constitu­
tional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 165-173 (1996) (criticizing recent theories of 
majoritarian amendments to the Constitution for ignoring antidemocratic features of the 
Constitution). 
74. See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL 
PROCESS: A FuNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 12-
25 (1980) (describing the "defective character" of Congress's majoritarianism). 
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the only federal official elected by the entire electorate.75 Instead, 
leading international law academics have criticized the expansion in 
presidential power that has allowed for sole executive agreements.76 
While Presidents currently enjoy the authority to make sole executive 
agreements in areas within their plenary constitutional powers, and 
while those agreements may even trump inconsistent state law,77 their 
executive power in foreign affairs has never been read to include the 
authority to make any and all international agreements, regardless of 
their subject matter or nature. 
Such an argument obviously conflicts with the text and structure of 
the Constitution. This approach not only would read the text of the 
Treaty Clause out of the Constitution, it also would allow the Presi­
dent to encroach on Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers in foreign 
affairs, such as the regulation of international commerce. Internation­
alists have sharply criticized such theories of executive dominance in 
foreign affairs when they have arisen elsewhere in cases such as United 
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 78 If it were acceptable, however, 
to allow statutes to replace the Treaty Clause as a method for making 
international agreements, despite the Constitution's sole mention .of 
the federal government's power to do so in Article II, Section 2, then 
it would be equally legitimate to allow unilateral presidential decree to 
replace the congressional-executive agreement. Perhaps, in the inter­
nationalists' defense, one might say that the statutory process still en­
sures that some form of checks and balances exists in the making of 
international agreements. Maintaining checks and balances, though, 
does not explain why the congressional-executive agreement is to be 
preferred to the treaty process; the treaty process itself contains both 
checks and balances and a majoritarian element through the participa­
tion of the President. Making the Constitution more majoritarian in­
cludes no principle to limit its application. 
75. In fact, one of the earliest defenders of the congressional-executive agreement, 
Wallace McClure, made precisely this argument. McClure believed that the President on his 
sole authority could make any international agreement, so long as it was not disapproved by 
Congress. See WALLA CE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS: 
DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 363 (AMS 
Press 1967) (1941). 
76. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 221-24; KOH, supra note 6, at 44-
45. 
77. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 
U.S. 324 (1937). 
78. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 69, at 17-43; 
KOH, supra note 6, at 134-46, 208-12. 
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2. The Transformationist Effort at Rehabilitation and Its Faults 
While internationalists prefer to see a gradual evolution from the 
treaty to the congressional-executive agreement, another group of 
academics arrive at the same destination by a different, jagged path. In 
order for treaties and statutes to have the same status, they argue that 
in 1945 the American people rejected the legitimacy of the Senate's 
supermajority role in favor of a statutory process for making interna­
tional agreements. I call this the transformationist school because its 
theorists, Professors Ackerman and Golove, maintain that "We the 
People" have amended the Constitution - even though no formal 
constitutional amendment ever underwent the ratification process -
so as to allow the United States to incur any international obligation 
by congressional-executive agreement. In their minds, political strug­
gle over the treaty power during the birth of the postwar world order 
amounted to a non-textual constitutional change that eliminated the 
exclusivity of the Treaty Clause. This Section will discuss several 
problems - textual, interpretive, and historical - that afflict the 
transformationist account and undermine its defense of interchange­
ability. 
Transformationists rely upon practice to support their conclusion 
that such instruments should enjoy the same status as treaties. They 
emphasize the use of the congressional-executive agreement in the 
construction of the international financial and trade systems, and they 
seek justification in the manner in which use of the congressional­
executive agreement has outpaced the treaty. As the numbers suggest, 
the congressional-executive agreement did not appear by accident. In­
stead, Professors Ackerman and Golove argue that a group of profes­
sors and government officials, scarred by the Senate's refusal to ap­
prove the Versailles Treaty, waged an intellectual campaign before 
and during World War II to make congressional-executive agreements 
interchangeable with treaties.79 Transformationists believe, however, 
that neither scholarly opinion nor political practice before World War 
II supported the interchangeability of statutes and treaties. Rather, 
they conclude that the New Deal scholars misread precedent and 
made blatant appeals to policy in order to set the stage for the moth­
balling of the treaty process. Building on elite opinion, the centrally 
important event in legitimating the congressional-executive agreement 
occurred in the 1944 elections, in which the American people allegedly 
lent their overwhelming approval to the re-election of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and his postwar plans for intensive participa­
tion in international institutions. Opinion polls and newspaper editori­
als at the time, according to Ackerman and Golove, indicate that the 
79. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 861-73. 
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electorate supported the elimination of the Senate's chokehold over 
treaties as part of a groundswell against isolationism. 
The most nagging flaw with the transformationist position, as with 
the internationalist approach, is that it essentially reads the Treaty 
Clause out of the Constitution. If congressional-executive agreements 
are fully interchangeable with treaties, and if congressional-executive 
agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution while treaties are, 
then the New Deal internationalists are guilty of amending the Consti­
tution without resort to the Article V process. Responding to this 
challenge, made most forcefully by Professor Laurence Tribe against 
the constitutionality of the congressional-executive agreements ap­
proving NAFfA and the Uruguay Round,80 Ackerman and Golove 
invoke Ackerman's controversial theory of amending the Constitution 
outside of Article V.81 Ackerman and Golove believe that the Consti­
tution provides for two types of lawmaking: higher/constitutional 
lawmaking and ordinary/political lawmaking. The latter occurs most of 
the time, when people make ordinary policy through regular elections. 
The former occurs at revolutionary "moments," when the citizenry 
becomes consumed with more profound constitutional and political 
issues, debates them, and resolves them in ways that fundamentally al­
ter the nature of constitutional government.82 
Ackerman and Golove view the adoption of the congressional­
executive agreement as another episode in one of these moments, the 
New Deal. As the end of World War II neared, intellectual and politi­
cal leaders sought to avoid a repeat of Versailles by engaging in an end 
run around the treaty's supermajoritarian requirement. According to 
Ackerman and Golove, overwhelming popular majorities agreed with 
elite internationalist opinion to replace the treaty with a more demo­
cratic process. Transformationists view the 1944 triumph of Roosevelt 
and the Democratic Party as legitimating the substitution of the pro­
internationalist congressional-executive agreement for the treaty. 
With public opinion polls in favor of a two-house process for interna­
tional agreements,83 and in the face of proposed constitutional 
amendments in the House to strip the Senate of its monopoly over the 
treaty power, the Senate backed down. Its agreement to the statutes 
approving the Bretton Woods agreements, according to Ackerman 
and Golove, signified the Senate's acquiescence to a new constitu-
80. See generally Tribe, supra note 14. 
81. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 873-75. 
82. For a fuller elaboration of the thesis, see ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: 
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13; ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS, supra 
note 13. 
83. In May 1944, 60% of the public favored an ordinary two-house process for inter­
national agreements, while only 19% continued to support the traditional treaty method. See 
Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 863. 
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tional settlement.84 By 1947, " [i]nterchangeability had become part of 
the living Constitution,"85 and it was firmly "codified" in the 1950s, 
1960s, and 1970s. This became part of the larger constitutional change 
wrought by the New Deal, which transferred power from the states to 
the national government and from Congress to the administrative 
state. Similarly, the internationalist victory produced more populist 
lawmaking in foreign affairs by removing the anachronistic ability of a 
minority of the states, through their votes in the Senate, to keep the 
nation on an isolationist path.86 Rather than evolution, the move to the 
congressional-executive agreement was a sharp, and quite conscious, 
break from the past. 
While certainly colorful and provocative, the transformationist ar­
gument suffers from a number of terminal defects. First, it -bears the 
same defects that afflict Ackerman's general theory of constitutional 
interpretation.87 While this is not the place to engage in a full-scale cri­
tique of the "constitutional moments" theory, some of the main points 
may be summarized here. There is little doubt that the Framers con­
ceived of constitutional lawmaking as distinct from ordinary lawmak­
ing, but Ackerman provides little evidence that the Framers believed 
higher lawmaking could occur outside of Article V, but within the 
normal constitutional framework. If the people were to act outside of 
Article V, they would be altering and abolishing their previous form of 
government completely, rather than making minor adjustments.88 To 
84. See id. at 890-93. 
85. Id. at 896. 
86. Ackerman and Golove are worth quoting in detail on this point. 
Just as New Deal scholars attacked the antimajoritarian character of the Old Court, now the 
New Internationalists attacked the antidemocratic veto granted the malapportioned Senate. 
Just as New Deal scholars mined the history of the Marshall Court to create a pedigree for a 
newly expanded Commerce Clause, now the New Internationalists scavenged for precedents 
that helped expand the scope of Article I yet further to support congressional-executive 
agreements. The point of both exercises was the same: to convince legalists that the constitu­
tional tradition applauded the collective effort to correct the anachronistic formalisms of the 
past when modern Americans were demanding fundamental change. 
Id. at 911. 
87. For penetrating criticism of the Ackerman thesis and its variants, see, for example, 
Tribe, supra note 14, at 1228-49; Michael J. Gerhardt, Ackermania: The Quest for a Common 
Law of Higher Lawmaking, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1731 (1999) (book review); Michael 
Klarman, Constitutional Fact/Constitution Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Theory of 
Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759 (1992) (book review); Suzanna Sherry, The 
Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARV. L. REV. 918 (1992) (book review). 
Ackerman's thesis has received praise from some scholars. See, e.g., Sanford Levinson, 
Accounting for Constitutional Change, 8 CONST. COMMENT. 409, 429 (1991); James Gray 
Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitu­
tional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304 (1990); Mark Tushnet, The Flag-Burning Episode: 
An Essay on the Constitution, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 39, 48-53 (1990). 
88. I have argued elsewhere that the Framers understood the right to abolish and alter 
government as one of the unenumerated majoritarian rights. See John Choon Yoo, Our De­
claratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967, 970-99 (1993). 
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act within the framework of the Constitution, amenders must include a 
text that can identify exactly what supermajorities of the people have 
agreed to change in the Constitution, and whether permanent super­
majorities on the question indeed exist. Both the Framing and Recon­
struction are distinct from 1944 in that the first two constitutional 
moments resulted in formal amendments that embodied the revolu­
tions that occurred, while the New Deal and the 1944 moment did not. 
If popular support were indeed as overwhelming as transformationists 
believe for the congressional-executive agreement, its supporters 
should have guaranteed its future legitimacy by ratifying a constitu­
tional amendment. Legal instruments, such as statutes or constitu­
tional amendments, allow the polity itself to judge whether large, in­
choate majorities will translate into concrete changes in social and 
political norms. Indeed, without the text of an amendment, it is diffi­
cult if not impossible for later interpreters to determine what changes 
the majority actually understood it was making in the governing struc­
ture and how long-lasting they would be. 
Second, even accepting that constitutional change may legitimately 
occur outside the context of a formal amendment, Ackerman provides 
no sure way to identify when an amendment-less constitutional mo­
ment has occurred.89 If periodic elections are the product of lesser, 
sordid, ordinary political lawmaking, it seems contradictory to assert 
that they also can reflect higher lawmaking, unless accompanied by a 
constitutional amendment. To take the 1944 elections, for example, 
Ackerman and Golove are forced to assume that voters actually had 
the congressional-executive agreement issue in mind when they voted 
for the Democratic Party or for President Franklin D. Roosevelt for 
the fourth time. But voters had any number of issues on their minds 
during the 1944 elections: Roosevelt's enormous personal popularity, 
maintaining political stability during the endgame of the war, dislike of 
the Republican presidential candidate, Governor Thomas Dewey 
(who was so uninspiring a candidate that contemporaries compared 
him to "the bridegroom on the wedding cake, the only man who could 
strut sitting down, a man you really had to know to dislike, the Boy 
Orator of the Platitude"),90 and approval of the Democratic admini­
stration's wartime policies. 
Ackerman and Golove's defense of interchangeability, in other 
words, suffers from a level-of-generality problem. FDR and the 
Democrats certainly won the 1944 elections, and it seems safe to con­
clude that the Democrats' more internationalist approach to the post­
war order had something to do with it. Ackerman and Golove, how­
ever, provide no compelling reason why we must interpret general 
89. See Sherry, supra note 87, at 929-34. 
90. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT: THE SOLDIER OF FREEDOM 502 (1970). 
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political approval for the Democrats and distaste for the Republicans 
to be the mandate for a constitutional amendment on the far narrower 
issue of congressional-executive agreements. They fail to point to any 
significant campaign speeches or statements where FDR or Dewey 
mentioned interchangeability, congressional-executive agreements, or 
the Senate's constitutional role in treatymaking; they do not identify 
any facts that show that the electorate was conscious of the constitu­
tional difficulties created by the Senate's supermajoritarian check; nor 
do they demonstrate that party leaders believed this to be a significant 
issue in the campaign. Instead, Ackerman and Golove are left to infer 
that, because the electorate wanted a more secure, internationalist 
postwar order, they would have agreed to lesser-included measures to 
achieve that goal, such as interchangeability. Historians of the period 
have reviewed the same evidence and have not reached similar con­
clusions. Indeed, while a recent work by historians Townsend Hoopes 
and Douglas Brinkley recognizes the 1944 electoral results as "a clear­
cut mandate for American participation in the United Nations and for 
a large American role in the postwar world,'' they also point out that 
Roosevelt had won by only three million votes, the tightest margin of 
victory since 1916 and a reflection of concerns about FDR's health and 
long term in office.91 The 1944 elections provided a vague mandate for 
internationalism, but nothing more concrete or defined. 
To be sure, Ackerman and Golove raise several historical facts 
that they believe show this link between the 1944 elections and the al­
leged constitutional moment. They point, for example, to 1944 opinion 
polls, newspaper editorials, and proposed constitutional amendments 
in the House that all supported stripping the Senate of its exclusive 
power over international agreements. They then claim that the House 
withdrew proposals to achieve this result in exchange for approval of 
the Bretton Woods agreements by statute. Yet, Ackerman and Golove 
encounter severe difficulties in showing the necessary linkages that 
would indicate a constitutional moment: a) party leaders chose to 
make the 1944 elections a referendum on the Senate's treatymaking 
role; b) the electorate understood the 1944 elections to embody this 
choice; c) the President and the House intended to force the Senate to 
give up its role; d) the Senate understood itself to be accepting inter­
changeability in allowing the Bretton Woods agreements. 
In order to show that these events all occurred and were inter­
linked, Ackerman and Golove are forced to rest their argument upon 
some very slim reeds indeed. One glaring example is that they make 
much hay out of small differences in the wordings of the platforms of 
the political parties (one mentions "treaty or agreement,'' the other 
only "agreements and arrangements"), in order to claim a real differ-
91.  TOWNSEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE 
U.N. 164 (1997). 
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ence between the parties concerning the interchangeability of congres­
sional-executive agreements and treaties.92 Only by finding a differ­
ence between the parties can they claim that the 1944 elections dem­
onstrated any choice of constitutional instruments. Yet they do not 
show that political leaders or the voters understood this difference in 
language to signify sharply divergent positions, if any, on interchange­
ability. Similarly, Ackerman and Golove believe that the timing of the 
passage of the Bretton Woods agreement by statute, coming as it did 
after the House considered a proposal to amend the treaty power, evi­
denced the Senate's acceptance of the "deal" for interchangeability.93 
Yet they can show no historical evidence that any significant actor in 
the passage of Bretton Woods or of the United Nations Charter, 
which came shortly thereafter, understood these agreements to repre­
sent a constitutional settlement of any sort. 
As an interpretive matter, none of these facts standing alone pro­
vides historical support for the notion that the voters in 1944 or their 
elected representatives undertook to engage the nation in a constitu­
tional revolution on a par with the Framing or Reconstruction. News­
papers editorialize and popular opinion polls register on any number 
of issues that never translate into constitutional amendments. Any 
number of proposed amendments never make it into the Constitution. 
One can never be sure whether these imperfect, and temporary, sig­
nals of popular preferences actually amount to the permanent support 
for a change in the written Constitution unless they actually meet the 
test for one: approval by two-thirds of the House and Senate and 
three-quarters of the states. Indeed, Ackerman and Golove cannot 
show that proposals to eliminate the Senate's monopoly over the 
treaty power ever had this support, because none ever came to a vote 
in both houses of Congress.94 
The transformationist account further stumbles upon the very pri­
mary source history from which it draws its strength. It is dubious, for 
example, whether the 1944 elections and the passage of the Bretton 
Woods agreements serve as convincing evidence of a constitutional 
moment. While the 1944 elections may have provided support for a 
more internationalist foreign policy, it does not appear that any of the 
major political leaders viewed the election results as a mandate to do 
away with the treaty. Neither Roosevelt nor Dewey engaged in any se-
92. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 884-85. 
93. See id. at 891-92. 
94. While one amendment to strip the Senate of its exclusive treaty powers passed the 
House by 288 to 88, 91 CONG. REC. 4367-68 (1945), these proposals never came to a vote in 
the Senate. Ackerman and Golove present no explanation concerning the votes in the 
House; were the Members of the House serious? Was this part of a concerted campaign to 
strip the Senate of its authority? Or was this vote symbolic, meant only to show that the 
House was doing something about international agreements? 
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rious debate or discussion during the campaign about the shape of the 
postwar world or the United Nations - in fact, the presidential candi­
dates had negotiated a truce to keep the question of international or­
ganization out of the wartime elections.95 Franklin Roosevelt's cam­
paign activity during the summer and fall of 1944 shows no mention of 
the Senate's treaty role or of congressional-executive agreements.96 In 
his most significant speech concerning foreign affairs during the elec­
tion, President Roosevelt only saw fit to discuss broad policy differ­
ences with the Republican Party - namely his claims that Republi­
cans had always championed isolationism - rather than process issues 
like the Senate's power over treaties.97 
Evidence is similarly absent concerning the approval of the Bret­
ton Woods and U.N. Charter agreements. President Truman's mem­
oirs do not discuss any constitutional deal, nor even the issue of the in­
terchangeability of congressional-executive agreements. Dean 
Acheson, who at the time was Assistant Secretary of State for con­
gressional relations, never mentions the issue in his detailed account of 
the period.98 It does not appear that either Senators or Members of the 
House understood the passage of Bretton Woods to impart any 
meanings of constitutional significance. While Ackerman and Golove 
rely upon statements in the congressional record, committee reports, 
and the occasional campaign speech or party platform, they do not 
place these records in the context provided by numerous available 
primary sources, such as the Foreign Relations of the United States se­
ries, presidential library materials, memoirs, and oral histories - all 
standard sources for diplomatic and presidential historians of the ori­
gins of the Cold War. 
Ackerman and Golove further fail to rely upon, or even cite, any 
secondary historical and political science works about the period. Such 
sources reveal that their reading of the construction of the postwar 
world has little support in the mainstream historical accounts. Stan­
dard biographies of FDR, both old and new, do not mention inter­
changeability, congressional-executive agreements, or the Senate's 
95. See HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note 91, at 162. 
96. See, e.g., Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Dinner of International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America (Sept. 23, 1944), in THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1944-45 VOLUME: 
VICTORY AND THE THRESHOLD OF PEACE 284 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950); Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association (Oct. 21, 1944), in id. at 
342 [hereinafter Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association). 
97. See Roosevelt, Radio Address at Dinner of Foreign Policy Association, supra note 
96. 
98. See DEAN ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE 
DEPARTMENT 104-15 (1969). Secondary sources on Acheson's role likewise are silent about 
interchangeability and congressional-executive agreements. See, e.g., JAMES CHACE, 
ACHESON: THE SECRETARY OF STATE WHO CREATED THE AMERICAN WORLD 97-109 
(1998). 
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role in treatymaking in the context of the 1944 elections.99 More spe­
cialized works on Franklin Roosevelt and foreign policy, such as 
Robert Dallek's standard Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign 
Policy, 1932-1945,100 and more recent studies,101 make no mention of 
interchangeability - indicating again that neither Roosevelt nor the 
voters in the 1944 elections thought much about the issue. If anything, 
the secondary works indicate that FDR respected the Senate's treaty 
role and sought ways to work with leading Senators on important in­
ternational agreements, such as the U.N. Charter, rather than avoiding 
the Senate through new constitutional loopholes.102 Leading histories 
of President Truman's establishment of the Cold War national security 
state and of the policy of containment, such as John Lewis Gaddis's 
Strategies of Containment, 103 Melvyn Leffler's A Preponderance of 
Power104 or Michael Hogan's Cross of Iron,105 are similarly silent -
further confirming that no one of any political significance believed 
that passage of the Bretton Woods or the U.N. agreements signified 
the acceptance of interchangeability. 
It seems unlikely that modern historians have utterly missed a de­
velopment of such significance, one that would have removed a major 
stumbling block to American participation in postwar international 
organizations. The more likely explanation is simply that Ackerman 
99. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 90, at 521-31; FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. 
ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 556-76 (1990). The definitive biography of 
FDR, by Kenneth S. Davis, has yet to reach the 1944 elections. See KENNETH S. DA VIS, 
FDR: THE BECKONING OF DESTINY, 1882-1928 (1972); FDR: THE NEW YORK YEARS, 
1928-1933 (1985); FDR: THE NEW DEAL YEARS, 1933-1937 (1986); FDR: INTO THE STORM, 
1937-1940 (1993). 
100. ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 
1932-1945 (1979); see also ROBERT A. DIVINE, ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II (1969); 
GADDIS SMITH, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1941-1945 
(1965). 
101. See, e.g. , WARREN F. KIMBALL, THE JUGGLER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AS 
WARTIME STATESMAN (1991); FREDERICK W. MARKS III, WIND OVER SAND: THE 
DIPLOMACY OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1988). Specialized historical works on the home 
front and on wartime economic policy also show no evidence that interchangeability, the 
congressional-executive agreement, or the Senate's treaty role was an important part of the 
Roosevelt administration's thinking about the postwar world. See ALAN S. MILWARD, WAR, 
ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY, 1939-1945 (1977). 
102. See, e.g., FREIDEL, supra note 99, at 521-22 (describing Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull's activities with the Senators of the Committee of Eight to develop a bipartisan policy 
on international organizations). 
103. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 
OF POSTWAR AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (1982). 
104. MELVYN LEFFLER, A PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE 
TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THE COLD WAR (1992). 
105. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS 
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954 (1998); see also DANIEL YERGIN, 
SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STATE (1977). 
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and Golove have overreached in their use of the constitutional mo­
ments theory, have ignored the great wealth of research on Roosevelt, 
World War II and the origins of the Cold War, and have used primary 
sources in a manner that is strikingly inconsistent with these broader 
historical and political accounts. 
These problems can be illustrated by another example involving 
international agreements. In 1951, Senator Bricker promoted a consti­
tutional amendment that would have made clear that treaties were 
subject to the Constitution's limitations on the powers of the federal 
government.106 In another form, the Bricker Amendment required that 
congressional-executive agreements could not replace treaties, and yet 
a different version added that international agreements required con­
gressional legislation to become effective as internal law of the United 
States.107 In other words, the Bricker Amendment would have allowed 
the national government to make treaties that extended only so far as 
Congress could legislate under Article I, Section 8, and it also would 
have required legislation to implement all treaties. This final form of 
the Bricker Amendment lost by only one vote in the Senate, and only 
after the Eisenhower administration had publicly declared that it un­
derstood the law governing treaties to correspond already to the pro­
posal.108 The Bricker Amendment certainly came closer to passage 
than proposals to strip the Senate of its treaty monopoly ever did. Un­
der the Ackerman thesis, perhaps the Bricker Amendment was the 
transformative moment, not Bretton Woods, as defeat of the trans­
formative amendment required acquiescence by the President in a 
new constitutional practice. 
One last fault with the transformationist approach to treaties is 
worth discussion. In order for the Ackerman thesis to work, it needs to 
see as sharp a break as possible with the politics and law that prevailed 
immediately before the constitutional moment allegedly occurred. 
Evolution does not make for an exciting revolution. Ackerman and 
Golove, therefore, must do all they can to discredit the arguments of 
the internationalist New Deal scholars who preceded them - they 
come very close to accusing these intellectuals of misrepresenting 
precedent and of consciously making up their constitutional theories 
out of whole cloth. They also must work hard to create as sharp a dis­
tinction as possible between the practice of the political branches be­
fore the constitutional moment and the practice afterwards. This is a 
mistake. While there was no long tradition of the use of ex post con­
gressional-executive agreements, the earlier examples of presidential 
106. See DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT CONTROVERSY: A TEST 
OF EISENHOWER'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988). 
107. See S.J. Res. 102, 82d Cong. (1951); S.J. Res. 130, 82d Cong. (1952); S.J. Res. 1, 83d 
Cong. (1953). 
108. See T ANANBAUM, supra note 106, at 175-90. 
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and legislative cooperation in foreign affairs showed the possibilities 
that the constitutional text and structure might have permitted. While 
the New Deal intellectuals and current-day internationalists may not 
have settled on the right constitutional basis for the congressional­
executive agreement, Ackerman and Golove err in reading their ar­
guments as result-oriented justifications for their desired policies. We 
are left with the conclusion that the transformationist account fails on 
its own terms. 
3. The Response to the Transformationists: Treaty Exclusivity 
While Ackerman and Golove defend the broad interchangeability 
of congressional-executive agreements, other leading academics have 
responded to this new instrument by articulating a theory of treaty ex­
clusivity. Treaty exclusivity holds that the Treaty Clause provides the 
only constitutional method for reaching significant international 
agreements. Put simply, exclusivists argue that the Constitution men­
tions only one method of making international agreements - the 
treaty - and thus all other means are excluded. While this view has 
received the approval of various academics over the years, including 
Edwin Borchard109 and Raoul Berger,110 this Section will focus on Pro­
fessor Laurence Tribe's recent espousal of treaty exclusivity and his 
criticisms of the transformationist approach. It will conclude by ex­
plaining why treaty exclusivity itself is ultimately an unsuccessful ef­
fort to account for the relationship between treaties and statutes. 
Replying to Professor Ackerman and Golove's defense of the con­
gressional-executive agreement, Professor Tribe argues that the statu­
tory process for making international agreements violates the Consti­
tution. m Much of Tribe's argument hits home. What Tribe fails to do, 
however, is provide an explanation for the constitutionality of the 
congressional-executive agreement, or identify a distinction between 
treaties and statutes for purposes of making international agreements. 
Rather, Tribe is left arguing that the Treaty Clause is the exclusive 
method for making significant international agreements, that the 
WTO and NAFf A agreements are unconstitutional, and that Ameri­
can presidents and congresses have built much of the postwar world 
order on unconstitutional foundations. 
Tribe effectively criticizes Ackerman's approach to constitutional 
interpretation on several grounds. He accuses Ackerman and Golove 
of ignoring the basic architecture of the Constitution, as expressed in 
109. Edwin Borchard, Treaties and Executive Agreements - A Reply, 54 YALE L.J. 616 
(1945). 
1 10. Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1 
(1972). 
1 1 1. See Tribe, supra note 14. 
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the manner in which its text and structures fit together. Rather than 
attempting to harmonize the Constitution's different provisions, 
Ackerman and Golove read them only as "suggestions" or "illustra­
tions" of many possible governmental structures.112 Any gap, there­
fore, in the constitutional text - such as the absence of a provision 
making clear the Treaty Clause's exclusivity - constitutes an oppor­
tunity to provide for an extratextual means of lawmaking.113 The Nec­
essary and Proper Clause notwithstanding, the Supreme Court's ap­
proach to the separation of powers demonstrates the faults of the 
Ackerman and Golove approach. In INS v. Chadha, 114 for example, 
the Court did not infer any extra congressional power to provide for 
the legislative veto, while in New York v. United States115 the Court did 
not allow the Necessary and Proper Clause to permit for the comman­
deering of state legislatures. In both cases, the Constitution's struc­
tural guarantees for the protection of the other branches of the federal 
government and of the states barred use of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to transform a constitutional gap into a new form of federal 
lawmaking. As with the legislative veto and commandeering state 
governments, Tribe concludes, so it is with the congressional-executive 
agreement. 116 
Tribe makes several less abstract textual and structural arguments 
that more directly undermine the transformationist approach. In per­
haps his most insightful textual response to Ackerman and Golove, 
Tribe claims that the transformationist reading conflicts with the 
Court's understanding of the Appointments Clause.117 According to 
the transformationist account, the Treaty Clause is nonexclusive be­
cause it does not expressly prohibit any alternative methods for mak­
ing international agreements. The Appointments Clause, however, 
which sits adjacent to the Treaty Clause in Article II, expressly pro­
vides for alternative methods: while it requires Senate approval of 
principal officers of the United States, it allows Congress to vest the 
appointment of inferior officers in the President, heads of depart­
ments, or the federal courts. Thus, in Article II, Section 2 itself, the 
Framers made exclusive senatorial advice and consent to the appoint­
ment of principal officers, and then explicitly created an alternate pro-
112. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1245. 
1 13. See id. at 1239-45. 
114. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
115.  505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
1 16. Professor Golove has written a lengthy response to Professor Tribe that argues that 
much of Tribe's criticisms contradict Tribe's own approach to constitutional interpretation. 
See generally Golove, supra note 38. Golove argues, for example, that Tribe's arguments 
would render unconstitutional much of the administrative state - a result that Tribe clearly 
would not favor. See id. at 1831-32. 
1 17. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1272-75. 
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cedure for inferior officers. Application of the canon of expressio 
unius, Tribe argues, indicates that there is no alternate procedure for 
the making of international agreements. If the Framers had wanted to 
provide for other methods for making international agreements, they 
knew how. 
Tribe's second main point is based on the Constitution's provision 
for a presidential veto over statutesY8 According to most authorities, 
the President has the plenary authority to refuse to ratify a treaty, 
even after the Senate has consented to it.119 Under Article II, it is the 
President who "makes" the treaty, subject only to Senate advice and 
consent. But if congressional-executive agreements serve as a valid al­
ternative to treaties, the President has only a conditional veto over 
statutes that Congress may override by a two-thirds vote. Resort to a 
statutory method for making international agreements allows Con­
gress to make international agreements over presidential objection, a 
result forbidden by the text of the Treaty Clause. If Congress can use 
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Tribe asserts, in combination with 
its enumerated powers to override presidential opposition, then it also 
could use the same powers to appoint its own ambassadors and to 
conduct its own negotiations with foreign powers. Use of the congres­
sional-executive agreement thus has the effect of reducing the Presi­
dent's constitutional prerogatives in foreign relations. 
Tribe effectively identifies interpretive, textual, and structural 
problems with the transformationist defense of interchangeability. He 
fails, however, to develop a convincing theory to take its place. Tribe's 
uncompromising reading of the text forces him to conclude that the 
treaty power is the only method for making significant international 
agreements, although he concedes that the President can make other 
nontreaty agreements alone as sole executive agreements.12° For Tribe, 
deciding whether an agreement must receive the consent of a Senate 
supermajority depends upon whether the "agreement constrains fed­
eral or state sovereignty and submits United States citizens or political 
entities to the authority of bodies wholly or partially separate from the 
ordinary arms of federal or state government. "121 To support this 
proposition, Tribe relies solely upon a letter written by his colleague, 
Professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, to a Senator during the Senate's 
consideration of the WT0.122 Absent from Tribe's analysis is any ex-
118. See id. at 1252-57. 
1 19. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 303 cmt. d; HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 184. 
120. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1268-69. 
121. See id. at 1268. 
122. See id. at 1267 n.157. While I have the greatest respect for Professor Slaughter's 
work, to my knowledge she has never written a scholarly work about the nature of treaties 
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amination of the treaty power in light of the Constitution's allocation 
of powers to other branches of the government, of the historical con­
troversies concerning the treaty power's scope, or of the work of pre­
vious scholars who have sought answers to these questions. 
More troubling still, the distinction Tribe pursues in defining the 
Treaty Clause is both too broad and too narrow. Tribe believes that 
the nation must use treaties whenever it constrains its sovereignty or 
subjects its citizens to another sovereign power, but he fails to define 
sovereignty and whether the political branches can delegate it. Tribe 
fails to understand the difference between international obligations on 
the one hand, and their implementation according to domestic consti­
tutional processes on the other. This leads him to confuse sovereignty 
in its international sense and sovereignty in its domestic constitutional 
sense. Any international obligation, whether assumed by the President 
alone, by the President and the Senate, or by the Congress as a whole, 
constrains the sovereignty of the people of the United States. That is 
the very nature of an international obligation. If Tribe believes that 
any international agreement that constrains federal or state sover­
eignty must undergo the treaty process, then all such pacts must be 
executed as treaties. Tribe himself, however, refuses to go that far, as 
he acknowledges the constitutionality of sole executive agreements. 
Tribe's effort to develop an exclusivist theory fails to understand 
sovereignty in its domestic sense. The difficult question is not whether 
an international agreement constrains or delegates national sover­
eignty, but whether the branches of government will live up to it. 
While a treaty creates an international obligation, it is the Constitu­
tion's allocation of powers to the three branches that provides the 
powers to fulfill it - no treaty can constrain the lawmaking authority 
of the federal government. According to the last-in-time rule, for ex­
ample, Congress is free at any time to override a treaty simply by 
passing a statute.123 Even the President, acting alone, can effectively 
terminate a treaty.124 A treaty cannot permanently alter the sover­
eignty of the United States or of the American people; it cannot 
change the allocation of authority between federal and state govern­
ments as established by the Constitution. Only a constitutional 
amendment could achieve that result. 
under the American constitutional system, and I am sure that she herself would not hold out 
her letter as an authoritative examination of the question. While Professor Spiro does not 
scrutinize the merits of Tribe's distinctions, he likewise expresses surprise that Tribe would 
rest a critical part of his argument on a letter from a colleague. See Spiro, supra note 15. 
123. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The Chinese 
Exclusion Case); Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Edye v. Robertson, 112 
U.S. 580, 599 (1884) (The Head Money Cases). 
124. See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 444 
U.S. 996 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 339; HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 214. 
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A constitutional amendment, not a treaty, would also be required 
to achieve the second class of actions envisioned by Tribe: subjecting 
American citizens directly to international rules and organizations. 
The Constitution makes no explicit provision that would allow for the 
transfer of federal power to entities - outside of the American gov­
ernmental system - that are not directly responsible to the American 
people. In a different context, I have outlined the constitutional diffi­
culties with delegating public power outside of the national govern­
ment.125 Placing American citizens under the direct regulation of in­
ternational law and organizations seems inconsistent with the very 
Appointments Clause that provides Tribe with such ammunition 
against Ackerman and Golove. While much recent scholarship on the 
Clause has focused on the relative roles of the President and Senate in 
appointing judges,126 the Court has articulated the Clause's broader 
function in ensuring that only federal officers accountable to the peo­
ple's elected representatives may exercise federal power.127 As first 
stated by the Court in Buckley v. Valeo, the Appointments Clause re­
quires that those exercising substantial authority under federal law 
must undergo appointment according to the Clause's terms.128 As sub­
sequent cases explain, this rule prevents Congress from transferring 
executive law enforcement authority to individuals not responsible to 
the President or his subordinates.129 
Read in this manner, the Appointments Clause plays more than a 
separation of powers role in maintaining the balance between the 
Congress, the treatymakers, and the President. As Chief Justice 
Rehnquist has written for the Court, "The Clause is a bulwark against 
one branch aggrandizing its power at the expense of another branch, 
but it is more: it 'preserves another aspect of the Constitution's struc­
tural integrity by preventing the diffusion of the appointment 
power.' "130 According to the Chief Justice, the Clause prevents the 
125. See John C. Yoo, Kosovo, War Powers, and the Multilateral Future, 148 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1673, 1708-20 (2000) [hereinafter Yoo, Kosovo]; John C. Yoo, The New Sovereignty 
and the Old Constitution: The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Appointments Clause, 
15 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 116 (1998) (hereinafter Yoo, New Sovereignty]. 
126. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, The President, the Senate, the Constitution, and the 
Confirmation Process: A Reply to Professors Strauss and Sunstein, 71 TEX. L. REV. 633, 638-
39 (1993); David A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Con­
firmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1502-12 (1992); John C. Yoo, Criticizing Judges, 1 
GREEN BAG 20 277, 278 (1998). 
127. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 663 (1997); Ryder v. United 
States, 515 U.S. 177, 180-84 (1995); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 169-76 (1994); 
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884 (1991); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976) 
(per curiam). 
128. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 132. 
129. See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 659; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922-23 
(1997). 
130. Ryder, 515 U.S. at 182 (quoting Freytag, 501 U.S. at 878). 
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diffusion of federal power by limiting its exercise only to those who 
undergo the appointment process.131 The Framers, the Court con­
cluded, centralized the appointment power because they feared the 
vesting of power in officeholders who were not accountable to the 
electorate, as had occurred during the colonial period. A centralized 
appointment process prevents the national government, as a whole, 
from concealing or confusing the lines of governmental authority and 
responsibility so that the people may hold the actions of the govern­
ment accountable. 
Other constitutional structures limit the treatymakers' ability to 
transfer lawmaking and law enforcement power outside the United 
States. Whether one agrees with the formalist or functionalist side in 
the debate over the separation of powers,132 transferring power outside 
of the federal government fundamentally conflicts with the concept of 
unified executive power. For formalists, any exercise of federal 
authority by an individual who is not a member of the executive 
branch, and thus is not removable by the President, unconstitutionally 
prevents the President from directing the implementation of federal 
law.133 While functionalists may be willing to accept some conditions 
on the removal power, they have not endorsed the delegation of fed­
eral power to those who are completely insulated from the Chief Ex­
ecutive.134 Functionalists further would object to such delegation be­
cause it would undermine accountability in government. Voters 
cannot hold either the President or Congress accountable if govern­
ment actions result from the decisions of officials who do not belong 
to either branch. The nondelegation doctrine, which has begun to re­
ceive renewed attention,135 lends added support to this notion. As for­
mulated by the Court, this doctrine prohibits Congress from delegat­
ing its enumerated power to another branch unless it has stated an 
objective, prescribed methods to achieve it, and articulated intelligible 
131. See id. at 182-84 (noting that the Clause prevents diffusion of the appointment 
power). 
132. Compare, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44 (formalist), with Martin S. Fla­
herty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725 (1996) (functionalist), and Lawrence 
Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1994) (functionalist). 
133. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44, at 593-99. 
134. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691-92 (1988) (noting that "good cause" 
removal of the independent counsel still allows the President to retain authority over the 
counsel's duties); see also Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 132, at 106-16 (claiming that al­
though there are numerous independent agencies, complete independence from the Presi­
dent would still raise constitutional problems). 
135. See, e.g., Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-47 (1998) (striking down the 
President's use of the Line Item Veto Act where its effect was to amend acts of Congress, 
thus violating the Presentment Clause); American Trucking Ass'n v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 
1033 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev'd, Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 121 S. Ct. 
903 (2001). 
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standards to guide administrative discretion.136 These standards pro­
vide the courts, Congress, and the public with some objective factors 
to review whether the power is being exercised within the limits of the 
delegation. Delegating lawmaking or law enforcement authority to 
foreign or international officials threatens the purposes of this rule. If 
the political branches transfer such authority over American citizens 
entirely outside of the federal government, neither Congress nor the 
public can determine whether foreign or international officials exer­
cise their authority according to American standards, nor can they en­
force their policy wishes through the usual legal or political methods 
available when power is delegated within the executive branch.137 
Transferring sovereign lawmaking and law enforcement authority 
to international organizations - by which I mean imposing rules di­
rectly upon American citizens within the United States without any 
intervening participation by domestic governmental organs - threat­
ens these structures. International officials do not undergo the execu­
tive, congressional, and public scrutiny that accompanies federal ap­
pointments. They are not responsible to the American political 
system: they are not bound by federal statutory or administrative 
guidelines, they cannot be removed or disciplined by the President, 
they need not obey presidential orders, their funding cannot be cut off 
by Congress, they have no obligation to obey congressional summons 
to testify, they cannot be sued in American courts for their official ac­
tions, and they need not respond to press inquiries. If Congress or the 
people disagree with the policies established by an international or­
ganization, they have no resort to the usual political channels that al­
low the national political system to control elected officials and the 
administrative state. Every other exercise of governmental sovereignty 
- the power to make and enforce laws that directly regulate the con­
duct of individual citizens - is strictly regulated by the Constitution 
and subject to the delicate and difficult procedures of the Article I, 
Section 8 statutory process. It would seem that to allow the federal 
government to restructure the public lawmaking process to include a 
significant actor that is independent of the political process would re­
quire, at the very least, a constitutional amendment. Neither a treaty 
nor a congressional-executive agreement will suffice. 
An examination of the congressional-executive agreement marking 
American entry into the new WTO demonstrates the dual faults of 
136. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-79 (1989) (approving a congres­
sional delegation of power where the goals were clearly set out, the purposes asserted, and 
the scope of the delegation was definitively confined). 
137. Elsewhere, I have argued that the original understanding of the Constitution sup­
ports this reading of the Constitution and its structures in favor of governmental account­
ability. See Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1717; Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 125, at 
109. 
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Tribe's approach to sovereignty. Tribe believes that the Uruguay 
Round agreements, which established the WTO, constrains American 
national or state sovereignty sufficiently to require the use of a 
treaty.138 In one sense, Tribe correctly observes that the WTO limits 
American sovereignty by committing the United States to a system of 
rules that constrain its ability to engage in trade-related measures, 
such as raising tariffs, enacting discriminatory import restrictions, or 
barring foreign corporations from certain markets. Every international 
agreement, however, imposes some type of obligation upon the 
United States - some limit on American sovereignty - for which it 
receives some benefit. Unless Tribe believes that every single interna­
tional agreement requires a treaty, his definition of sovereignty at this 
level is far too broad. This is an extreme position that even Tribe does 
not espouse,139 and one that is at odds with two centuries of national 
practice. 
Along the domestic dimension of sovereignty, Tribe's account of 
the WTO similarly misses the mark. Even though the WTO may place 
international obligations upon the United States' trade practices, it 
places no binding restrictions on American sovereignty or power in 
the constitutional sense.140 Upon agreeing to the new WTO system, the 
United States agreed to live up to certain substantive trade provisions, 
but the agreement itself does not directly act upon American citizens. 
It remains within the purview of the federal government whether to, 
and how to, live up to the WTO's requirements, consistent with do­
mestic constitutional procedures. For example, the WTO creates a 
dispute settlement procedure, in which other nations may bring ac­
tions to protest American violations of the WTO's terms. A decision 
by a WTO dispute settlement panel, however, has no binding legal ef­
fect within the United States, nor does it have any constitutional im­
pact on the branches of the national government. A WTO body could 
not order the State of California, for example, to cease discriminatory 
import restrictions on computer equipment imports from abroad, nor 
could it legally force the United States to treat South American agri­
cultural imports on an equal footing with American produce. The 
United States can choose to ignore the WTO decision and keep its 
laws and policies intact; there is no supranational body that can com­
pel the United States to obey. While aggrieved nations might receive 
permission from the WTO to impose compensatory sanctions on 
138. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1267 n.156. 
139. See, e.g., id. at 1268-69 (arguing that the President po�sesses an "unenumerated 
power to enter non-treaty agreements"). 
140. See, e.g., Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 
Memorandum from Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger, to Ambassador Michael 
Kantor, United States Trade Representative, at 18-21 (Nov. 22, 1994), at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/olc/gatt.htm. 
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American imports, there is no direct regulation of American citizens 
or parties by any international organization. Tribe's definition of the 
scope of treaties, therefore, provides little help on this score because 
neither GATT, NAFTA, nor any international agreement can restrict 
American sovereignty - the Constitution itself gives to the political 
branches the discretion whether to comply or to ignore any inter­
national obligation. If an international agreement did call for a trans­
fer of sovereignty beyond the limits of the federal government, a con­
stitutional amendment would be required to make the agreement en­
forceable. 
Professor Tribe's conclusion that all congressional-executive 
agreements violate the Constitution sweeps too far. If Tribe were cor­
rect, about ninety percent of all of the international agreements made 
by the United States since World War II would be invalid.141 These 
agreements include not just postal exchange agreements, but many of 
the foundations of the postwar economic order, such as Bretton 
Woods and GATT, and America's recent efforts to expand free trade 
after the end of the Cold War, such as NAFTA and the WTO. Fur­
ther, the exclusivist view ignores competing constitutional structures 
and texts that cut against it. Tribe argues, for example, that the Neces­
sary and Proper Clause cannot justify the congressional-executive 
agreement, but he provides no explanation for the reach of Congress's 
plenary power over international commerce. Even if Congress cannot . 
send its own ambassadors or ratify its own international agreements, 
Tribe's interpretation of the Treaty Clause does not bar Congress 
from passing statutes involving international commerce that unilater­
ally accept international obligations. 
While Tribe's view reduces the problems created by interchange­
ability by granting the Treaty Clause a broad scope, it creates its own 
structural distortions. In order to expand the reach of treaties, the ex­
clusivist view must engage in a corresponding reduction in Congress's 
constitutional powers. If Tribe concludes that treaties are the exclusive 
method for entering into international agreements, and if he believes 
that treaties can be self-executing in the domestic legal system, then 
his approach leads to the conclusion that the treatymakers can legis­
late on almost any subject, so long as it is addressed by an interna­
tional agreement. This would allow the treatymakers to exercise Con­
gress's Article I, Section 8 powers to regulate domestic and 
international commerce by treaty. To take but one example, if the na­
tion wanted to change the length of time for patents, it generally 
141. Professor Golove also has taken Professor Tribe to task for this reason. See 
Golove, supra note 38, at 1804-05. While Tribe attempts to escape from the results of his ar­
guments by pointing out that some congressional-executive agreements were approved by 
two-thirds of the Senate anyway, Tribe, supra note 14, at 1227, or that the President could 
have unilaterally made many such agreements without congressional consent, id. at 1269, 
these tentative justifications do not seem convincing. 
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would use a statute due to Congress's Article I, Section 8 authority to 
regulate intellectual property. If an international agreement is in­
volved, however, authority over this subject suddenly would transfer 
to the treatymakers. Tribe's exclusivist approach would deprive the 
House of its constitutional function over certain classes of domestic 
legislation merely because an international agreement became in­
volved. 
Tribe might escape this dilemma if he were to accept the view that 
most treaties are non-self-executing; in other words, that they do not 
exert a domestic legal effect unless Congress implements their terms 
by statute. As I will explain in further detail later in this Article, treaty 
non-self-execution permits a harmonization of the treaty power and 
the legislative power by precluding treaties from exercising any power 
granted to the legislature in Article I, Section 8. Tribe might argue, as 
I have, that treaties could form the primary method for international 
agreement-making because all domestic implementation would re­
main in the hands of Congress, thereby avoiding structural contradic­
tions created by the potential overlap of the treaty and legislative 
powers. Tribe, however, does not appear to take this view in his criti­
cism of the transformationist school.142 Indeed, he appears to take the 
opposite position, because his criticism is that the WTO - enacted as 
a statute - enjoys the powers of a treaty without its form. If Tribe ac­
cepted that treaties were non-self-executing, then the WTO's passage 
as a statute would be of little concern, because the government would 
still need to pass a statute to implement its terms. Even if Tribe were 
to adopt a general non-self-execution view, his approach to interna­
tional agreements does not explain why some treaties may immedi­
ately take effect domestically, while others must await congressional 
implementation. 
Finally, Tribe's exclusivist reading fails to take account of the 
changing nature of international law and organizations. As is becom­
ing clear, many areas of life that were once considered wholly domes­
tic have become international in scope.143 International agreements 
now regulate issues such as crime, national security, the environment, 
economic regulation, and individual rights - issues that used to be 
governed primarily by domestic legislation. These agreements seek to 
mimic domestic legislation in directly regulating the conduct of private 
individuals and in creating their own independent means of lawmaking 
and law enforcement. If the exclusivist reading were correct, then we 
should expect the Treaty Clause to have expanded in recent years, 
rather than retracted, as international agreements have come to play a 
more important role in domestic regulation. Tribe's approach would 
142. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1261 n.133; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 644 (3d ed. 2000). 
143. See, e.g., Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1967-69. 
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shift the locus for domestic regulation from the normal legislative pro­
cess to the supermajority Treaty Clause process, which excludes the 
House. These and other issues will be the subject of Parts II and III, 
which will explain why both full interchangeability and the exclusivist 
reading of the Treaty Clause are flawed and incomplete, and then pre­
sent a new theory of treaties and congressional-executive agreements. 
II. PRACTICE, PUBLIC LAWMAKING, AND THE CONGRESSIONAL­
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT 
A starting point for a durable theory of international agreements 
must recognize that the practice of the political branches roughly de­
lineates separate spheres for treaties and statutes. Not only ought the­
ory explain this record, but it also should provide a satisfying account 
of how international agreement-making interacts with our general 
public lawmaking system. Theories that create anomalies and contra­
dictions in the manner in which the branches participate in making 
laws ought to be rejected in favor of a theory that accounts for practice 
in a manner consistent with the text, structure, and original under­
standing of the Constitution. 
Judged by these standards, the internationalist, transformationist, 
and exclusivist approaches fail. As an initial matter, the sweeping con­
clusions of all three camps cannot account for the practice of the po­
litical branches during the postwar period. If the internationalists or 
transformationists were right, one would expect to see the nation use 
congressional-executive agreements in almost every instance. If the 
exclusivist theory were correct, the branches should have used treaties 
to make all international agreements. Yet, as will become clear, the 
political branches continue to use both instruments of foreign policy. 
Further, they do so in a way that maintains a subject matter distinction 
between the two, something that none of the academic theories on in­
ternational agreements can explain. In my view, this record of practice 
not only represents a practical way to work out the conflict between 
treaties and statutes, but also shows how deeper structural imperatives 
in the Constitution have led the branches to interact in a way that 
harmonizes their potentially conflicting powers. As such, practice can 
provide a true reflection of a correct reading of the Constitution. 
An even more significant defect in these theories is their creation 
of severe conflicts within the constitutional text and structure. Advo­
cates of full interchangeability ignore the fundamental problems that 
emerge when statutes take the place of treaties. Under the current 
consensus view, for example, treaties enjoy a substantial amount of 
freedom from the normal constitutional limitations that apply to stat­
utes. Allowing statutes to replace treaties would permit Congress to 
expand its Article I powers beyond their current boundaries. Nor do 
those who believe that the treaty power is exclusive avoid structural 
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difficulties. As domestic affairs become more international, and hence 
increasingly subject to international regulation, international agree­
ments will assume a greater role in imposing rules of conduct on pri­
vate citizens. Treaties could potentially replace statutes as a method 
for domestic legislation. Because of the expansive sweep of the Treaty 
Power, regulation through international agreement could reach well 
beyond the limits on Congress's statutory powers. 
This Part will begin to construct a theory that addresses these prac­
tical, textual and structural problems. First, it will discuss the practice 
of making international agreements in the postwar period, with the 
goal of identifying the line between statutes and treaties. Second, it 
will argue that statutes and treaties must remain distinct due to the 
constitutional contradictions that arise when one replaces the other. 
Part III will then propose a different way to conceptualize congres­
sional-executive agreements, and the manner in which they can be dis­
tinguished from the treaty process, to solve these problems. 
A. The Record of Practice 
Practice is of particular importance in foreign affairs law. Due to 
the lack of authoritative judicial precedent, many of the issues involv­
ing the Constitution and international relations do not have clear an­
swers. In such circumstances, the executive and legislative branches 
often have taken the lead in interpreting the Constitution, and this 
practice can provide us with guidance as to a realistic, workable con­
struction of its terms. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube, "The Constitution is a framework for government. 
Therefore the way the framework has consistently operated fairly es­
tablishes that it has operated according to its true nature. "144 In domes­
tic areas, judicial precedent represents the experience of courts in 
working out the Constitution's text and structure within different prac­
tical contexts; in the absence of case law, practice by the political 
branches provides a similar record in foreign affairs. Recognizing this, 
the Supreme Court often has deferred on foreign affairs questions to 
the practical construction of a constitutional provision by the political 
branches.145 Prominent foreign affairs scholars, such as Professors 
Harold Koh and Gerhard Casper, often have followed suit.146 
144. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
145. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990); Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). 
146. KOH, supra note 6, at 70-71 (discussing quasi-constitutional custom as a source of 
law in foreign affairs); Gerhard Casper, Constitutional Constraints on the Conduct of Foreign 
and Defense Policy: A Nonjudicial Model, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 463, 478 (1976). 
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No scholar has yet conducted an empirical survey upon which to 
test his or her theory of treaties and congressional-executive agree­
ments. This Article will be the first to show that customary practice 
indicates that the political branches have observed discernable lines in 
the use of these instruments of national policy.147 Viewed in this light, 
the practice of the political branches in making international agree­
ments strikes at the heart of both the internationalist and the trans­
formationist approaches. Traditional explanations for the congres­
sional-executive agreement maintain that congressional-executive 
agreements have always served as a perfect substitute for the treaty. A 
demonstration that ex post congressional-executive agreements are of 
relatively recent vintage, and that even today they have not achieved 
full interchangeability with treaties, undermines internationalist 
claims. Without the pedigree provided by the consistent practice of the 
political branches and by the imprimatur of the courts, international­
ists are left only with the textual arguments that they have developed 
to justify the substitution of statutes for treaties. As argued above, 
these arguments leave the congressional-executive agreement with 
very weak foundations indeed. 
Practice also deals a fatal blow to the transformationists. Their case 
depends not only on the notion that the defenders of the ancient re­
gime capitulated to the changes wrought by the constitutional mo­
ment, but also that the old guard, as it were, itself observes the new 
constitutional settlement.148 It is not much of a constitutional moment 
if no one remembers it. A history of consistent practice that distin­
guishes between treaties and congressional-executive agreements con-
147. In his forthcoming article, Professor Spiro takes note of the consistent use of trea­
ties in some areas, such as arms control and human rights. Spiro, supra note 15. Spiro, how­
ever, does not seek to identify systematically what areas have consistently been subject to 
treaties or congressional-executive agreements, nor is it his object to develop a theory that 
explains the line between the two instruments. Id. Rather, Spiro seeks to establish a new 
theory of interpretation that depends upon historical developments and political practice to 
legitimate constitutional change. While this Article is not the place to conduct a thorough 
examination of Spiro's theory, it seems to me that his approach - while critical of 
Ackerman's theory of constitutional moments - is equally flawed by allowing politics to 
trump the text and structure of the Constitution. In regard to interchangeability, for exam­
ple, Spiro can supply no coherent line between treaties and congressional-executive agree­
ments aside from the fact that the political branches simply have acted differently in differ­
ent areas, without reference to the constitutional text and structure. Spiro's approach is a 
constitutional theory of political fiat - if the political branches follow a certain practice, it 
becomes constitutional. The problems with this theory are clear - Spiro would be forced to 
accept, for example, the constitutionality of Plessy v. Ferguson and the entrenchment of Jim 
Crow between 1877 and 1954. He provides no normative guide to judge the constitutionality 
of government action, beyond whether the people of that time approve of its constitutional­
ity. Cf. John C. Yoo, Choosing Justices: A Political Appointments Process and the Wages of 
Judicial Supremacy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1436, 1449 (2000) (book review) (criticizing a related 
theory that constitutional outcomes are legitimate based on the political support they re­
ceive). 
148. See ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 48-49 (dis­
cussing "the period of ratification"). 
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tradicts the Ackerman and Golove theory, because no definitive 
"codification" of the constitutional moment into formal legal doctrine 
ever took place - a critical stage of the general transformationist the­
ory of constitutional change.149 Even after the alleged constitutional 
moment, the political branches appear to have observed subject mat­
ter distinctions between treaties and congressional-executive agree­
ments. This leads to two possible conclusions: either none of the 
branches understood the decision to approve the Bretton Woods 
agreement by statute as a significant metamorphosis in constitutional 
doctrine, or the 1944 transformation was a stillborn constitutional 
moment because it failed to stick over time. 
Let us first examine how practice undermines the standard account 
of congressional-executive agreements. The doctrine of interchange­
ability has not been with us always, nor has it ever held full sway. As 
Professors Ackerman and Golove have argued in their exhaustive ex­
amination of international agreement-making during the interwar era, 
the nation does not appear to have used, before 1945, the ex post con­
gressional-executive instrument to substitute for the treaty process.150 
To be sure, some precedents came close. As mentioned earlier, Con­
gress had provided ex ante authorizations to the President to engage 
in reciprocal tariff reduction or other trade measures. These measures, 
however, involved congressional delegation of factfinding powers to 
the President, in which certain trade restrictions were reduced once 
the President had found that another nation had ended its discrimina­
tion against American goods. These laws can be characterized as in­
ternational agreements only because the President could negotiate, if 
he wished, with foreign countries to secure for them the benefits of the 
statute; the statute's provisions themselves do not require an interna­
tional agreement in order to take effect. 
To the extent that traditional defenders of the congressional­
executive agreement can rely upon practice, it is only the practice of 
the postwar world.151 Since 1945, Presidents and Congress have used 
149. See id. at 288-90 (discussing the codification stage of transformation). 
150. Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 813-61. 
151. Traditional accounts of the congressional-executive agreement sometimes rely 
upon the annexations of Texas and Hawaii to show historical support for interchangeability. 
In both cases, Congress decided to annex these territories by statute after treaties to do the 
same had been withdrawn due to Senate opposition. While the annexations of Texas and 
Hawaii appear similar to the subjects that ordinarily would fall within the treaty power, the 
unique facts of those cases seem to permit use of the statutory process. Both Texas and 
Hawaii were independent nations at the time of the annexations. Their absorption into the 
United States did not involve an agreement with another sovereign nation, as occurred, for 
example, with the Louisiana Purchase or with the transfer of territory at the end of the 
Mexican-American or Spanish-American wars. See id. at 832-36. One could view the annexa­
tions as the voluntary request of another nation to join the United States. A treaty would be 
unnecessary because the other party would no longer exist once the agreement was exe­
cuted. A statutory process may have been further appropriate due to Congress's plenary 
authority to govern territories and admit new states. 
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the statutory method to enter the nation into sweeping agreements, 
such as NAFfA and the WTO, which have established America's 
place in the world trading system. Presidents and Congress have re­
sorted to congressional-executive agreements, rather than treaties, to 
join international organizations, such as the IMF and the World Bank. 
Certain statutes, such as the Atomic Energy Act of 1946152 and the 
Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961,153 explicitly allow the 
President to submit international agreements in specified areas to 
statutory approval rather than as treaties. Congressional-executive 
agreements, which now appear to outnumber treaties by about four­
teen to one, have included such diverse subject matter areas as intel­
lectual property rights, foreign assistance, and fishery rights.154 Even 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which one would expect to 
maintain the Senate's prerogatives in the making of international 
agreements, has issued a report that admits that "it is now well-settled 
that the treaty mode is not an exclusive means of agreement-making 
for the United States and that (congressional-]executive agreements 
may validly co-exist with treaties under the Constitution. "155 
Despite this statement against interest, however, complete inter­
changeability has not been borne out in practice. A review of Ameri­
can postwar international agreements indicates that the political 
branches have reserved certain areas, specifically national security and 
arms control, for the treaty process. The political branches' consistent 
maintenance of subject matter distinctions between treaties and con­
gressional-executive agreements not only directly contradicts the in­
terchangeability thesis (whether of the internationalist or transforma­
tionist variety), but also shows that deeper separation of powers 
Professor Spiro, however, raises doubts about the transformationist account of pre­
World War II practice on international agreements. He argues that some early precedents, 
such as agreements joining the International Labor Organization and addressing World War 
I British war debts lend more support for the use of statutes to make international agree­
ments. As Spiro claims, these "earlier examples of other forms of non-treaty agreements, 
combined with some instances in which international agreements were subjected to ex post 
bicameral approval, in fact laid a tenable basis for a more extended use of the congressional­
executive agreement." Spiro, supra note 15. If true, Spiro's point further undermines the 
Ackerman and Golove defense of a constitutional moment in the 1944-45 period. 
152. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-585, § 8(a)-(b), 60 Stat. 755, 765 (codi­
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994)) (providing that any treaty approved by the Sen­
ate or other international agreement approved by Congress supercedes inconsistent provi­
sions of statute). 
153. Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-297, § 33, 75 Stat. 631, 
634 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2595 (1994)). For the particular provision 
permitting the President to commit the nation to arms control agreements only pursuant to a 
treaty or legislation passed by Congress, see 22 U.S.C. § 2753(c). 
154. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 53. 
155. Id. at 52. 
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principles are afoot. This Section will now survey the subjects for 
which the political branches have reserved the treaty process.156 
Political Agreements. In the early postwar period, significant 
agreements such as the peace treaties with Japan and Italy, the entry 
of the United States into the United Nations ("U.N.") and the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO"), and the current web of U.S. 
mutual defense agreements, such as bilateral agreements with South 
Korea,157 the Philippines,158 Japan,159 and Taiwan (terminated in 
1978),160 and multilateral security arrangements, such as the Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization, the Australian-New Zealand-U.S. agree­
ment, and the Rio Treaty, occurred by treaty.161 With one exception, 
subsequent, less-intensive security agreements, such as promises to de­
fend against threats, training of local forces, or pre-positioning of 
equipment, have resulted from unilateral executive declarations or 
sole executive agreements, and none of those rose to the level of seri­
ousness of America's entry into the U.N. or NAT0.162 Perhaps the 
most significant international security arrangements to arise from the 
end of the Cold War also were formalized by treaty - the final set­
tlement with regard to Germany163 and expansion of NATO to include 
some of the nations of the formerly communist Eastern Europe.164 
While some exceptions exist, they do not seem to undermine the gen­
eral subject matter trend.165 
156. I conducted this survey by relying upon the U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN 
FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 2000 (2000), which groups agreements by subject-matter 
and by party. I then used the Statutes at Large and the United States Treaty Series to verify 
whether an agreement had undergone the treaty process or the statutory process. 
157. Mutual Defense Treaty, Oct. 1, 1953, U.S.-S. Korea, 5 U.S.T. 2368. 
158. Mutual Defense Treaty, Aug. 30, 1951, U.S.-Phil., 3 U.S.T. 3947. 
159. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, Jan. 19, 1960, U.S.-Japan, 1 1  U.S.T. 
1632. 
160. Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-Taiwan (China), Dec. 2, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 433. 
161. Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, Sept. 8, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 81, 209 U.N.T.S. 
28; Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact), Sept. 1 ,  1951, 3 U.S.T. 3420, 131 U.N.T.S. 83; Inter­
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty), Sept. 2, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 21 
U.N.T.S. 77. See also Spiro, supra note 15. 
162. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 206-07. 
163. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany and a Related Agreed 
Minute, Sept. 12, 1990, s. TREATY Doc. No. 101-20 (1990), 29 I.L.M. 1 186. 
164. See Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, 
Hungary, and the Czech Republic, Dec. 16, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-36 (1998). 
165. The three significant exceptions appear to be the 1973 Paris agreement ending the 
Vietnam War, the 1988 agreement settling the Afghanistan conflict, and the 1991 agreement 
ending the Cambodian conflict. The latter two agreements did not involve use of American 
troops in combat. While the first did, it was not submitted for approval to Congress, but in­
stead constituted a sole executive agreement that President Nixon appears to have under­
taken pursuant to his sole executive powers. See Act of the International Conference on 
Viet-Nam, Mar. 2, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 485, 935 U.N.T.S. 405. 
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Standing alone, even the ratification of the United Nations Charter 
by the normal treaty process strikes a deadly blow to the transforma­
tionist and internationalist defense of interchangeability. If the 
Ackerman/Golove account is to be believed, the political controversy 
that surrounded the alleged 1944-45 constitutional moment focused on 
America's entrance into a permanent international body to guarantee 
the peace. Concern over whether the Senate would oppose entry into 
the United Nations prompted an earlier generation of internationalist 
scholars in 1944-45 to create the theory of interchangeability. These 
scholars blamed America's failure to join the U.N. 's predecessor, the 
League of Nations, for the coming of the Second World War. If the 
transformationists were correct, the constitutional moment should 
have allowed Truman to seek entry into the U.N. by congressional­
executive agreement. If today's internationalists were right, the Con­
stitution's textual permission for interchangeability likewise should 
have led Truman to seek a congressional-executive agreement for the 
U.N., if only to avoid the potential political obstacles looming in the 
Senate. Despite all of these concerns, the United States entered the 
United Nations through the treaty form. It does not appear that there 
was any serious effort to enact this most significant of all postwar trea­
ties by the statutory method. 
Arms Control. Recent experience with arms control cuts even 
more sharply against interchangeability. Since the end of World War 
II, Presidents submitted almost every significant arms control agree­
ment, such as the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty,166 the Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty,167 the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,168 the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty,169 the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty,170 and the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,171 
to the Senate as treaties.172 These agreements established the policy of 
166. Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 15 l.L.M. 891; Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in 
Outer Space, and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 131, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. 
167. Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974, 
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 13 1.L.M. 906. 
168. Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.­
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435. 
169. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 
483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
170. Treaty between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, Dec. 8, 1987, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 
l.L.M. 90. 
171. Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, done Nov. 19, 1990, S. TREATY 
Doc. No. 102-8 (1991) ,  30 l.L.M. 1 .  
172. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at  209-10 (observing that most arms con­
trol agreements have been submitted to the Senate as treaties); see also Treaty on the Prohi­
bition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on 
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nuclear deterrence through mutually assured destruction, sought to 
restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, and began the de-militarization 
of Europe. There appears to have been only one exception to this con­
sistent pattern: approval by statute of the first round of the Strategic 
Arms Limitations Talks ("SALT I") between the United States and 
the Soviet Union, which imposed limits upon the nuclear warheads 
and delivery vehicles possessed by the superpowers.173 Approval of 
SALT I by statute, however, cannot serve as a firm precedent for in­
terchangeability. SALT I had a limited duration of only five years; 
both sides understood that SALT I would be replaced by a permanent 
pact, SALT II.174 Indeed, the agreement was formally known as the 
SALT I Interim Agreement. And when negotiation of SALT II was 
finally completed, President Carter initially sent the agreement to the 
Senate for approval as a treaty, but then did not press for its approval 
in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.175 Presidents 
Reagan and Bush never asked the Senate to approve the agreement. 
Experience since the Cold War has only reaffirmed the consistent 
use of the treaty to make arms control agreements. Presidents have 
submitted to the Senate bilateral agreements between the United 
States and Russia, such as the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
("START") I and II agreements, which have reduced the level of nu­
clear warheads and restricted the use of certain delivery systems.176 
Presidents have sent to the Senate agreements with our former Cold 
War adversary that have reduced the positioning of conventional 
weapons in the European theater of operations, and that have allowed 
unimpeded over-flights to verify compliance with arms control pacts.177 
The political branches have also chosen to use the treaty process to 
approve controversial multilateral arms control agreements, such as 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, even when they faced significant 
opposition in the Senate.178 Agreements that the United States has not 
the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, done Feb. 1 1 ,  1971, 23 U.S.T. 
701, 955 U.N.T.S. 155. See also Spiro, supra note 15. 
173. Strategic Arms Limitation I Agreement, Pub. L. No. 79-448, 86 Stat. 746. 
174. See Trimble & Weiss, supra note 6, at 657-60. 
175. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 179. 
176. See Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, Jan. 
3, 1993, U.S.-USSR, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 103-1 (1993) [hereinafter The START II Treaty]; 
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991, U.S.­
USSR, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-20 (1991) [hereinafter The START I Treaty]. 
177. See Treaty on Armed Conventional Forces in Europe, supra note 171; Flank 
Document Agreement to the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, adopted May 
31,  1996, s. TREATY Doc. No. 105-5 (1997), 36 1.L.M. 866. 
178. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use 
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, S. TREATY Doc. No. 103-21 
(1993). 
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yet signed, such as the Land Mines Convention,179 and agreements still 
in development, such as the strengthening of the Biological Weapons 
Convention,180 would take the form of treaties, rather than of congres­
sional-executive agreements. 
In part, this consistent treaty practice seems to have resulted from 
Senate efforts to defend its prerogatives. During ratification of the last 
round of arms control agreements, for example, the Senate included in 
the resolution of advice and consent a condition that all future agree­
ments involving military, security, or arms control issues must be sub­
mitted to the Senate as treaties rather than as congressional-executive 
agreements.181 To be sure, the Senate's ability to create binding consti­
tutional law through the attachment of reservations, understandings 
and declarations to treaty ratification documents may be open to 
doubt.182 Nonetheless, the Senate's attachment of this condition ex­
presses its own intention not to accept the theory of interchangeabil­
ity, and indicates that it will enforce this understanding of the Consti­
tution by refusing to approve any international agreements that do not 
take the treaty form. Indeed, the Clinton administration so understood 
the condition and agreed to abide by it.183 
Human Rights. In addition to political/military and arms control 
agreements, one of the most significant areas of recent American for­
eign policy is conducted primarily through treaties, rather than con­
gressional-executive agreements: human rights. Historically, signifi­
cant human rights agreements, such as the Hague conventions on the 
rules of war and the Red Cross conventions, underwent the superma­
jority Senate consent process.184 In more recent times, the Bush ad-
179. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, adopted Sept. 18, 1997, 36 1.L.M. 1507. 
180. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of 
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, opened for sig­
nature Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163. 
181. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 49, at 56. 
182. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Condi­
tional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399 (discussing constitutional validity of the Senate's use 
of reservations, understandings, and declarations in the treaty process). 
183. See Trimble & Koff, supra note 49, at 56. 
184. Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, done 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat­
ment of Prisoners of War, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Con­
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Conven­
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, done Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention of July 27, 1929, Rela­
tive to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021; Convention Respect­
ing the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2310; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; see also Spiro, supra note 15. 
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ministration used treaties to formalize American entry into the Inter­
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which 
guarantees certain minimum individual rights in the political sphere,185 
and the Genocide Convention, which makes genocide a crime against 
humanity.186 President Clinton followed suit. The two important hu­
man rights agreements approved during his presidency, the Conven­
tion against Torture in 1994,187 and the International Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1994,188 took 
the treaty form. Four other multilateral human rights agreements that 
supporters once thought that the Clinton administration would seek to 
join189 - the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimi­
nation against Women,190 the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cul­
tural Rights,191 the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights,192 
and the Convention on the Rights of the Child193 - also would take 
treaty form, even in the face of likely Senate opposition. Indeed, it is 
difficult to think of a human rights agreement that has gone through 
two-house approval, rather than through the President and Senate 
alone. 
The history of these human rights treaties highlights the fact that 
the political branches recognize a distinction between treaties and 
congressional-executive agreements. Some human rights agreements 
have languished in the Senate for up to 30 years. The ICCPR, for ex­
ample, had been proposed first in 1966, but was not ratified until 1992. 
The Genocide Convention was first presented for signature in 1948, 
but was not ratified by the United States until 1989. Senate leaders 
opposed several of these treaties because of the concern that they re-
185. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 (providing for equal rights, a right against arbitrary arrest, a right to marriage, and re­
stricted use of the death penalty, and establishing a Human Rights Committee). 
186. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, S. EXEC. Doc. 0, 81-1, S. Exec. Doc. B, 91-2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for 
U.S., Feb. 23, 1989). 
187. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, entered into force June 26, 1987 (for U.S., Nov. 20, 1994), S. TREATY Doc. 
No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 1 13.  
188. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina­
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (en­
tered into force for U.S., Nov. 20, 1994). 
1 89. See, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost 
of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341 (1995). 
190. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13. 
191. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
192. American Convention on Human Rights, Aug. 27, 1979, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
193. Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 28 1.L.M. 1448. 
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quire more expansive individual rights than those in the Constitu­
tion.194 To mention one disreputable example, southern Senators 
feared that certain human rights treaty provisions would hasten the 
dismantling of segregation.195 If treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements truly were interchangeable, Presidents could have short­
circuited this opposition by sending human rights agreements to both 
houses of Congress for majority approval. This course of action would 
have been all the more successful once much of the political opposi­
tion to the goals of the treaties had disappeared in the wake of the 
Civil Rights revolution. Yet it does not appear that Presidents have 
ever attempted to use the alternate statutory procedure to avoid such 
political opposition in the Senate.196 
Extradition. Yet another area where the political branches gener­
ally have resorted to treaties to reach international agreements has 
been extradition. Under standard extradition agreements, one nation 
agrees to surrender a person charged with or convicted of a crime un­
der the law of another state, so that the latter state may try or punish 
the individual.197 Although at one time it was thought that nations had 
a duty to grant extradition freely, customary international law never 
recognized a general duty to surrender fugitives.198 As a result, the 
United States and other nations have entered into a web of bilateral 
agreements that generally require a showing that there is cause to hold 
a person, that the offense has been created by treaty or statute, that 
the offense was within the jurisdiction of the requesting country, and 
that double jeopardy would not be violated.199 Article 27 of the 1794 
Jay Treaty with Great Britain contained the first American extradition 
provision,200 and its implementation by President John Adams pro­
duced one of the early Republic's great foreign policy crises.201 
194. For a review of historical examples, see NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN 
RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A HISTORY OF OPPOSITION (1990). 
195. See TANANBAUM, supra note 106, at 15. 
196. This information is all the more striking in light of the fact that several significant 
treaties have yet to be approved by the Senate decades after they were submitted. The In­
ternational Labor Organization Convention No. 87, for example, has been awaiting Senate 
approval since 1949; the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
since 1978; the American Convention on Human Rights, since 1978; and the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, since 1980. 
197. See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 
U.S. 270 (1902); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). 
198. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 474. 
199. See generally id. 
200. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 8 Stat. 
116 (signed at London, approved by the Senate June 24, 1795, ratified by the United States, 
Aug. 14, 1795). 
201. For a discussion of the constitutional issues arising from this early extradition con­
troversy, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 
YALE L.J. 229 (1990). 
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Extradition poses an interesting question in regard to federal 
power, as Congress does not appear to possess any textual authority to 
provide for the seizure of an individual on American soil and for his 
delivery to a foreign nation for trial. Ever since the Jay Treaty, how­
ever, the political branches have used Article II treaties to reach ex­
tradition agreements with more than one-hundred nations.202 Only a 
single recent example appears to have broken this record. In 1994 and 
1995, the President entered into executive agreements with the Inter­
national Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
to surrender persons within the United States charged or convicted by 
those tribunals.203 Rather than approval by treaty, Congress imple­
mented the agreements by statute by expanding federal extradition 
laws - which until 1996 had implemented treaties - to include the 
two international tribunals.204 In a 1999 challenge brought by a Rwan­
dan citizen in the United States indicted by the Rwanda tribunal, a di­
vided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the use of the congressional-executive agreement.205 Citing dicta from 
previous extradition cases, the majority relied upon interchangeability 
even though the plaintiff maintained that "the United States has never 
surrendered a person except pursuant to an Article II treaty."206 In dis­
sent, Judge DeMoss demonstrated that the majority's new exception 
proves the rule. "Every extradition agreement ever entered into by the 
United States (before the advent of the new Tribunals) has been ac­
complished by treaty . . . .  "207 Aside from this sole, rushed example, ex­
tradition has stood as another example in which the treaty power has 
provided the sole mechanism for reaching international agreements. 
202. See SENATE 1993 REPORT, supra note 5, at 227. 
203. Agreement Between the United States of America and the International Tribunal 
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citi­
zens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of 
Neighbouring States, Jan. 24, 1995, T.l.A.S. No. 12601; Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible 
for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Terri­
tory of the Former Yugoslavia, Oct. 5, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 12570. 
204. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-106, 
§ 1342, 1 10 Stat. 186, 486. 
205. See Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999). 
206. Id. at 426. The majority cited, of all things, Tribe's AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW. 
207. Id. at 436 (DeMoss, J., dissenting). Judge DeMoss also pointed out that the expan­
sion of the extradition statute to include the Rwanda and former Yugoslavia tribunals had 
occurred via a last-minute attachment to non-relevant legislation, without any hearings, 
committee consideration, or floor debate of the provisions. For scholarly discussion of the 
Ntakirutimana case, see Evan J. Wallach, Extradition to the Rwandan War Crimes Tribunal: 
ls Another Treaty Required?, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 59 (1998); Panayiota 
Alexandropoulos, Note, Enforceability of Executive-Congressional Agreements in Lieu of an 
Article II Treaty for Purposes of Extradition: Elizaphan Ntakirutimana v. Janet Reno, 45 
VILLA. L. REV. 107 (2000). 
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Environment. In addition to extradition, the President and Senate 
have used the treaty process for most of the nation's significant envi­
ronmental agreements.208 While perhaps not as crucial to national se­
curity as alliances or arms control, international environmental trea­
ties may represent the most legislation-like agreements in their setting 
of norms for domestic private conduct. The United States has entered 
into agreements limiting pollution, such as the Montreal Protocol, 
which accelerated the retirement of certain chemicals that harmed the 
ozone layer,209 and the Convention on Transboundary Pollution,210 
which seeks to reduce cross-border air pollution, all by the treaty pro­
cess. Agreements that protect certain environments, such as the Ant­
arctic region211 or outer space,212 or endangered species, such as 
whales, polar bears, migratory birds, and seals,213 also have undergone 
approval by a supermajority of the Senate. More ambitious regulatory 
agreements, such as the U.N. Convention on Climate Change, also 
have undergone the treaty process.214 As with human rights treaties, 
Presidents have agreed to submit these pacts to the Senate even when 
they could have avoided significant opposition by resorting to the two­
house procedure.215 Presidents have delayed the submission of contro­
versial environmental agreements, such as agreements that would re­
quire the nation to protect biodiversity and to restrict its energy use 
208. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, done May 9, 1992, 
S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-38 (1992), 31 1.L.M. 849; The Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 
U.S.T. 794, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. 
209. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted June 29, 
1990, 30 l.L.M. 537; Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for 
signature Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1516. 
210. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Nov. 13, 1979, 18 J.L.M. 
1442. 
211. See The Antarctic Treaty, supra note 208. 
212. See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967, 18 
U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. 
213. See Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, done Nov. 15, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 
3918, 13 l.L.M. 13; Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 
U.S.T. 441, 11 l.L.M. 251; Benelux Convention Concerning Hunting and the Protection of 
Birds, June 10, 1970, 847 U.N.T.S. 255; International Convention for the Protection of Birds, 
Oct. 18, 1950, 638 U.N.T.S. 185; International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. 
214. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 208. 
215. President Reagan declined to sign the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, Oct. 7, 1982, and hence prevented Congress from considering the agreement. If the 
theory of interchangeability were correct, Congress could have enacted the Law of the Sea 
Convention in the face of presidential opposition. International agreements involving the 
oceans, however, seem to follow no clear principle. Some agreements involving the rules that 
apply at sea have been done as statutes, see, e.g., Convention for the Unification of Certain 
Rules with Respect to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658, 1 Bevans 
780, while others have been done as treaties, see, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, done 
Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82. 
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and industrial pollution, because of likely Senate opposition.216 Al­
though President Reagan decided against submitting to the Senate one 
of the most significant international environmental agreements, the 
Law of the Sea Convention, there is little doubt that the agreement 
would have been formalized as a treaty, rather than a congressional­
executive agreement.217 
Examination of postwar practice by the political branches thus re­
veals a manageable line between treaties and congressional-executive 
agreements. The President and Senate have used the statutory process 
to approve agreements that generally involve international trade and 
economics. These subjects fall within Congress's Article I, Section 8 
power over international commerce and often require modification of 
existing statutory law to bring the United States into compliance. The 
President and Senate, it appears, still reserve certain classes of subjects 
for the treaty process, primarily national security, arms control, human 
rights, and the environment. These areas bear important constitutional 
differences from international economics and commerce.218 Subjects 
such as national security and arms control, for example, fall primarily 
within the President's plenary powers as Commander-in-Chief and 
sole organ of the nation in its foreign relations.219 They also involve 
concurrent powers on the part of Congress, such as those of appro­
priations and of declaring war. After City of Boerne v. Flores,220 which 
invalidated Congress's effort to extend broader protections for relig-
216. See Convention on Biological Diversity, done June 5, 1992, S. TREATY Doc. No. 
103-20 (1993), 31 l.L.M. 818; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
supra note 208. 
217. President Clinton, for example, submitted the Convention follow-on agreements to 
the Senate for approval as a treaty. See Bernard H. Oxman, The Law of the Sea Convention, 
ASIL Newsletter (Nov.-Dec. 1994). 
218. Tax treaties might seem to be the exception that disproves this rule. Tax is certainly 
a matter of international economics and commerce, and yet our agreements with other na­
tions on taxation usually assume the treaty form. It appears, however, that tax treaties do not 
apply domestically of their own force - in other words, they are non-self-executing. Rather, 
Congress has chosen to implement tax treaty obligations through provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code. See l.R.C. §§ 894, 7852(d) (2000). Moreover, Congress regularly overrides 
tax treaty obligations through its normal tax statutes. See generally David Sachs, ls the 19th 
Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?,  47 TAX 
LAW. 867 (1994) (examining the tax-treaty-override doctrine and arguing for its termination 
or modification). This practice indicates that the political branches have continued to use 
legislation, rather than treaties alone, to regulate international economics and commerce 
that would usually fall within Congress's Article I powers. For an examination of current 
international tax treaty issues, see, for example, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of In­
ternational Taxation: A Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301 (1996); Julie Roin, 
Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World with Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1753 (1995). 
219. See generally John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The 
Original Understanding of the War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167 (1996) [hereinafter Yoo, 
War Powers]. 
220. 519 U.S. 1088 (1997) (finding Religious Freedom Restoration Act to lie outside of 
Congress's enforcement powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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ious freedom beyond those established by the Constitution, the im­
plementation of the substantive terms of human rights treaties may 
rest outside of Congress's enumerated powers as well.221 It is unclear 
what congressional power could justify extradition - the seizure of 
persons because of their alleged acts in foreign countries, regardless of 
their involvement in interstate or international commerce - due to 
the lack of an explicit enumerated power. Environmental law strad­
dles the line between treaties and congressional-executive agreements 
- while some environmental matters rest within Congress's powers 
over interstate commerce, others (especially more recent environ­
mental agreements addressing energy use or biodiversity) might not, 
in light of the recent restrictions on the Commerce Clause imposed by 
the Supreme Court.222 
Consistent use of the treaty process for certain classes of interna­
tional agreements undercuts the most compelling justification for the 
internationalist and transformationist accounts. Practice simply cannot 
be explained by either theory. If the two instruments were utterly in­
terchangeable, as both groups of scholars would have it, then one 
would expect the President to send most international agreements 
through the two-house procedure because of the easier chances of 
passage. Instead, practice indicates that there was no constitutional 
moment that removed the Senate from the role of making interna­
tional agreements, that there was no consensus accepting "codifica­
tion" of the ascendancy of the congressional-executive agreement, and 
that something more complex is going on in the growing use of the 
congressional-executive agreement. Rather than interchangeability, 
the political branches have followed significant distinctions between 
congressional-executive agreements and treaties. 
The history of international agreement-making also undermines 
the central claim of the internationalist camp. There has been neither 
a long pedigree of complete interchangeability, nor a recent practice 
of completely substituting statutes for treaties. President Wilson could 
not have used a statute to enact the Treaty of Versailles because the 
idea never would have occurred to him - the legislative method of 
agreement-making did not exist. President Clinton could not have 
submitted the failed comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty as a 
congressional-executive agreement, because he would have violated 
221. Indeed, one leading international law scholar has suggested that the only way to 
achieve such goals is now through the Treaty Clause, which Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 
416 (1920), has indicated is not limited by the same federalism considerations that apply to 
Congress. Gerald L. Neuman, The Nationalization of Civil Liberties, Revisited, 99 CO LUM. L. 
REV. 1630, 1644 (1999) ("Those treaties create international obligations that Congress has 
the authority to implement under the Necessary and Proper Clause in conjunction with the 
treaty power."). 
222. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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the constitutional understanding that has reserved all arms control 
agreements for supermajority approval in the Senate. Neither history 
nor practice, however, provides refuge for the treaty exclusivist. Con­
gressional-executive agreements, despite their relatively youthful 
pedigree, have come to dominate international agreements covering a 
wide variety of fields. Part III will explore the theoretical reasons why 
the President, Senate, and Congress have reserved different subjects 
for different instruments of agreement-making. For the moment, the 
next Section completes the critique of existing scholarly theories by 
illuminating the constitutional distortions created by interchangeabil­
ity. 
B. StructuralProblems Created by Interchangeability 
This Section will examine the textual and structural inconsistencies 
created by interchangeability. First, interchangeability distorts the al­
location of powers among the branches in the area of foreign affairs. 
By transferring agreement-making power from the executive branch 
(the President and Senate acting in their Article II capacity) to Con­
gress, the President's authority in foreign affairs is diminished and 
domestic regulation becomes unmoored from the Constitution's law­
making processes. Second, interchangeability allows a class of statutes 
to escape the structural limitations, such as the separation of powers 
and federalism, that restrict congressional power. Because of its loca­
tion in Article II, treaties have been free from the processes and re­
strictions that govern statutes. If congressional-executive agreements 
were fully interchangeable with treaties, statutes logically would as­
sume the broader sweep of treaties. These points will become clear af­
ter comparing the process of making statutes with the process of 
making treaties. 
1 .  Congressional-Executive Agreements and the 
Foreign Affairs Power 
Interchangeability's most obvious distortion of the constitutional 
structure lies in the weakening of the President's formal foreign affairs 
powers. Article II, Section 2 declares that the President makes trea­
ties, subject to the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. The 
President, not the Senate, chooses to initiate the treaty process, and 
the President can still refuse to make a treaty even after the Senate 
has approved it.223 A statutory process for making international 
agreements threatens to oust the President from this constitutionally 
dominant position and effectively negates the President's absolute 
223. See HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 184. 
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veto over foreign policy.224 If the agreement takes the form of a public 
law, then Congress can initiate the process without presidential ap­
proval, just as it can propose any statute without his consent. Even if 
the President unequivocally opposes an agreement and vetoes it, Con­
gress can choose to override the presidential veto by a two-thirds vote. 
These structural implications of interchangeability conflict with the 
Constitution's centralization of foreign affairs power in the executive 
branch. Under United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,225 as well 
as long executive and legislative practice reaching to the very begin­
nings of the Republic,226 the President is constitutionally responsible 
for the conduct of foreign policy. Creating an alternate process for 
making international agreements, one that excludes the President, 
would allow Congress to pursue its own foreign policy and interfere 
with the executive's leadership role. This would radically alter the con­
stitutional structure of the foreign affairs power.227 
Interchangeability further warps the President's foreign affairs 
powers after the public lawmaking process ends. Statutes require the 
consent of both houses of Congress and the President, or two-thirds of 
Congress without the President, before they can be repealed. Al­
though the Constitution does not address the issue, today most com­
mentators, courts, and government entities believe that the President 
may terminate a treaty unilaterally.228 The President retains this 
authority due to his dominant constitutional position in foreign af­
fairs229 and his structural superiority in conducting international rela­
tions. If the nation were to regulate certain domestic conduct by stat­
ute, the President could not terminate the rules without congressional 
approval. If the nation were to regulate the same conduct in concert 
with a treaty, however, the President enjoys the power to terminate 
224. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1253. 
225. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
226. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson to Edward Charles Genet, Nov. 22, 1793, in 27 PAPERS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (John Catanzariti ed. 1997) (stating that the President is the 
"only channel of communication" between United States and foreign nations); John 
Marshall, Speech Before House of Representatives, 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800) (ar­
guing that the President is "sole organ" of nation in its communications with foreign na­
tions). 
227. See Tribe, supra note 14, at 1255. 
228. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 708-09 (D.C. Cir.), vacated as moot, 444 U.S. 
996 (1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 339; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
supra note 6, at 214. Some once thought that breaking treaties required the consent of two­
thirds of the Senate. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Power of Congress and the President in 
International Relations: Three Recent Supreme Court Cases, 25 CAL. L. REV. 643, 658-65 
(1937). 
229. The D.C. Circuit, for example, upheld President Carter's unilateral termination of 
the Taiwan treaty due to both the President's role as the constitutional representative of the 
nation in its foreign affairs and his plenary authority over recognition of foreign govern­
ments. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705-08. 
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the regulation at will. Interchangeability, however, upsets this struc­
ture in either one of two ways. On the one hand, it could mean that 
Congress can bind the nation to an international agreement that the 
President could not terminate unilaterally, which would represent a 
serious curtailment of the executive's foreign affairs powers. On the 
other hand, defenders of interchangeability might allow the President 
the same ability to terminate congressional-executive agreements as to 
terminate treaties. This, however, would provide the President with 
the heretofore unknown power of executive termination of statutes.230 
This would be tantamount to granting the President a direct share of 
the legislative power - a result, as Professor Henry Monaghan has 
argued, that is at odds with our understanding of the executive 
power.231 
Termination raises another problem for the interchangeability of 
treaties and statutes. Under the "last in time" rule, the consensus view 
is that treaties may trump earlier statutes, and that subsequent statutes 
can override earlier treaties.232 Allowing treaties and statutes to termi­
nate each other in this way runs counter to the formalist approach to 
lawmaking articulated by the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha.233 A 
decision to repeal earlier legislation, as was the ca se with the use of 
the legislative veto in Chadha, requires a new law. The last-in-time 
rule seems to violate this principle by allowing the treatymakers to 
counteract an earlier action by the President, Senate, and House. In­
terchangeability allows international agreements to override previous 
statutes. In discussing this possibility, Madison rejected it out of hand 
during the Jay Treaty debates because "it involved the absurdity of an 
Imperium in imperio; [or] of two powers both of them supreme, yet 
each of them liable to be superseded by the other."234 Although 
Madison admitted that the Roman constitution had operated similarly, 
he believed that it was only a "political phenomenon, which had been 
celebrated as a subject of curious speculation only, and not as a model 
for the institutions of any other Country."235 In Madison's mind, vest-
230. Indeed, many believe that, at a minimum, the very purpose of the Take Care 
Clause was to prevent the President from enjoying this power. See Calabresi & Prakash, su­
pra note 44, at 549-50. 
231 .  The constitutional text resists the notion that an "independent, free-standing presi­
dential Jaw-making authority exists insofar as the rights of American citizens are con­
cerned." Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 ,  
4 (1993). 
232. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Chae Chan Ping v. United 
States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion Case); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 
580, 599 (1884) (The Head Money Cases); HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 209-
11 .  
233. 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
234. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty (Mar. 10, 1796), in 16 PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 255, 257 (J.C.A. Stagg et al. eds. 1989) [hereinafter MADISON PAPERS]. 
235. Id. 
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ing the legislative power in two separate authorities that could "annul 
the proceedings of the other" would produce only an unstable and ir­
rational government.236 
2. Interchangeability and the Lack of Limits on the Treaty Power 
Interchangeability further undermines the Constitution's basic 
structure by allowing Congress to escape the restrictions on its enu­
merated powers. If the statutory process is a perfect substitute for the 
Treaty Clause, then congressional-executive agreements must enjoy 
the same constitutional benefits that accrue to the treaty form. This 
result has important implications for both the separation of powers 
and federalism, because most internationalist scholars argue that much 
of the structural elements of the Constitution do not apply with the 
same force to treaties as to domestic laws. 
Under standard internationalist theories, interchangeability could 
allow statutes to enjoy the less stringent application of the separation 
of powers to treaties. This could happen in one of two ways. First, 
treaties could transfer powers among the branches, or create hybrid 
forms of government power, that would prove unconstitutional if un­
dertaken solely by domestic law. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp. ,237 for example, the Court observed that the nondelega­
tion doctrine would not apply with the same force in foreign affairs, a 
proposition the Court recently re-affirmed in Clinton v. New York.238 
Some have argued further that treaties are limited, at best, only by 
"radiations" from the separation of powers.239 Second, the treatymak­
ers could delegate authority that normally resides with the executive 
or judicial branches to international organizations.240 Under standard 
internationalist doctrine, a treaty could transfer authority from Con­
gress to the executive branch or to an international organization, as 
some argue that the U.N. Charter actually does,241 when a statute 
could not. Theoretically, interchangeability allows statutes to enjoy 
236. Id. 
237. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
238. 524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
239. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 195. 
240. Some scholars even maintain that a treaty could "bargain away" Congress's 
authority to declare war by allowing war to be triggered automatically under certain events. 
See id. at 196. 
241. See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in Lieu of War: "The Old 
Order Changeth," 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63 (1991); but see Michael J. Glennon & Allison R. 
Hayward, Collective Security and the Constitution: Can the Commander in Chief Power Be 
Delegated to the United Nations?, 82 GEO. L.J. 1573 (1994) (arguing that UN. Security Coun­
cil resolutions cannot provide domestic legal authorization for war). For a criticism of the 
ability of the United States to delegate command authority over U.S. troops to U.N. or for­
eign command, see Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1708-20. 
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the loosened restrictions that would apply to treaties in these situa­
tions. 
Used in these ways, congressional-executive agreements can un­
dermine the separation of powers in both of its inter-branch aspects. 
First, suppose that a statute required the transfer of law enforcement 
or judicial power to an international agency or tribunal. Officials of 
the international body would not generally be removable by the Presi­
dent, because the very point of creating international regulatory insti­
tutions often is to free them from the direct influence of different na­
tion-states.242 Even under the loose standards of Morrison v. Olson243 
or Mistretta v. United States,244 a domestic effort by Congress to com­
pletely shield individuals who exercise executive authority from presi­
dential removal would fall afoul of either the Appointments Clause, 
the Article II vesting clause or the Take Care Clause, while efforts to 
transfer the federal judicial power might violate Article Ill's vesting 
clause. Yet, some international and constitutional law scholars argue 
that such standards should not apply to international agreements be­
cause they involve foreign affairs.245 Second, if statutes are to enjoy the 
same status as treaties, and if treaties are not subject to the usual 
structural constraints of the separation of powers, then presumably 
Congress could restructure the separation of powers when acting 
through the congressional-executive agreement, even though it could 
not with an identical statute that concerned domestic affairs. 
Interchangeability also threatens to allow Congress to exercise 
powers that, if exercised domestically, would violate federalism limita­
tions. Before the Rehnquist Court's reinvigoration of federalism, the 
generous interpretation given to the Commerce Clause relieved the 
government of relying upon the broad extent of the treaty power for 
its actions. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has placed 
new limits upon the extent of the federal government's powers. Fol­
lowing up on United States v. Lopez,246 the Court last Term struck 
down the Violence Against Women Act as beyond the Commerce 
Clause because it regulated a noneconomic activity.247 In Alden v. 
242. See Yoo, New Sovereignty, supra note 125, at 91-96 (discussing creation of Chemi­
cal Weapons Convention Technical Secretariat); Kenneth W. Abbott, "Trust But Verify": 
The Production of Information in Arms Control Treaties and Other International Agree­
ments, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 57 (1993) (discussing benefits of neutral international or­
ganizations). 
243. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
244. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
245. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Can Buckley Clear Customs?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1309 (1992); William J. Davey, The Appointments Clause and International Dispute Settle­
ment Mechanisms: A False Conflict, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1315 (1992). 
246. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
247. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
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Maine, the Court concluded that Congress could not use its Article I, 
Section 8 powers to override state sovereign immunity in either fed­
eral or state court.248 In Printz v. United States249 and New York v. 
United States,250 the Court held that Congress could not use its Com­
merce Clause powers to "commandeer" state executives or legisla­
tures. And in City of Boerne v. Flores,251 College Savings Bank of 
Florida v. Florida,252 and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,253 the 
Court invalidated federal statutes that had attempted to redefine indi­
vidual rights at variance with the Court's own interpretation of the Bill 
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. In these cases, the Court 
has sought both to place limits on Congress's enumerated powers and 
to expand the protections for state sovereignty. 
Interchangeability provides the lawmakers with a way to avoid 
these recent restrictions on their powers. According to both standard 
internationalist thought and Supreme Court case law, treaties are not 
subject to the same federalism limitations that bind statutes. As a tex­
tual matter, the Constitution locates treaties in Article II, which im­
plies that they need not live within the same boundaries that contain 
Article I. Leading commentators therefore assert that the treatymak­
ers can make policy on any subject, even where the lawmakers would 
be prevented from doing so by Article I, Section 8's enumeration of 
limited congressional powers or the Tenth Amendment's reservation 
of powers to the states.254 According to Professor Henkin, " [u]nlike 
the delegations to Congress which give it authority over enumerated 
substantive areas of national policy, the treaty power is authority to 
make national policy (regardless of substantive content) by interna­
tional means and process for an international purpose."255 Internation­
alists read the Tenth Amendment as inapplicable to the treaty power, 
because they view the broad scope of treaties as part of the powers 
expressly delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. 
Anything that the treaty power can extend to is, by definition, ex­
cluded from the Tenth Amendment. Concludes Professor Henkin, 
" [m]any matters, then, may appear to be 'reserved to the States' as re­
gards domestic legislation if Congress does not have power to regulate 
them; but they are not reserved to the states so as to exclude their 
248. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
249. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
250. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
251 .  521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
252. 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
253. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
254. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at §§ 302-03; HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 190-93. 
255. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 191. 
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regulation by international agreement."256 This argument, we are told, 
is "clear and indisputable,"257 although it has been the subject of a vig­
orous debate recently between Professors Curtis Bradley and David 
Golove in this Law Review over whether the same federalism limita­
tions ought to apply to both statutes and treaties.258 
In Missouri v. Holland,259 the Supreme Court expressed agreement 
with the notion that the normal limits on the legislative power do not 
apply to treaties. Holland raised the question of whether Congress had 
authority to enact the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, which im­
plemented a 1916 treaty between the United States and Great Britain 
that protected certain birds flying between the United States and Can­
ada. The treaty barred the hunting or capture of any of the birds pro­
tected by the treaty, a substantive action that the federal courts at the 
time had held lay outside Congress's Commerce Clause powers.260 In 
an opinion by Justice Holmes, the Court rejected the idea that the 
Tenth Amendment's limitations on Congress's powers also applied to 
the treaty power. Conceding that the Commerce Clause did not in­
�::lude the power to regulate migratory birds, Justice Holmes concluded 
that the treaty did not violate "any prohibitory words to be found in 
the Constitution," nor did it conflict with "some invisible radiation 
from the general terms of the Tenth Amendment."261 The Treaty 
Power, according to the Court, was not to be limited in the same man­
ner as Congress's powers under Article I, Section 8, because the treaty 
concerned "a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude," the 
power over which had to be vested somewhere in the national gov­
ernment.262 As the Court declared, " [i]t is obvious that there may be 
matters of the sharpest exigency for the national well being that an act 
of Congress could not deal with but that a treaty followed by such an 
act could."263 While the Court later limited Holland in the individual 
rights context in Reid v. Covert,264 it has yet to identify restrictions 
emanating from the separation of powers or federalism. 
Holland's expansive reading of the treaty power suggests the struc­
tural distortions caused by interchangeability. At least in regard to the 
256. Id. at 191 (footnote omitted). 
257. Id. 
258. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. 
REV. 390, 394 (1998); David Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Founda­
tions of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075 (2000). 
259. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
260. See id. at 432 (citing lower court decisions). 
261. Id. at 433-34. 
262. Id. at 435. 
263. Id. at 433. 
264. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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Commerce Clause, Holland makes some sense, because the Treaty 
Power is an executive one located in Article II, Section 2, which logi­
cally is not subject to the limitations that apply to legislative power in 
Article I. This clause becomes, however, a structural loophole if one 
accepts the argument that congressional-executive agreements are 
completely interchangeable with treaties. If such statutes can take the 
place of treaties, and if treaties are not subject to the regular federal­
ism limitations that apply to laws, then interchangeability exempts 
congressional-executive agreements from the limitations imposed by 
Article I, Section 8 and the Tenth Amendment. Interchangeability, in 
other words, creates a subclass of statutory law that is somehow free 
from the restrictions that apply to all other statutes. 
Interchangeability provides yet a third way for statutes to escape 
the normal limitations on their scope. Treaties, many believe, are not 
subject to subject matter limitations in the same manner as statutes. 
Under the internationalist approach, the United States can enter into 
a treaty on any subject, so long as it is "an agreement between two or 
more states or international organizations that is intended to be legally 
binding and is governed by international law."265 Drawn from interna­
tional law, this definition contains no subject-matter limitations. As 
everyday life becomes more closely intertwined with international 
events, systems, trends, and markets, and treaties involve not just mili­
tary alliances, but individual rights, environment, finance and com­
merce, and crime, it will become even more difficult to cordon off a 
domestic sphere that shall remain immune from international agree­
ment. If internationalists correctly argue that international agreements 
can be made on virtually any subject, and if internationalists and trans­
formationists are correct that congressional-executive agreements and 
treaties are fully interchangeable, then statutes that embody interna­
tional agreements can regulate virtually any subject. Lawmakers 
would be able to enact statutes that are not limited in subject-matter, 
are not limited by Article I, Section S's enumeration of powers, and 
are not limited by the Tenth Amendment or federalism. Interchange­
ability provides the lawmakers with an almost unrestricted authority 
to legislate on any subject.266 
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301. Section 301 tracks the definition of 
a treaty from Article 1 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the United 
States has not ratified. 
266. While complete interchangeability creates severe textual and structural distortions 
in constitutional law, the alternate theory of treaty exclusivity is open to other significant 
doubts. Treaty exclusivity proves as equally unable as interchangeability in accounting for 
the practice of the political branches in making international agreements. If treaty exclusiv­
ity were correct, the United States should never have entered into the Bretton Woods 
agreements immediately after World War II, or the more recent string of free trade agree­
ments such as NAFTA and the WTO. Further, if exclusivity is to be applied in the future, 
America's entry into NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of GAIT are unconstitutional and 
could be successfully challenged by appropriate plaintiffs in federal court. Concluding that 
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As the previous Parts have shown, the leading academic theories 
have failed to provide a satisfying account of the current American 
practice toward international agreements. Defenders of interchange­
ability sacrifice constitutional coherence - maintaining the structural 
integrity of the Constitution while giving each of its provisions force -
in order to provide a limitless flexibility to the political branches. 
Treaty exclusivists, on the other hand, seek a stricter adherence to the 
constitutional text and structure, but at the price of rejecting recent 
practice, including the legitimacy of the GA TT and NAFT A agree­
ments. These two approaches seem to set up a classic conflict between 
the Constitution and expediency. 
This Article will now develop an approach that preserves the con­
stitutionality of significant international agreements that take the 
statutory form, without causing interchangeability's severe textual and 
structural distortions. We can reconcile constitutional text with mod­
ern demands by recognizing the distinction drawn by the political 
branches themselves. Congress can resort to congressional-executive 
agreements in areas over which Congress already possesses plenary 
constitutional authority, such as international trade and finance. Trea­
ties, however, still remain the required instrument of national policy 
when the federal government reaches international agreements on 
matters outside of Article I, Section 8, or over which the President and 
Congress possess concurrent and potentially conflicting powers. As I 
have argued elsewhere, treaties may still be concluded in areas of 
Congressional authority, but such treaties must be non-self-executing, 
in order to preserve the Constitution's separation of the executive and 
legislative powers. The theory developed here is consistent with, and 
the treaty constitutes the only method whereby the United States can enter into interna­
tional agreements would require us to find that about 80 percent of all of the United States' 
current international obligations are constitutionally invalid. Just as interchangeability can­
not recognize the distinctions that the political branches apparently have drawn between 
treaties and congressional-executive agreements, treaty exclusivity similarly would sweep 
aside that line in favor of declaring that all agreements must undergo the treaty form. 
Naturally, proponents of treaty exclusivity shy away from such revolutionary implica­
tions. Professor Tribe, for example, seeks to save NAFT A and the WTO from the implica­
tions of treaty exclusivity through a functional approach. NAFTA and the Uruguay Round 
agreement, he argues, are still legitimate ex post because they received more than a two­
thirds vote of approval in the Senate. Tribe, supra note 14, at 1227 n.18 & 1276. If a congres­
sional-executive agreement received enough supermajoritarian political support to have sur­
vived as a treaty, Tribe suggests, we should consider it as a constitutional treaty. This effort 
to play fast-and-loose with the Constitution's categories for lawmaking suffers from clear 
flaws. If agreements such as NAFT A and the WTO are to remain constitutional, American 
foreign relations Jaw requires a different theory of congressional-executive agreements that 
stands on firmer footing. 
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shares the main objectives of, my work defending the doctrine of non­
self-executing treaties. 
This approach conveys several advantages over interchangeability 
and treaty exclusivity. It respects the constitutional text and structure 
while also acknowledging recent practice and the importance of 
agreements such as GATT and NAFfA. It maintains the Constitu­
tion's principle of limited, enumerated powers and its protection for 
the sovereignty of the states, as articulated by recent Supreme Court 
opinions. It honors the Constitution's separation of powers, specifi­
cally the distinction between the legislative and executive powers, by 
reserving for legislation matters within Article I, Section 8, and for the 
executive treaty power issues outside of those areas. Finally, this the­
ory of international agreements makes sense of several apparent in­
consistencies in the constitutional structure produced by treaties and 
interchangeability: treaty initiation and termination, treaty implemen­
tation and non-self-execution, and the scope of treaties and federal­
ism. 
Section A argues that congressional-executive agreements make 
sense as an effort to preserve a clear line between the executive and 
legislative powers. Section B draws support for this reading from the 
Constitution's text, structure, and history. Section C suggests how this 
theory of congressional-executive agreements and treaties works out 
in practice. 
A. A Theory of Congressional-Executive Agreements 
A theory of congressional-executive agreements should take as its 
starting point the distinction drawn by the political branches them­
selves. As discussed earlier, the executive and legislative departments 
have consistently used statutes to enter into international agreements 
that address international economic affairs, such as trade agreements, 
international financial institutions, and the like. Despite the alleged 
constitutional moment in 1945, the President and Senate have re­
served the treaty form for significant international obligations in sev­
eral areas, such as political/military agreements, arms control, extradi­
tion, the environment, and human rights. Examples where the political 
branches have overstepped this line are rare. 
In observing this distinction, the political branches appear to be 
honoring the Constitution's basic division of the executive and legisla­
tive powers. The treaty power is an executive power that rests in Arti­
cle II, as distinguished from a legislative authority vested in Congress 
in Article I, Section 8. Congressional-executive agreements may be 
used in the arena of international economic affairs because Congress 
has plenary authority over the area under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. If, for example, Congress were to adopt unilaterally the 
changes in tariffs, customs laws, or national treatment required by 
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NAFfA or the WTO, in the absence of an international agreement, it 
would have ample authority to do so pursuant to Article I, Section 8. 
Not only are congressional-executive agreements acceptable, but 
in areas of Congress's Article I, Section 8 powers, they are - in a 
sense - constitutionally required. In order to respect the Constitu­
tion's grant of plenary power to Congress, the political branches must 
use a statute to implement, at the domestic level, any international 
agreement that involves economic affairs. Otherwise, the mere pres­
ence of an international agreement would allow the treatymakers to 
assume the legislative powers so carefully lodged in Article I for Con­
gress. Because internationalists generally believe that most treaties 
automatically become federal law without implementing legislation,267 
interchangeability produces precisely this incongruity.268 Congres­
sional-executive agreements preserve Congress's Article I, Section 8 
authority over matters such as international and interstate commerce, 
intellectual property, criminal law, and appropriations, by requiring 
that regardless of the form of the international agreement, Congress's 
participation is needed to implement obligations in those areas. 
Intellectual property protections under recent international trade 
agreements illustrate this point. Before the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT, regulation of the length of patents was a matter of domestic 
law. Congress established the period of patents under its plenary Arti­
cle I, Section 8 power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex­
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."269 Under 
an 1861 law, patent terms in the United States ran seventeen years 
from the time a patent application received approval. Part of the 
WTO agreement, Article 33 of the Agreement on Trade-Related As­
pects of Intellectual Property Rights, altered that term of patent pro­
tection to twenty years from the time of the filing of a patent applica­
tion. 270 Just as Congress would have used a statute to change the term 
267. See generally, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Origi­
nal Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 
(1999) (defending the internationalist view); Carlos Vazquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (same). 
268. I have argued elsewhere that the text, structure, and history of the Constitution 
suggest that the better reading is that most treaties require congressional participation - via 
implementing legislation - to take effect in domestic courts. Non-self-execution, as this doc­
trine is known, respects - as does the theory of congressional-executive agreements pre­
sented here - the distinctions between international agreements and domestic law, and be­
tween the executive treaty power and the legislative power. See generally Yoo, Globalism, 
supra note 8 (arguing that original understanding supports doctrine of non-self-executing 
treaties); Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10 (arguing that text and structure justify 
non-self-execution). 
269. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
270. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, art. 33, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 
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of patent protection unilaterally, it used the same instrument to alter 
domestic laws in accordance with our international obligations.271 
Under a theory of treaty exclusivity, however, the only way for the 
United States to have implemented this change was through a super­
majority vote of the Senate. Indeed, exclusivity would require the use 
of the treaty process even though Congress possesses ample authority 
to alter patent terms under its plenary constitutional powers. Congress 
could even adopt the twenty-year term unilaterally to bring the United 
States into harmony with an international agreement that it has not 
joined. But, according to exclusivists, if the nation were to enter into a 
formal agreement that achieved the exact same result in substantive 
law, the federal government must use the treaty form. Further, if one 
adheres to the doctrine of self-executing treaties, treaty exclusivity re­
quires that such a treaty be able to override Congress's power to set 
the length of patents. As treaties are an executive power under Article 
II, this result allows the executive branch to exercise legislative powers 
vested by the Constitution in Congress alone. 
Using congressional-executive agreements in areas of plenary con­
gressional authority avoids this constitutional conflict. Whether Con­
gress adopts the new twenty-year period as part of an international 
agreement or as merely a change in domestic policy, the instrument is 
the same: a statute that receives the support of simple majorities in 
both houses of Congress and the signature of the President. This ap­
proach, which follows the doctrine of treaty non-self-execution, im­
plies that the treatymakers could choose to make a treaty on a subject 
within Congress's Article I powers. This theory, however, also re­
quires that such a treaty be without domestic effect until implemented 
by Congress. In the end, both the treaty and congressional-executive 
route would still require a statute to make changes in domestic law 
within areas under Congress's Article I competence, thereby preserv­
ing congressional authority under Article I. 
Viewing congressional-executive agreements in this way helps 
clarify the line that separates statutes from treaties. Allowing treaties 
to expand into areas regulated by Article I, Section 8 would under­
mine the constitutional structure by excluding the most direct popular 
representatives in the national government from exercising their con­
trol over areas given specifically to Congress. On the other hand, as 
Part II argued, allowing congressional-executive agreements to reach 
areas outside of Article I, Section 8's enumeration of powers would 
undermine the Constitution's vesting of a limited legislative power in 
the federal government. With the growing internationalization of do-
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS - RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 l.L.M. 81, 96 
(1994) [hereinafter TRIPs Agreement]. 
271. Congress created an alternative method for calculating patent terms under in the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994). 
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mestic affairs, merely asserting a foreign relations link or the need to 
comply with a multilateral international agreement would prove too 
large a loophole for expansive congressional powers. Allowing treaties 
directly to regulate subjects outside of congressional powers, while 
limiting congressional-executive agreements to matters given to the 
legislature alone by Article I, Section 8, would prevent international 
agreements from distorting the Constitution's public lawmaking sys­
tem. 
Following this approach would avoid the severe federalism con­
cerns raised by interchangeability. Due to the special role of the Sen­
ate, which has a unique interest in defending state prerogatives, the 
treaty process provides greater political safeguards for the states than 
the regular statutory process.272 Even though the Court's reinvigora­
tion of federalism in the last decade has substantially undermined (if 
not overruled) Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Author­
ity ,213 the idea that the structure of the national government provides 
significant protection for state sovereignty has special force with the 
Treaty Clause. Unlike the statutory process, which some scholars be­
lieve already provides sufficient political safeguards for federalism,274 
the treaty process requires a supermajority vote in the Senate. Only a 
constitutional amendment or the override of a presidential veto de­
mand as high a degree of consensus in the Senate. This requirement 
presumably provides federalism interests with even greater protection 
with regard to a treaty than a statute, not only because one-third plus 
one of the Senate can stop a treaty, but also because these Senators 
can represent an even smaller percentage of the population. Protec­
tion of state institutional interests was one of the very reasons why the 
Framers preserved the Articles of Confederation's supermajority re­
quirement for treaties.275 It seems that practice has borne out these in­
tentions, as the Senate has proceeded to attach "federalism" reserva­
tions to several recent treaties, limiting their reach to that already 
possessed by the national government.276 
Treaties usually involve matters of foreign affairs that are of great 
national importance, over which the Constitution already centralizes 
power in the national government. Putting to one side the serious 
272. See CHOPER, supra note 74, at 174-84. While I have criticized the political safe­
guards of federalism argument, it was on the ground that the theory erred in claiming that 
the safeguards excluded judicial review, not on the notion that the structure of the national 
political process itself protects federalism. John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 
70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1380-81 (1997). 
273. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
274. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 74, at 176; Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back 
into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 233-78 (2000) (arguing 
that history supports this view). 
275. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2009-13, 2029-32. 
276. See id. at 1973-76. 
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doubts of legal scholars,277 the Court has observed in cases such as 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. ,278 United States v. 
Belmont,279 and United States v. Pink,280 that the Constitution's transfer 
of all of the foreign affairs power to the federal government may have 
relieved the states of any cognizable interests when international rela­
tions are involved.281 National sovereignty in international relations 
may allow the federal government to exercise broader powers, vis-a­
vis the states, than it could domestically. Even in foreign affairs areas 
not specifically delegated to the federal government by the Constitu­
tion, as Justice Sutherland asserted in Curtiss-Wright, the states may 
have been completely ousted because of the need to unify national 
sovereignty in the federal government. As Justice Sutherland later 
wrote in Belmont, " [g]overnmental power over internal affairs is dis­
tributed between the national government and the several states. 
Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is 
vested exclusively in the national government."282 While this national­
ist view of the foreign affairs power is not free from doubt, the ap­
proach developed here would allow such exercises of national sover­
eignty to occur through the treaty power, whose supermajority 
requirement in the Senate and the limitations of non-self-execution 
would harmonize it with the constitutional structure. 
This analysis finds that the domestic area open to control only by 
treaty is the class of subjects that rests outside of Congress's Article I, 
Section 8 powers. While the reach of the Commerce Clause has ex­
panded enormously since the New Deal, United States v. Morrison 
demonstrates that there are still some matters that Congress cannot 
277. See Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An 
Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States 
in Foreign Affairs: The Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 341 (1999). 
278. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
279. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
280. 315 U.S. 203 (1942). 
281 . The absence of constitutional federalism interests on the part of the states in for­
eign affairs, however, does not answer the question of what presumption is to be applied in 
the absence of an affirmative federal action by the political branches. When the political 
branches have chosen not to use their foreign affairs powers, then general federalism consid­
erations may re-emerge. Jack Goldsmith has argued that the underpinnings for a dormant 
federal foreign affairs pre-emption doctrine are accordingly weak. See generally Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617 (1997). He 
also has claimed, with his co-author Curtis Bradley, that federal courts are also limited in 
creating a federal common law that incorporates customary international law norms. See 
Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common 
Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997); Curtis A. Bradley & 
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts and the Incorporation of International Law, 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 2260 (1998). 
282. 301 U.S. at 330. 
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regulate under the Commerce Clause.283 City of Boerne v. Flores 
makes clear that Congress's Section 5 enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment cannot expand definitions of individual con­
stitutional rights.284 Printz285, New York286, Seminole Tribe287, and Al­
den288 rule out use of the Commerce Clause to overcome certain as­
pects of state sovereignty. Nevertheless, Missouri v. Holland indicates 
that these areas may still be subject to Article H's treaty power, even if 
Congress could not use its Article I powers to pass a domestic statute 
on the matter.289 Commentators have been troubled by Holland's ex­
pansive language because it seems to assert without any textual basis 
that the federal government can act outside of its enumerated pow­
ers. 290 In fact, Holland makes sense as an accommodation of the execu­
tive treaty power and Article I's vesting of all of the federal legislative 
power in Congress. While treaties should not be self-executing in areas 
of plenary congressional authority, they should reach areas that lie 
outside of congressional powers due to Article I or Tenth Amendment 
limits.291 Giving treaties this scope prevents them from infringing upon 
Congress's enumerated powers, while also respecting Article Vi's 
grant of supremacy effect to treaties over state law.292 
This theory explains why the political branches have refused to use 
congressional-executive agreements to enter into international human 
rights conventions. Interchangeability cannot prevail because of the 
constitutional limitations on Congress's enumerated powers to expand 
the definition of individual rights that apply against the states. Several 
treaties that the United States has ratified alter the definition of cer­
tain individual rights contrary to Supreme Court decisions. For exam­
ple, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits 
the death penalty for crimes committed when the criminal offender 
was under the age of eighteen.293 Supreme Court precedent, however, 
permits states to execute juvenile offenders for crimes committed as 
young as sixteen years old.294 That same treaty sets international stan-
283. 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000). 
284. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
285. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
286. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
287. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
288. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
289. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
290. See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 258, at 394 (arguing that federalism limits should be 
placed on the "plenary" treaty power) . · 
291. See Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 10, at 2249-57. 
292. See id. at 2244. 
293. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 185, at art. 6(5). 
294. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 321 (1978). 
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dards against cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment while in prison 
that go beyond the Court's reading of the Eighth Amendment.295 
Other agreements, such as the International Convention on the Elimi­
nation of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which prohibits racial 
hate speech,296 similarly would expand individual rights beyond the 
Court's interpretation of the Bill of Rights.297 
It was once thought that Congress had some authority under Sec­
tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to participate in the definition of 
the substance of individual constitutional rights.298 City of Boerne, 
however, made clear that Congress could not use its Section 5 powers 
to pursue a definition of constitutional rights at variance with the deci­
sions of the Court.299 While we may live in an age when many impor­
tant rights are guaranteed by statute, City of Boerne still forbids Con­
gress from interfering in areas where the Court has refused to 
recognize broader constitutional protections. At most, Congress may 
enact only non-substantive, remedial statutes that bear a certain con­
gruence and proportionality to violations of constitutional rights by 
the states.300 As Professor Gerald Neuman has recently suggested, 
however, this limitation on congressional authority may not apply to 
the treaty power due to Missouri v. Holland.301 The treaty power, 
Justice Holmes indicated, was not just a different procedure for the 
exercise of Article l's enumerated power, but was an independent 
source of substantive power. 
295. See Michael H. Posner & Peter J. Spiro, Adding Teeth to United States Ratification 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The International Human Rights Conformity 
Act of 1993, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1209, 1216-17 (1993). 
296. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina­
tion, supra note 188, art. 4, S. EXEC. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1, 3-4, 660 U.N.T.S. at 218-220 (pro­
hibiting hate speech). The Supreme Court has found racial hate speech to be protected by 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
297. Several other multilateral human rights treaties similarly would expand individual 
rights beyond what the Court has permitted. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, su­
pra note 193, would provide children with substantive and procedural rights that they cur­
rently lack. The Court has held that family law remains the preserve of state regulation. 
Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979). Similarly, the Convention on the Elimi­
nation of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 190, which the United 
States has signed but not ratified, also would extend gender discrimination rules to areas that 
have been considered the preserve of the states. See Bradley, supra note 258, at 403. 
298. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 646-47 (1966). See generally Jesse H. Choper, 
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil 
War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REV. 299 (1982). 
299. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). Recent cases, such as United States v. Morrison's invalidation 
of the Violence Against Women Act, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and College Savings Bank's limita­
tion on federal remedies for intellectual property, College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), demonstrate that City of Boerne was 
no one-time event. See also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
300. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529-36. 
301. Neuman, supra note 221, at 1644-45. 
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If Missouri v. Holland remains good law, then the political 
branches theoretically can use the treaty power to reach the same re­
sult as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), without 
being limited by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Commerce Clause. Rather than altering the meaning of the Constitu­
tion, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, Congress would merely be 
implementing a treaty. Indeed, Professor Neuman has argued that 
provisions of the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights already create the treaty hook necessary to pass another ver­
sion of RFRA.302 Federal regulation of other areas may also require 
the treaty form in order to benefit from Missouri v. Holland's sweep. 
United States v. Lopez, for example, indicates that Congress can use its 
Commerce Clause powers only to regulate activity that either is in in­
terstate commerce, is an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or 
substantially effects interstate commerce if commercial itself in na­
ture.303 Last Term's United States v. Morrison re-emphasized this limit. 
Some environmental protection measures thus might encounter con­
stitutional difficulties if undertaken solely by Congress's Commerce 
Clause power. Current treaties that protect endangered species might 
fall outside the Court's current approach to the Commerce Clause,304 
as might proposed treaties that would protect biodiversity and estab­
lish national quotas for energy use. Only the Treaty Clause might sup­
ply a certain source of power to regulate in these areas.305 
Treaties also might be necessary in areas over which the executive 
and legislative branches have concurrent or overlapping powers. Be­
cause unilateral action by one branch cannot bind the other branch as 
a constitutional matter, the nation may need to assume an interna­
tional obligation by treaty in order to commit both branches. Not sur­
prisingly, different elements of the foreign affairs powers may be the 
area where treaties are most necessary. As Professor Koh has ob­
served, the Constitution often delegates different powers over the 
same foreign affairs issue to the two political branches, without speci­
fying the relationship between those powers.306 War powers provide a 
302. See Neuman, supra note 52, at 49-50. The Senate, however, declared the treaty non­
self-executing when it gave its advice and consent, which might bar congressional efforts to 
use the ICCPR as authority for a second-generation RFRA statute. This result would occur 
not because of a constitutional defect in the scope of the treaty power, but because of the 
manner in which the Senate approved the treaty. 
303. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
304. See Bradley, supra note 258, at 408. 
305. Cf. Gavin R. Villareal, Note, One Leg to Stand On: The Treaty Power and Congres­
sional Authority for the Endangered Species Act After United States v. Lopez, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 1125 (1998) (suggesting that treaty power represents the best weapon for defenders of 
congressional power to enact the Endangered Species Act). 
306. See KOH, supra note 6, at 67 ("One cannot read the Constitution without being 
struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority among 
the branches."). 
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ready example. The Constitution gives the President the Commander­
in-Chief power and the undefined executive power, while vesting in 
Congress the sole power to declare war and to raise and fund the mili­
tary. Yet, the constitutional text does not clearly state which branch 
has the authority to initiate military hostilities. This gap has led me to 
argue elsewhere that no constitutionally prescribed method exists for 
going to war, but instead that the branches may use their plenary pow­
ers either to cooperate or to compete for primacy.307 While the Presi­
dent may use the Commander-in-Chief power to send troops into con­
flict, Congress may deny him or her the operational or financial means 
to engage in hostilities; Congress, however, cannot force the President 
to send troops into certain conflicts or deploy them in certain ways. 
Neither branch can engage in unilateral action that will result in the 
sustained commitment of the United States to make war as part of a 
political or military alliance. A treaty, in contrast, allows both 
branches with a say to commit themselves to such long-term interna­
tional obligations. 
We may therefore expect treaties to be used in areas where the 
branches possess concurrent powers that require cooperation -
rather than unilateral congressional or presidential action - for their 
consistent exercise. Political/military alliances and arms control are ar­
eas where the participation of both the President and a supermajority 
of the Senate may be necessary because of the competing allocation of 
foreign affairs power. The United States, for example, could not live 
up to its obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty alliance through 
the unilateral actions of the executive or legislature alone. To be sure, 
the President could station troops in Europe under the Commander­
in-Chief power, and even order them into conflict on his own author­
ity.308 Nonetheless, the President has required congressional participa­
tion to guarantee that the nation could raise, properly equip, and fund 
the large, permanent military forces that have guarded Europe for 
more than fifty years. While Congress could pass a statute creating 
those armies, it could not constitutionally force the President to de­
ploy them to Europe.309 The treaty form provides the appropriate 
means to fulfill the nation's obligations under the NATO treaty, be­
cause it represents the promise of both the President and a superma­
jority of the upper house of the legislature to meet demanding, long­
term obligations. 
307. Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219, at 296-02; see also John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The 
Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1 171-73 (1999); 
Yoo, Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1687. 
308. See generally Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219. Even if one did not agree that 
Presidents can send the military into hostilities without a declaration of war, one might be­
lieve that they could do so pursuant to treaty or even international law obligations. See Yoo, 
Kosovo, supra note 125, at 1719-28 (discussing and criticizing this argument). 
309. See Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219. 
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Or consider arms control agreements. In the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces treaty with the Soviet Union, the United States agreed 
to remove an entire class of nuclear weapons from deployment and to 
cease production and refrain from any future flight-testing of certain 
missiles and launchers.310 Implementation of this treaty required both 
branches to cooperate in the use of their constitutional authorities. 
The Commander-in-Chief power controlled the placement and use of 
existing missiles such as the Pershing II, which President Reagan had 
deployed to Western Europe in the early 1980s, as well as the poten­
tial conversion of other weapons systems into intermediate-range 
weapons. Legislative participation was necessary to guarantee that 
Congress would not authorize or fund the development of future in­
termediate-range nuclear weapons. A similar analysis may be applied 
to the START treaties, which require the elimination of some existing 
nuclear weapons and the commitment to ceilings on American nuclear 
force structures.311 Contrast these treaties with a trade agreement such 
as NAFT A or the WTO. Congress could bring domestic law into com­
pliance with NAFTA or the WTO in the absence of any agreement, or 
even in the face of presidential opposition. For trade, a congressional­
executive agreement, or statute, is all that is needed.312 
B. Solving the Conflict Between Articles I and II 
This Article's analysis of international agreements does more than 
explain the subject-matter-based distinction drawn by practice be­
tween congressional-executive agreements and treaties. It also solves 
many of the severe distortions in the constitutional text and structure 
wrought by interchangeability and treaty exclusivity. On the one hand, 
as we have seen, interchangeability allows the legislative power not 
only to subsume executive functions, but also to escape the limitations 
imposed by Article I, Section 8. Treaty exclusivity, on the other hand, 
ultimately fails because it creates irreconcilable conflicts between the 
treaty power and the legislative power. Although the treaty power 
fundamentally remains an executive one, several developments -
such as the rise of globalization, the doctrine of self-execution, and 
relaxed structural limits on treaties - threaten to give the treaty 
power a sweeping legislative dimension. Executive assumption of leg­
islative power assaults the Constitution's vesting of all legislative 
power in Congress, and it undermines constitutional structures that 
promote popular sovereignty. 
310. Treaty between the United States of America and the U.S.S.R. on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, supra note 170. 
311 .  See The START II Treaty, supra note 176; The START I Treaty, supra note 176. 
312. Other areas within the President's Article II powers may be handled by a sole ex­
ecutive agreement, such as international claims settlement. 
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Congressional-executive agreements avoid this conflict by con­
tinuing to reserve to the legislature the power to regulate those areas 
given to it under Article I, Section 8, but allowing ample room for 
treaties to operate outside that field. This Part will develop this ap­
proach by examining the original understanding of the treaty power 
and its relationship to the legislative power, by demonstrating how the 
congressional-executive agreement has actually served to defend the 
federal legislative power from encroachment by the executive, and by 
showing how this theory of international agreements harmonizes with 
the American public lawmaking system. 
1. The Original Understanding 
Maintaining a line between statutes and treaties finds support in 
the original understanding of the Constitution. Separation of the leg­
islative and executive powers underlay the Framers' general approach 
to the constitutional allocation of the foreign affairs power. A century 
of struggle between Crown and Parliament had taught the framing 
generation that the power to legislate served as an important check 
upon the executive's activities in foreign affairs.313 They continued this 
distinction, established by the British constitution, during the revolu­
tionary period, culminating in the division of the treaty and legislative 
powers during the drafting and ratification of the Constitution. While 
this Article is not the place to conduct a thorough review of the consti­
tutional history of foreign affairs during the British colonial and early 
national periods,314 several episodes illustrate the Framers' under­
standing that the legislative power and the treaty power were to oc­
cupy separate spheres in domestic law. 
First, by the middle of the eighteenth century, the British political 
and constitutional system had established the norm that treatymaking 
and domestic lawmaking were to remain distinct and separate. Famil­
iar authorities on the British constitution, such as John Locke, 
Montesquieu, and William Blackstone, envisioned a foreign affairs 
power vested in the executive that could not exercise the authority to 
establish domestic rules of conduct, which they considered the essence 
of the legislative power.315 Both Locke's and Montesquieu's separation 
313. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1982-2091 (reviewing evidence from the origi­
nal understanding regarding the difference between the legislative and treaty powers). 
314. I have attempted such a study elsewhere, see id. , although in regard to the different 
question of self-executing treaties. Professors Martin Flaherty and Carlos Vazquez have 
criticized different aspects of this historical analysis, see generally Flaherty, supra note 267; 
Vazquez, supra note 267, to which I have responded in Yoo, Non-Self-Execution, supra note 
10, at 2221-33. 
315. See JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 143-47 (J.W. 
Gough ed., Basil Blackwell 1947) (1690); 1 M. DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, 
SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. 11 ,  ch. 6, at 196-210 (trans., 4th ed. 1768) (1748); 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160-*161, *252-*253, *257, *270. 
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of powers theories, which defined the function of representing the na­
tion in its international relations as distinct from that of enacting rules 
of conduct, and Blackstone's balanced government approach, which 
saw the legislative power as a check on the executive, established that 
the foreign affairs power was not to intrude upon the legislative 
authority. Recent British political history reinforced these lessons. 
During the struggles between Crown and Parliament in the seven­
teenth century, the latter had successfully used its exclusive powers 
over funding and legislation to control the King's efforts in treaty­
making.316 By the time of the framing, the British political system had 
reached a constitutional settlement in which the Crown's exclusive 
prerogative over treatymaking was checked by Parliament's absolute 
authority to make domestic law. This accommodation became a cen­
tral element of the British Constitution's system of checks and bal­
ances and of the rise of parliamentary government. 
Second, experience during the colonial and revolutionary period 
confirmed that the foreign affairs power and domestic legislation were 
to remain separate spheres. Mirroring the division of powers between 
King and Parliament, London unilaterally controlled the external 
powers of war and treaty, while avoiding interference with the colonial 
assemblies' management of internal affairs.317 From a constitutional 
perspective, one can view the American Revolution as the colonies' 
rejection of London's efforts to use its foreign affairs power to assume 
more direct legislative power. With the Revolution, Americans trans­
ferred the Crown's imperial powers to the Articles of Confederation 
Congress, while the legislative power remained dispersed among the 
states.318 Just as the Crown required Parliament's consent to fund and 
implement treaties, so too the Continental Congress remained pow­
erless to legislate directly without state cooperation. This division of 
authority produced debilitating foreign affairs crises, such as the fail­
ure by the states to honor the 1783 Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, 
316. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 1997-04. Summarizing the British approach to 
treaties and public lawmaking, English legal historian Frederick Maitland observed: "Sup­
pose the queen contracts with France that English iron or coal shall not be exported to 
France - until a statute has been passed forbidding exportation, one may export and laugh 
at the treaty." F.W. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 425 (H.A.L. 
Fisher ed., 1961) (1908); see also id. at 424-25; 10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY 
OF ENGLISH LAW 373-74 (1938); 11 id. at 253, 268. 
317. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN 
REVOLUTION 217-29 (1967); JACK P. GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER: CONSTITU­
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT JN THE EXTENDED POLITIES OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND THE 
UNITED STATES 1607-1788, at 19-43 (1986); JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 126-41 (1991). 
318. See JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF 
POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 303-04 (1987); Eugene R. Sheridan & John M. Mur­
rin, Introduction to CONGRESS AT PRINCETON: BEING THE LETTERS OF CHARLES 
THOMSON TO HANNAH THOMSON JUNE-OCTOBER 1783, at xi, xxxiv-xxxviii (Eugene R. 
Sheridan & John M. Murrin eds., 1985). 
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which led many of the Framers to seek a stronger national govern­
ment.319 While some, such as John Jay and Alexander Hamilton, be­
lieved that the answer was to give all treaties self-executing effect as 
domestic law, others such as James Madison sought to create a truly 
national legislative power that could implement treaties directly.320 Be­
cause "a unanimous and punctual obedience of thirteen independent 
bodies, to the acts of the federal Government, ought not be calculated 
on," Madison wrote in a memo just before the Philadelphia Conven­
tion, the national government needed the power to operate directly 
upon individuals without the intervention of the States.321 
Evidence from the ratification of the Constitution further indicates 
that the treaty power was not to intrude into Congress's legislative 
authority. When the Constitution went to the States, Anti-Federalists 
initially seized on the Treaty and Supremacy Clauses for improperly 
vesting legislative power in an aristocratic body like the Senate. 322 
George Mason's influential Objections to the Constitution echoed the 
claims of other widely publicized Anti-Federalists writers, such as the 
"Federal Framer" and "Brutus": "By declaring all Treaties supreme 
Laws of the Land, the Executive & the Senate have, in many Cases, an 
exclusive Power of Legislation . . . .  "323 In order to maintain the sepa­
ration of lawmaking and treatymaking, Mason argued, the approval of 
the House of Representatives ought to be necessary before any treaty 
could have legislative effect. Anti-Federalists repeated similar claims 
in significant ratification conventions in Pennsylvania and Virginia.324 
Federalists responded throughout the ratification process that the 
separation of the legislative power in Article I from the treaty power 
in Article II would respect the traditional Anglo-American distinction 
between treaties and laws. In Pennsylvania, James Wilson answered 
the Anti-Federalist charges by referring to the Crown's need to seek 
parliamentary cooperation in any treaties that changed domestic laws. 
319. See FREDERICK w. MARKS III, INDEPENDENCE ON TRIAL: FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 52-95 (1973). 
320. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2016-24. 
321. See VICES OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES (Apr. 1787), re­
printed in 9 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 345, 351 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975). 
322. See Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2040-43; see, e.g., GEORGE MASON, MASON'S 
OBJECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT FORMED BY THE CONSTITUTION 
(Oct. 7, 1787), reprinted in 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 348, 350 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds. 1981) [hereinafter 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY]. 
323. MASON, supra note 322, at 350; see also LETTER IV FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER 
(Oct. 12, 1787), reprinted in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 322, at 42, 43-44; 
BRUTUS II (Nov. 1 ,  1787), reprinted in 13 id. at 524, 529. 
324. Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2043-48, 2059-68. 
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He then asked "And will not the same thing take place here?"325 In 
New York, Alexander Hamilton as Publius argued that treaties were 
not legislative in nature: 
The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws, or in other 
words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; while the exe­
cution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either 
for this purpose or for the common defence, seem to comprise all the 
functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, 
plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution 
of the subsisting laws nor to the enaction of new ones; and still less to an 
exertion of the common strength. Its objects are CONTRACTS with for­
eign nations which have the force of law, but derive it from the obliga­
tions of good faith. They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the 
subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in 
question seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong 
properly neither to the legislative nor to the executive.326 
Hamilton's co-author followed a similar line in the all-important 
Virginia ratifying convention. Managing the response to Anti­
Federalist leaders Patrick Henry, Mason, and James Monroe, Madison 
circulated talking points that urged Federalist delegates to emphasize 
the House's control over domestic legislation. "It is true that this 
branch is not of necessity to be consulted in the forming of Treaties," 
Madison admitted, but nonetheless its "approbation and co-operation 
may often be necessary in carrying treaties into full effect."327 Because 
of the House's monopoly over funding and legislation, Madison ar­
gued, it would have the same check on treaties that Parliament en­
joyed in Great Britain. " [A]s the support of the Government and of 
the plans of the President & Senate in general must be drawn from the 
purse which [the House of Representatives] hold[s] ,'' he explained, 
"the sentiments of this body cannot fail to have very great weight, 
even when the body itself may have no constitutional authority."328 
Relying upon these arguments in the convention debates, Madison 
and his Federalist colleague, George Nicholas, answered Anti­
Federalist concerns by analogizing the practical workings of the na­
tional government to the British system, in which the House of Com-
325. The Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11 ,  1787), in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, su-
pra note 322, at 550, 563. 
326. THE FEDERALIST No. 75 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in id. at 481, 482. 
327. Letter from James Madison to George Nicholas (May 17, 1788), in id. at 804, 808. 
328. Id; see also id. at 809 ("[U]nder the new System every Treaty must be made by 1 .  
the authority of  the Senate in which the States are to vote equally. 2. that of  the President 
who represents the people & the States in a compounded ratio. and 3. under the influence of 
the H. of Reps. who represent the people alone."). 
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mons' control over domestic law "gives them such influence that [it] 
can dictate in what manner [treaties] shall be made."329 
Two other pieces of evidence from the Framing period also suggest 
that those who ratified the Constitution understood that the treaty 
power could not infringe on Congress's legislative powers. First, to­
ward the end of the ratification debates in the press, some leading 
Anti-Federalists appeared to accept the arguments of Wilson, Hamil­
ton, and Madison. One of the earliest critics of the Treaty Clause, the 
Federal Farmer, moderated his public views later in the debate. "On a 
fair construction of the constitution," he wrote in a subsequent set of 
essays, "I think the legislature has a proper controul over the presi­
dent and senate in settling commercial treaties."330 Recognizing that 
the treaty power and Congress's power over international commerce 
could come into conflict, the Federal Farmer observed that: 
As to treaties of commerce, they do not generally require secrecy, they 
almost always involve in them legislative powers, interfere with the laws 
and internal police of the country, and operate immediately on persons 
and property, especially in the commercial towns: (they have in Great­
Britain usually been confirmed by Parliament;) they consist of rules and 
regulations respecting commerce; and to regulate commerce, or to make 
regulations respecting commerce, the federal legislature, by the constitu­
tion, has the power. I do not see that any commercial regulations can be 
made in treaties, that will not infringe upon this power in the legislature; 
therefore, I infer, that the true construction is, that the president and 
senate shall make treaties; but all commercial treaties shall be subject to 
be confirmed by the legislature. This construction will render the clauses 
consistent, and make the powers of the president and senate, respecting 
treaties, much less exceptionable.331 
Consensus between Federalists and Anti-Federalists on how to har­
monize the Treaty Clause and Congress's plenary powers should not 
be taken lightly. In accepting Federalist arguments about the limited 
nature of the treaty power, the Federal Farmer essentially adopted the 
same view that Federalists had used to prevail in the major ratifying 
states. Because treaties could not exercise Congress's legislative pow­
ers, the most populous branch enjoyed the means to check the designs 
of the treatymakers. 
Second, experience during the early years of the Republic suggests 
that the political branches accepted this reading of the constitutional 
structure. In 1795, the Senate approved the controversial Jay Treaty, 
which settled several outstanding issues causing friction in Anglo-
329. George Nicholas, Debates - The Virginia Convention, June 13, 1788, in 10 id. at 
1228, 1251; see Yoo, Globalism, supra note 8, at 2059-68 (recounting Virginia ratifying con­
vention's debates on Treaty Clause). 
330. LETTER FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER XI, May 2, 1788, reprinted in 17 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 322, at 301, 309. 
331. Id. at 309-10. 
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American relations.332 Parts of the Jay Treaty involved appropriations 
as well as the treatment of British shipping and goods.333 Federalists 
argued that Congress had a constitutional duty to implement the 
treaty; the treaty power, leaders such as Alexander Hamilton argued, 
could exercise any power delegated to Congress in Article I. In the 
"Defence," Hamilton claimed that " [e]ach house of Congress collec­
tively as well as the members of it separately are under a constitu­
tional obligation to observe the injunctions of a [treaty) and to give it 
effect. "334 Assisted by the new Jeffersonian congressmen Albert 
Gallatin, Madison reiterated the theory he had propounded during the 
ratification - that the treaty power remained limited by Congress's 
legislative authority - and turned to the original understanding itself 
for support. Speaking before the House, Madison declared that he 
would only appeal to the Committee [of the Whole] to decide whether it 
did not appear, from a candid and collected view of the debates in those 
Conventions, and particularly in that of Virginia, that the Treaty-making 
power was a limited power; and that the powers in our Constitution, on 
this subject bore an analogy to the powers on the same subject in the 
Government of Great Britain. He wished, as little as any member could, 
to extend the analogies between the two Governments; but it was clear 
that the constituent parts of two Governments might be perfectly het­
erogeneous, and yet the powers be similar.335 
Following Madison's lead, the House resolved, fifty-seven to thirty­
four, that "when a Treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects 
submitted by the Constitution to the power of Congress, it must de­
pend, for its execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be 
passed by Congress. "336 
To be sure, the Framers could not have anticipated the great ex­
plosion in international agreements today, nor could they have fore­
seen the leading role that America would take in world affairs. They 
did, however, consider the potential conflict between making treaties 
332. See Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, supra note 200. The policy and 
politics of the Jay Treaty are discussed in SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JAY'S TREATY: A STUDY 
IN COMMERCE AND DIPLOMACY (rev. ed. 1962) (1923); JERALD A. COMBS, THE JA y 
TREATY: POLITICAL BATTLEGROUND OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS (1970); and ELKINS & 
MCKITRICK, supra note 66, at 375-449. 
333. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST 
PERIOD 1789-1801, at 210-17 (1997) (providing a description of the constitutional debates in 
Congress over the Jay Treaty). 
334. ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXXVI (Jan. 2, 1976), reprinted in 
20 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 3, 4 (Harold c. Syrett ed., 1974) [hereinafter 
THE HAMILTON PAPERS). Hamilton argued that reading the treaty power as limited by con­
gressional authority would make it impossible for the nation to enter into treaties. See also 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE DEFENCE No. XXXVII (Jan. 6, 1796), reprinted in 20 id. at 
13, 16-22. 
335. 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 777 (1796). 
336. Id. at 771. 
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binding upon the nation, in a way that they had not been under the 
Articles of Confederation, and vesting the federal legislative power in 
Congress alone. The Framers resolved this tension by returning to the 
traditional Anglo-American separation between legislating and 
treatymaking. Current practice by the political branches concerning 
congressional-executive agreements honors this original understand­
ing. While the branches continue to use treaties in areas of congres­
sional incompetence or overlapping executive and legislative powers, 
they have used the statutory process to enact international agreements 
that involve Congress's core Article I, Section 8 powers. This ar­
rangement maintains the balance between the executive and legisla­
tive branches, and it ensures that the people's most direct representa­
tives have the primary hand in enacting domestic rules of conduct. 
2. Congressional-Executive Agreements as a Defense of the 
Legislative Power 
Reserving areas within Article I, Section S's ambit for approval by 
congressional-executive agreement, rather than by treaty, preserves 
textual and structural elements of the Constitution and promotes the 
original understanding. Consider the ramifications of an alternate ap­
proach that would make treaties the exclusive method for making in­
ternational agreements. First, treaties remain an executive power that 
excludes the branch most directly accountable to the people, the 
House of Representatives. Second, unlike statutes, treaties have no 
defined subject matter, which means that the treatymakers can enter 
into an international agreement on any matter, regardless of whether 
the Constitution grants control over it to another branch. Third, most 
internationalist legal scholars believe that treaties are generally self­
executing - if their terms are clear, treaties do not require imple­
menting legislation by Congress, but instead are to be automatically 
enforced by the courts.337 Congressional-executive agreements, on the 
other hand, promote democracy by infusing foreign policymaking with 
House participation. Their use guarantees that the same lawmaking 
process will apply to laws that have the same effect in regulating do­
mestic conduct. 
337. See, e.g., HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 201; Lori Fisler Damrosch, 
The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" 
Treaties, in PARLIAMENTARY PARTICIPATION IN THE MAKING AND OPERATION OF 
TREATIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 205, 217-18 (Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. 
Abbott eds., 1994); Flaherty, supra note 267; Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 760, 760 (1988); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing Treaties and 
U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 892, 896-901 (1980); Carlos Manuel 
Vazquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113-
14, 1 121-22 (1992). 
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Because of its placement in Article II, the treaty power remains an 
executive power. Some have read Article II to constitute a broad grant 
of power because of Article Ill's parallel vesting clause and Article I's 
narrower, enumerated vesting clause.338 In keeping with this observa­
tion, the powers enumerated in Article II, Section 2, such as the pow­
ers to command the military, to issue pardons, and to execute the laws, 
must be (and traditionally have been considered to be), executive in 
nature. When Article II includes the Senate in the operation of these 
functions, such as the making of treaties or the appointment of federal 
judges and officers, it does not transform these clauses into legislative 
powers. 
The Senate's inclusion in treatymaking and appointments - pow­
ers held exclusively by the British Crown - represents instead an ef­
fort to dilute the unitary nature of the executive branch.339 In this re­
spect, the treaty power's division between President and Senate 
reflected the practice of the Revolution-era state constitutions, which 
had sought to control executive power not by re-allocating to the leg­
islature the powers of war, peace, and appointment, but by disrupting 
the unity and independence of the executive branch.340 While the Con­
stitution may reduce executive power in favor of the legislature when 
compared with the British constitution, it nowhere transfers what were 
considered legislative powers to Article II. 
This is not to say that the executive branch does not enjoy some 
legislative power. When the Constitution, however, grants the Presi­
dent a power that is legislative in nature, it does so in Article I, not Ar­
ticle II. Thus, the Constitution grants the President a conditional veto 
over legislation in Article I, Section 7, not Article II, Section 2. While 
no one can deny that the executive branch also makes law through 
administrative regulations, this lawmaking occurs due to the delega­
tion of authority by Congress, subject to clear and manageable stan­
dards.341 Similarly, when the federal courts exercise lawmaking 
authority, under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,342 this interstitial gap-
338. See Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44, at 570-71 (claiming that the vesting clause 
creates a reservoir of unenumerated executive power). But see Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 
132 (taking a contrary view); Flaherty, supra note 132 (same). 
339. This point was first made by Alexander Hamilton in his "Pacificus" essays defend­
ing the constitutionality of President Washington's Neutrality Proclamation. See, e.g. , 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, PACIFICUS No. I (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 THE HAMILTON 
PAPERS, supra note 334, at 33, 39. 
340. See Yoo, War Powers, supra note 219, at 222-28; WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 271-75 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) 
(1973); CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775-1789: A STUDY 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 34-54 (1922). 
341. See Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 442-47 (1998); Mistretta v. United States, 
488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). 
342. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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filling role must be authorized by federal law.343 The Constitution de­
lineates the President's lawmaking role in Article I, rather than Article 
II, because Article I contains the finely balanced method for making 
federal laws. The Constitution centralizes all public lawmaking into 
such a tortuous process specifically to make the exercise of legislative 
authority more difficult, thereby protecting the states and the people 
from unwarranted exercises of federal power.344 Hence Article I de­
clares that "all Legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States," and nowhere else. 
All of this detail indicates that the constitutional text resists the no­
tion that an "independent, free-standing presidential law-making 
authority exists insofar as the rights of American citizens are con­
cerned," as Professor Monaghan has put it.345 The executive power 
vested in the President by Article II, Section 1 is characterized by, as 
Hamilton argued in Federalist No. 75, "the execution of the laws and 
the employment of the common strength," which, he believed, "seem 
to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate."346 Hamilton 
had distinguished this power from the legislative power, "the essence" 
of which "is to enact laws, or in other words to prescribe rules for the 
regulation of the society. "347 In the few cases addressing this distinc­
tion, the Supreme Court has continued to define the executive power 
by its very lack of the power to make laws. "In the framework of our 
constitution," the Court declared in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, "the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully exe­
cuted refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."348 Whether one 
believes in a "law-enforcement,"349 "protective power,"350 or a broader 
inherent power model of the presidency,351 none of these theories rec­
ognizes an executive authority to legislate upon the domestic legal 
rights and duties of American citizens without congressional authori-
343. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 
144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245 (1996); Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal 
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie -
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405-07 (1964); Larry Kramer, 
The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 PACE L. REV. 263, 287 (1992); Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985); Henry 
P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 87 HARV. L. 
REV. 889, 892 (1974) (book review). 
344. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). 
345. Monaghan, supra note 231, at 4. 
346. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75, supra note 326, at 482. 
347. Id. 
348. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
349. Monaghan, supra note 231, at 10. 
350. Id. at 11 .  
351. See generally Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 44. 
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zation. Allowing the President and Senate, through the treaty power, 
to exercise powers allocated by the Constitution to Congress would 
step over this line. 
Using the statutory form to make international agreements that 
regulate matters within Congress's Article I powers avoids conflict be­
tween the textual grants of the executive and legislative power to dif­
ferent branches of government. According to internationalists, the 
President and Senate may resort to the treaty process to address any 
matter, so long as it is "an agreement between two or more states or 
international organizations that is intended to be legally binding and is 
governed by international law."352 °If treaties are this unlimited in sub­
ject-matter, and if they also are self-executing, then the treatymakers 
can regulate any area - even one that lies within the enumerated 
powers of Congress. Under this approach, a self-executing treaty could 
make certain actions federal crimes or establish new commercial or 
environmental regulations, despite Congress's power over both mat­
ters domestically. As the line between domestic and international mat­
ters disintegrates, and as the United States turns to multilateral inter­
national agreements to address problems that were once domestic in 
scope, treaties potentially could replace statutes as a primary vehicle 
for domestic regulation. For example, if an international agreement, 
such as the GA TI, required that the United States make adjustments 
to its rules governing intellectual property or modify its regulation of 
foods and drugs, internationalists would conclude that the treaty­
makers could enact these changes directly under their Treaty Clause 
authority. Internationalists agree with this result, even when there is 
no doubt that, in the absence of a treaty, the President and Senate 
could not achieve the same result without the participation of the 
House.353 
This approach threatens to read out of the Constitution Article I's 
vesting of legislative powers in Congress alone. It invites conflict be­
tween the treaty power and the legislative power, and it resolves this 
clash by allowing one clause of the Constitution essentially to trump 
the other. Further, the exclusivist position too easily removes the 
House from its constitutional role in domestic policymaking and cre­
ates an inviting loophole for an expansive use of the treaty power. 
Recognizing these problems, the Restatement and leading internation­
alist scholars admit that treaties cannot take direct effect as American 
law if legislation is "constitutionally required."354 Both Professor 
Henkin and the Restatement concede that legislation appears to be 
352. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(1). See also Damrosch, supra note 
52, at 530. 
353. See, e.g. , HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 6, at 194-98; Paust, supra note 
337, at 776-81. 
354. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 111 (4)(c). 
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necessary to implement a treaty if the international agreement calls 
for a declaration of war, an appropriation of money, the raising of 
taxes, or the punishment of criminal conduct.355 Neither, however, 
provides any principle that distinguishes those areas that are to be re­
served to statutes from the other powers that are subject to the treaty 
power. The constitutional text, which treats all of these powers in Ar­
ticle I, Section 8, certainly does not make any distinctions among 
them.356 
Indeed, if internationalists are correct in arguing that a treaty can 
exercise a single Article I, Section 8 power granted to Congress, then 
the treatymakers must be able to exercise all of Congress's legislative 
powers. If the President and the Senate, for example, can use a treaty 
to establish commercial regulations or intellectual property rules, 
there is no textual reason that should prevent a treaty from declaring 
war or establishing criminal punishments. Internationalist efforts to 
preserve congressional control over appropriations, war declaration, 
and crimes, makes even less sense in light of the absence of any consti­
tutional provision vesting Congress with a power to enact general fed­
eral criminal laws. As most federal criminal laws must be based upon 
the Commerce Clause, the Henkin/Restatement distinction collapses, 
as these authorities agree that the treatymakers can exercise the 
Commerce Clause power without resort to a statute. The internation­
alists fail to provide any reason rooted in the constitutional text or 
structure why treaties can establish trade regulations but cannot enact 
criminal laws. 
A logic that would make treaties the exclusive means of making in­
ternational agreements, combined with standard internationalist theo­
ries of the treaty power, leads to the conclusion that the treatymakers 
can exercise virtually any and all of the federal government's legisla­
tive powers. This conclusion is fundamentally at odds with the Consti­
tution's reservation of legislative authority to a popularly elected Con­
gress. As Madison declared during the Jay Treaty debates, "if the 
Treaty-power alone could perform any one act for which the authority 
of Congress is required by the Constitution, it may perform every act 
for which the authority of that part of the Government is required."357 
Madison further argued that if by treaty "the President and Senate can 
regulate Trade; they can also declare war; they can raise armies to 
355. See id. at § 1 1 1  cmt. i & reporters' note 6; HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, supra note 
6, at 203. 
356. The one exception is the Appropriations Clause, which declares: "No Money shall 
be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law." U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. Professor Henkin and the Restatement admit that use of the term 
"by Law" indicates that appropriations can only be made by a statute, rather than by a 
treaty. This reading, however, undermines their approach to the Supremacy Clause, which is 
built on the idea that a treaty is the constitutional equivalent of a "Law." 
357. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty, supra note 234, at 258. 
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carry on war; and they can procure money to support armies."358 
Madison believed that this result demonstrated that the treaty power 
could not be read so far as to enjoy legislative authority, because the 
Constitution vested Article I, Section 8's powers in Congress specifi­
cally to ensure that the House played a determinative role in their ex­
ercise. " [A]lthough the Constitution had carefully & jealously lodged 
the power of war, of armies, of the purse &c. in Congress, of which the 
immediate representatives of the people, formed an integral part,'' 
Madison observed, an exclusivist theory of treaties meant that the: 
President & Senate by means of Treaty of Alliance with a nation at war, 
might make the United States parties in the war: they might stipulate 
subsidies, and even borrow money to pay them: they might furnish 
Troops, to be carried to Europe, Asia or Africa: they might even under­
take to keep up a standing army in time of peace, for the purpose of co­
operating, on given contingences [sic), with an Ally.359 
Some internationalists wisely concede that only Congress can exer­
cise certain powers, such as appropriations and taxation. The exclusion 
of these areas from the general rule of self-execution makes sense 
when viewed as a matter of democratic policymaking. Clearly, matters 
such as declaring war, raising taxes, and imposing criminal penalties 
are some of the most vital exercises of the legislative power, and they 
have never been thought to lie with the judiciary or executive.360 This 
principle, however, also argues against allowing the treatymakers to 
transfer to themselves any of the powers vested exclusively in Con­
gress under Article I, Section 8, because the Constitution itself does 
not textually distinguish among those powers. As Madison said during 
the Jay Treaty debates, " [t]hese powers, however different in their na­
ture or importance, are on the same footing in the Constitution, and 
must share the same fate."361 Only by requiring congressional­
executive agreements in areas that involve Congress's powers, or by 
adopting a presumption that treaties are non-self-executing, can this 
conflict between Articles I and II be resolved. 
3. Congressional-Executive Agreements as Public Lawmaking 
Maintaining the line between executive and legisla\ive power, be­
tween treatymaking and lawmaking, better accords not just with the 
358. Id. 
359. Id. at 258-59. To prevent a permanent military establishment, Madison argued, the 
Constitution had vested appropriations in Congress and subjected military appropriations to 
a two-year limit, which intentionally coincided with the two-year cycle for House elections. 
"This is a most important check & security agst. the danger of standing armies, & against the 
prosecution of a war beyond its rational objects." Id. at 260. 
360. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 69 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (ar­
guing that the power of taxation is beyond the authority of the judicial branch). 
361. Speech by James Madison on Jay's Treaty, supra note 234, at 258. 
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constitutional text and structure, but also with the Constitution's sys­
tem of democratic governance and popular sovereignty. In domestic 
spheres of activity, the Constitution grants the power to legislate to 
the federal government through the institution of Congress. The Con­
stitution promotes the idea that when the government imposes rules of 
conduct on private individuals, those rules ought to be made by their 
most directly accountable representatives. This principle of popular 
sovereignty seems to demand that Congress usually participate in the 
promulgation of international agreements that require individuals to 
act or not act in certain ways, just as Congress is the dominant institu­
tional force in the enactment of domestic laws that have the same ef­
fect. As modern treaties begin to encompass matters such as econom­
ics, industrial and environmental activity, individual liberties, and 
other areas that have usually been the preserve of domestic legislation, 
congressional-executive agreements impose the same process on the 
same subjects, regardless of whether the impulse for regulation comes 
from domestic or international sources. 
Congressional-executive agreements promote democratic govern­
ment in the public lawmaking process as it relates to international 
matters. Use of the statutory process requires the consent of the most 
directly democratic part of the government, the House of Representa­
tives, before the nation can regulate domestic matters through interna­
tional agreements. The treaty process allows a minority of Senators, 
representing perhaps even a smaller minority of the national popula­
tion, to block international agreements.362 This point also has a flip 
side. While perhaps unlikely, it is also possible under the treaty proc­
ess for two-thirds of the Senate to force the nation to enter into a 
treaty without the support of the majority of the people. According to 
recent population estimates, two-thirds of the Senate can represent as 
little as thirty-two percent of the population. If the sixteen most 
populous states opposed a treaty, producing thirty-two Senate votes 
out of one-hundred, they would represent 185.6 million of the nation's 
estimated 272.7 million people, or sixty-eight percent of the popula­
tion.363 To be sure, the presence of a popularly elected President pro­
vides a safeguard against the chances of an anti-majoritarian treaty, 
but presidential participation is not a complete protection for majority 
rule, particularly once a President enters his or her second term. Es­
tablishing a process in which the House's prerogatives over domestic 
362. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 13, at 872. 
363. According to the Bureau of the Census, in 1999 the sixteen most populous states 
were (in millions of people): California: 33.l;  Texas 20.0; New York 18.2; Florida 15.1; 
Illinois 12.1; Pennsylvania 12.0; Ohio 1 1 .3; Michigan 9.9; New Jersey 8.1; Georgia 7.8; North 
Carolina 7.7; Virginia 6.9; Massachusetts 6.2; Indiana 5.9; Washington 5.8; Missouri 5.5. 
These figures are taken from Census Bureau estimates, available at http://quickfacts.census. 
gov/qfd/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2001 ). 
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legislation are preserved by the congressional-executive agreement 
provides yet another security for popular sovereignty. 
In addition, the reasons that existed in the eighteenth century for 
excluding the House from the making of international agreements no 
longer seem as compelling as they once were. In deciding to commit 
treaties to the President and Senate, the Framers believed that the 
House was too numerous and unstable to participate in the secrecy re­
quired for diplomacy. Hamilton's comment in Federalist No. 75 was 
typical Federalist thinking: "The fluctuating, and taking its future in­
crease into the account, the multitudinous composition of that body, 
forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential to the 
proper execution of such a trust."364 Today, however, the Senate has 
about fifty percent more members than the first House of Representa­
tives envisioned by the Constitution, suggesting that the Senate no 
longer has the small numbers that the Framers believed necessary for 
successful diplomacy.365 Incumbency retention rates in the House, 
which regularly reach ninety percent, also suggest that the House may 
enjoy more stability, particularly in its committees and leadership, 
than the Framers might have anticipated.366 Aside from the treaty pro­
cess, the House today can play an equal role to the Senate in foreign 
policy, with committees on international relations, national security, 
and intelligence that routinely handle sensitive information. 
Furthermore, the Senate never assumed the active role in foreign 
policy that some Framers may have anticipated. President Washing­
ton's attempt in the first year of the Republic to consult with the sit­
ting Senate on a potential treaty proved unsuccessful; the Senate 
proved too numerous and unwieldy to provide much help with diplo­
matic negotiations.367 Rather than before-the-fact advice, the Senate's 
formal role in treatymaking has become one of after-the-fact consent, 
a function that does not especially demand small numbers. The Presi­
dent and the executive branch are responsible for setting foreign pol­
icy goals and maintaining confidentiality during the conduct of nego­
tiations. Even if the Senate possessed some superiority in diplomacy 
over the House, the nature of the multilateral, regulatory treaties that 
make the most legislative demands do not require secrecy or speed of 
action. It is those treaties that have the least domestic regulatory ef­
fect, such as arms control or military alliance agreements, which de­
mand the most secrecy. Requiring that international agreements with 
the most domestic regulatory effect undergo approval by statute 
364. THE FEDERALIST No. 75, supra note 326, at 483. 
365. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (indicating that the first House of Representatives 
was to have 65 members). 
366. See NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN ET AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1997-1998, at 
47-49, 64-65 (1998). 
367. The episode is described in ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 66, at 55-58. 
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would have little impact on the nation's ability to negotiate these types 
of compacts. 
Mandating that treaties serve as the exclusive method for making 
international agreements, on the other hand, would generate tension 
in the public lawmaking process. Just as complete interchangeability 
creates textual and structural difficulties by importing certain doc­
trines that applied only to statutes into the foreign policy making pro­
cess, so too does treaty exclusivity disrupt the finely tuned statutory 
methods for regulating domestic affairs. Allowing treaties to exercise 
legislative power would shift the locus of lawmaking from the legisla­
ture to the executive branch. Laws begin in Congress, where they are 
introduced by Members and referred to committees that hold hearings 
to investigate the issue, markup any legislation, and serve a gatekeep­
ing function in controlling the flow of legislation to the floor. After re­
ceiving approval by the committees, statutes must receive the approval 
of both houses of Congress; differences in the bills must be worked out 
by a conference between the House and Senate. If the President ve­
toes the bill, both houses can still enact the legislation by two-thirds 
vote. Courts enforce the statute in keeping with the intentions of Con­
gress, whether expressed in the statutory text or the legislative history. 
Although the President surely has a significant political role in the ini­
tiation and enactment of legislation, the institutional weight behind 
domestic policymaking gives Congress at least an equal, if not domi­
nant, role in the passage of statutes. 
Using treaties to perform the same function as statutes has two ef­
fects on the public lawmaking process. First, although the Constitution 
provides for a Senate "advice and consent" function, this role has be­
come one of after-the-fact consent. The President, not the Senate, de­
cides whether to negotiate with other countries and on what subjects. 
It is the executive branch, rather than the House or Senate, which 
conducts the negotiations and actually concludes the treaty. Indeed, 
the Constitution forbids Congress from sending its own representa­
tives in foreign negotiations because of the President's plenary power 
to appoint and receive ambassadors.368 Further, the Court has read the 
Constitution to vest the President with the plenary power to serve as 
the "sole organ" of the nation in its foreign relations.369 As I argue 
elsewhere, the President takes the primary role in enforcing treaties, 
and it is often his understanding, as expressed to the Senate during the 
advice and consent process, that counts in future interpretation of the 
368. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "by and with the Advice and Con­
sent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors"); id. art. II, § 3 (President "shall receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers"). 
369. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
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treaty.370 The executive's dominance of the treaty process makes sense 
because the President - rather than the Senate - is charged with the 
bulk of the foreign affairs power, the President controls the conduct of 
diplomacy, and the President serves as Commander-in-Chief. De­
mands for flexibility, speed, and unity of action in foreign affairs have 
almost inevitably led to the flow of power to the executive. 
Second, requiring that treaties enjoy legislative power threatens to 
import these pro-executive structures into the normal lawmaking pro­
cess. Executive branch officials usually negotiate treaties with little 
formal input from Congress. Presidents refer the negotiated agree­
ment to the Senate almost as a fait accompli, in which the Senate has 
little freedom to modify the substantive provisions.371 The under­
standings of the agreement that will govern will often be those of the 
President and his or her advisers, not those of the congressional com­
mittees or individual Senators. Because the process that applies will be 
that of the Treaty Clause, the President will come to exercise broader 
powers over the domestic lawmaking process than would normally be 
the case. Termination of treaties draws these problems into sharp re­
lief. Statutes require a repealing statute to terminate their provisions. 
As discussed earlier, however, most authorities conclude that treaties 
may be terminated by unilateral presidential action.372 This conclusion 
creates an inconsistency in the constitutional structure. If the political 
branches choose to regulate domestic conduct by statute, the Presi­
dent cannot terminate the rules without Congress's permission. If, 
however, the political branches should regulate the same conduct by 
treaty, the President can terminate the regulation at will. Treaty exclu­
sivity, therefore, has the effect of expanding the President's powers as 
more and more aspects of domestic life can be regulated by interna­
tional agreement, rather than by statute. A doctrine whereby congres­
sional-executive agreements are needed to enter into agreements that 
have domestic legislative effects preserves the balance of powers 
among the branches. 
370. See John C. Yoo, Review Essay, Politics as Usual?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile 
Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation, 89 CAL. L. REV. 851 (forthcom­
ing 2001). Presidential dominance in treaty enforcement and interpretation was heavily con­
tested during the controversy over whether the ABM treaty permitted "Star Wars" research. 
See, e.g., Joseph R. Biden, Jr. & John B. Ritch III, The Treaty Power: Upholding a Constitu­
tional Partnership, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1529 (1989); Lawrence J. Block et al., The Senate's 
Pie-in-the-Sky Treaty Interpretation: Power and the Quest for Legislative Supremacy, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1481 (1989); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Commentary, Testing 
and Development of "Exotic" Systems Under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation 
Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956 (1986); Abraham D. Sofaer, Commentary, The ABM Treaty 
and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986). 
371.  Under fast track legislation, Congress cannot even modify or amend congressional­
executive agreements involving trade. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Fast Track and United 
States Trade Policy, 18 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 143 (1992). 
372. See supra note 228. 
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Congressional-executive agreements represent the political 
branches' best effort to preserve a distinction between treatymaking 
and lawmaking. Section II demonstrated the textual and structural dif­
ficulties that arise from a doctrine of complete interchangeability, in 
which statutes could utterly replace treaties. This Part has shown the 
similar constitutional problems created by the alternative theory of 
treaty exclusivity. In conjunction with the theory of self-execution and 
the growing internationalization of domestic affairs, treaty exclusivity 
provokes an irreconcilable conflict between the grant of the treaty 
power to the executive branch, anci the vesting of all federal legislative 
power in Congress. Congressional-executive agreements provide a 
way to resolve this tension by allowing Congress to retain authority 
over those matters delegated to it by the Constitution, even when an 
international agreement threatens to intrude upon its plenary powers. 
Unlike the internationalist or transformationist theories, however, this 
approach still reserves a meaningful role for treaties in the conduct of 
foreign policy. If congressional-executive agreements are needed to 
make international agreements in areas of Congress's Article I, Sec­
tion 8 powers, the political branches still must use treaties to enter into 
agreements that either lie outside of those limits or that involve areas 
where the executive and legislature possess competing powers. 
C. Statutes, Treaties, and the Future of International Agreements 
Conceiving of congressional-executive agreements as occupying 
the sphere of international agreements that involve Congress's Article 
I .powers has several implications for foreign affairs law and the mak­
ing of international agreements. It predicts what types of future inter­
national agreements will undergo the statutory or treaty processes. It 
indicates how the political branches may address several of the diffi­
culties that will arise with future international agreements. It also pro­
vides an understanding of the changing choice of instruments over 
time. Two developments make the choice of statute versus treaty sig­
nificant. As domestic affairs become internationalized, international 
agreements will come to play a more important role in domestic regu­
lation. At the same time, the Supreme Court's effort to protect state 
sovereignty and impose new checks on congressional power removes 
more areas from the reach of the legislature. This phenomenon may 
place pressure on the political branches to turn to treaties to engage in 
the regulation of non-commercial activities or individual rights. Be­
cause of these trends, whether the political branches adopt an interna­
tional agreement by treaty or by statute will bear important conse­
quences for the scope of federal jurisdiction and the substance of 
national regulation. 
Before turning to these issues, it is worth addressing questions 
about the status of congressional-executive agreements under interna-
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tional law. Treaties as defined by the Article II, Section 2 and Article 
VI of the Constitution constitute treaties for purposes of international 
law. One might ask whether congressional-executive agreements, in 
which Congress merely enacts an international agreement as a statute, 
can rise to the same level of international obligation as a treaty, which 
represents the assent of both the President and a supermajority of the 
Senate. International law, however, as represented by the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties and customary international law, 
defines an international agreement as "an agreement between two or 
more states or international organizations that is intended to be legally 
binding and is governed by international law."373 From this broad defi­
nition, it is apparent that international law is willing to consider trea­
ties, congressional-executive agreements, and even sole executive 
agreements all as species of international agreements that are equally 
binding on the United States. Even though congressional-executive 
agreements have not undergone the same domestic process as a treaty, 
there is an agreement - the President negotiates and signs a docu­
ment - and it becomes domestically binding once it receives approval 
from Congress. 
While they may appear identical under international law, the dif­
ference between statutes and treaties makes a significant difference 
for domestic purposes. The constitutional differences between the two 
will dictate what form the political branches must use to enter into cer­
tain types of international agreements. Future trade agreements, such 
as the accession of the People's Republic of China to the WTO, new 
WTO rounds, or expansion of American free trade areas will continue 
to undergo the statutory process because they involve Congress's 
powers over foreign commerce. Agreements that rest outside Con­
gress's plenary powers, such as human rights, political-military, and 
arms control, will still require use of the Treaty Clause. Some areas, 
such as the environment, may lie somewhere in between. Although 
much domestic environmental legislation presumably passes constitu­
tional muster under the Commerce Clause, the non-commercial na­
ture of proposed international environmental agreements and the Su­
preme Court's new restrictions upon the Commerce Clause may 
require use of the treaty form. As the scope of the Commerce Clause 
recedes and efforts to harmonize domestic regulation with interna­
tional standards increase, the Treaty Clause may present a more reli­
able source for legislative power. 
373. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 7, at § 301(1); see also Vienna Convention on 
the Jaw of treaties, May 23, 1969, arts. 1-2, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333. The treaty entered into 
force on January 27, 1980. Although the United States has not ratified the Vienna Conven­
tion on the Law of Treaties, the executive branch has decided to follow many of its substan­
tive provisions as a matter of practice. 
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Recent decisions on the scope of state sovereignty show how the 
distinction between congressional-executive agreements and treaties 
might play out. Under the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),374 which itself is part of the 
WTO agreement, state parties agreed to establish minimum substan­
tive protections for intellectual property and to provide for judicial 
remedies, including compensatory relief, against infringers.375 Under 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida,376 however, Congress may not provide a 
remedy in federal court for damages against a State, and under Alden 
v. Maine,377 the same is true in state court. Even when Congress has 
used its Section 5 powers under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather 
than its Commerce Clause power under Article I, the Court has in­
validated comprehensive efforts to protect intellectual property rights 
without a showing of systematic state violations of that right.378 These 
decisions appear to place the United States in violation of TRIPs by 
eliminating judicial remedies for violations of intellectual property 
rights against a class of potential infringers.379 
TRIPs could have provided a different source of power upon 
which to base new federal legislation against the states to protect in­
tellectual property. Indeed, Professor Peter Menell, among others, has 
suggested using the treaty power to restore protections for federal in­
tellectual property rights against the states.380 But the difference be­
tween treaties and congressional-executive agreements may raise an 
insurmountable stumbling block. Because the political branches chose 
to enter into the WTO agreement as a congressional-executive agree­
ment, TRIPs cannot enjoy the broader constitutional scope that ap­
plies to treaties. If the President and Senate had approved TRIPs as a 
treaty, they could have accessed the broader powers of Missouri v. 
Holland to impose obligations free from the "invisible radiations" of 
the Tenth Amendment. Since the Court has repeatedly made clear 
that state sovereign immunity applies only to statutes that draw upon 
Congress's Article I authority, TRIPs could have escaped Seminole 
Tribe and Alden because its power would have emanated from Article 
II's Treaty Clause. Efforts to establish judicial remedies for intellec­
tual property by treaty also would not fall subject to the Court's in-
374. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 270. 
375. Id. arts. 41, 44-45. 
376. 517 u .s. 44 (1996). 
377. 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
378. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 
666 (1999). 
379. See Peter S. Menell, Economic Implications of State Sovereign Immunity From In­
fringement of Federal Intellectual Property Rights, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1452-53 
(2000). 
380. See id. at 1460-64. 
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creasingly difficult test for remedial statutes enacted under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. But because Congress cannot escape 
these decisions when acting by statute, use of the congressional­
executive agreement has the consequence of restricting the national 
government's ability to implement international obligations on intel­
lectual property. 
Even this use of the treaty power to overcome the Court's recent 
federalism decisions may not be utterly free from doubt. Professor 
Curtis Bradley, for example, has argued recently that the treatymak­
ers' power to create federal law ought to be subject to the same feder­
alism limits that apply to Congress.381 As a formal matter, this argu­
ment may not be compelling because federalism limitations may not 
apply in the same manner to Articles I and II. As a matter of the 
original understanding, this argument does not seem to stand on firm 
ground: both the Treaty of Peace of 1783 and the Jay Treaty of 1795, 
both entered into by the framing generation, regulated issues such as 
access to state courts and the right to hold and dispose of property -
issues that would not have been within Congress's enumerated powers 
as they were understood at the time. Nonetheless, Bradley's claim has 
a certain structural appeal, because it harmonizes treaties within the 
existing constitutional model of limited and enumerated powers and 
the Court's recent federalism jurisprudence in the state sovereignty 
area. 
Another potential limit on the treaty power might arise from the 
Eleventh Amendment itself. If one believes the standard story con­
cerning the Eleventh Amendment, it was enacted in response to the 
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,382 which had allowed a citizen 
of the state of South Carolina to sue for damages against the state of 
Georgia.383 In itself, this rule does not explain the nation's over­
whelming rejection of the decision. Rather, the outcry in Congress and 
among the public was so great because of the issue of the pre­
revolutionary debts owed to British creditors.384 Under the Peace 
Treaty of 1783, the United States had agreed that "no lawful impedi­
ments" would stand in the way of British creditors seeking to recover 
from American debtors.385 Nonetheless, many states refused to allow 
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their courts to hear such claims. Some states had assumed the debts of 
the individual debtors; many expected that sovereign immunity would 
prevent the federal courts from adjudicating creditor suits against 
these states. Chisholm generated a national controversy because it 
raised the specter that British creditors, freed from state sovereign 
immunity, would be able to sue states directly under a treaty-granted 
cause of action.386 If this historical understanding guides interpretation 
of the Eleventh Amendment, then state sovereignty immunity may 
prove to have an equal effect upon treaties as it does upon statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has sought to provide a constitutional justification for 
the congressional-executive agreement. It criticizes reliance upon du­
bious historical claims of a non-amendment constitutional amendment 
or of a long-running pedigree of interchangeability. Rather, congres­
sional-executive agreements find support in Congress's plenary Article 
I, Section 8 powers to regulate interstate and international commerce, 
among other powers. Unlike claims of interchangeability, this Article's 
approach explains that there are continuing spheres of action for both 
treaties and statutes in enacting international agreements. Treaties are 
still a constitutionally required form when an international agreement 
calls for actions that lie outside of Congress's constitutional powers. 
Unlike claims of treaty exclusivity, however, this approach leaves am­
ple room to the political branches to use congressional-executive 
agreements in areas of congressional competence. 
Maintaining this line between congressional-executive agreements 
and treaties achieves two larger goals. First, it maintains a distinction 
between the executive and legislative powers, which allows Congress 
to check executive branch foreign policy that has dfrect domestic ef­
fects. Second, this line comports closely with the practice of the politi­
cal branches since the end of World War II. If the nation is to enjoy 
the benefits of a choice of instruments to pursue its foreign policy 
goals, it needs a constitutional theory to explain the co-existence of 
both treaties and congressional-executive agreements. This Article has 
supplied a possible theory. 
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